


THE FIGHT FOR ZIMBABWE

*The armed Conflict in
Southern Rhodesia since UDI*

KEES MAXEY



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KEES MAXEY

Rex Collings • London • 1975

Contents

First published in book form in Great Britain by
Rex Collings Ltd 6 Paddington Street London W1

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SBN 901720 81 X

Printed in Great Britain
at the University Printing House, Cambridge
(Euan Phillips, University Printer)

1 The Nationalists and Armed Confrontation	5
2 The Nationalist Parties in Exile	14
3 The International Relations of the Nationalists	25
4 The Rhodesian Security Forces	30
The Army	31
The Air-Force	38
The British South Africa Police	39
The South African Reinforcements	41
White Co-operation in Southern Africa	42
The Tactics of the Security Forces	44
The Political Offensive	46
The Regime's Undercover Service Abroad	47
5 The Armed Struggle	54
Before UDI	54
From UDI to mid-1967	54
The Wankie Battles: July to September 1967	64
The Zambezi Escarpment Battles: December 1967 to April 1968	72
The Kariba Battles: July to August 1968	84
1969, a Quiet Year	88
The Victoria Falls Attack: January to April 1970	91
Other Action in 1970	95
1971: The ZANU Underground	98
1972: The Pearce Commission	100
6 The Conflict Escalates	114
December 1972	114
ZANU's Strategy	115
The Closure of the Border	120
The Regime's Political and Administrative Offensive	126

The Use of Terror	134
The Conflict Continues	141
The Response of Europeans and Africans	157
7 The Future	168
APPENDIX 1 Words from the Dock	176
APPENDIX 2 The Geographical and Demographical Background	191

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to the men and women who have died, been imprisoned, or exiled because they have fought for the freedom of their homeland.

Preface

The first edition of this study was a duplicated pamphlet produced at the beginning of 1973. The impetus for the work came from a series of articles written for Anti-Apartheid News. I began to realize that there was no reliable detailed study of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The view propounded by the Rhodesian propaganda machine was, at that time, generally accepted as valid. This was that the Zimbabwe nationalist movements were totally ineffective, and the Rhodesian Africans, while not wildly enthusiastic about white rule, apathetically accepted it. This study is an attempt to put together the pieces of a jig-saw puzzle in which about three-quarters of the pieces are missing. I have attempted to make sense of the available pieces, but I am conscious that there must be gaps, errors and incorrect deductions. Since the study was started, we have heard the African people roar 'No' to the Proposals for a Settlement. We have also seen a major guerrilla front opened in the north-east of Rhodesia and (at the time of writing) maintained for two years. Finally, we have seen the Rhodesian regime free the nationalist leaders because of the armed struggle.

Another reason why I undertook this study was a comment by one of the founders of the nationalist movement in Guinea Bissau, Amilcar Cabral. He suggested that one way in which socialists in the west can help is by analysing the situation in the countries of Africa still under colonial or white settler rule. His own writings have much to say to Europeans in Europe, and I hope my work may clarify issues a little in the way he would have wanted. In

particular, his insistence that one should 'Tell no lies—Claim no easy victories', even if it seems to hurt, has been much in my mind. The tragic death of this great leader two years ago came as a bitter blow to all who pray for the real liberation of Africa and of mankind.

No study, such as this, could be done without the assistance of many people. I have had discussions with a great number of Zimbabweans, both African and European. I cannot mention their names for obvious reasons. Without this help, and these discussions, I would not have been able to relate many of the pieces of the jig-saw. I must especially mention Tony Wilkinson and Tim Matthews. I have received information from a variety of sources, including the Rhodesian Ministry of Information! Mrs. Eileen Haddon very kindly allowed me to see her cuttings from the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *Bulawayo Chronicle* for 1966, 1967 and part of 1968. I have acknowledged all the sources that I am able to, and cross-checked many of the others. However, I take full responsibility for the conclusions drawn from the many press cuttings I have used, for the views expressed, and the mode of expression.

I must thank the typists who have, at various stages, been involved in the production of this book. Helen Sparrow and Jo Wadsworth typed some of the earlier drafts. Agnes Williams also typed some of the earlier drafts and the whole of the final text of the first edition. Helene McLeod typed the extensive redraft for this edition.

Finally, Sheila, my wife, has been associated with it from the beginning. Not only has she kept me at it when I felt like giving it up, but she has read and re-read every script—and at a stage when I could scarcely negotiate the crossings out, the bad writing, and the confused English myself. Without this moral and practical backing, I doubt whether I would have finished the project.

Introduction

War is an extreme form of political conflict. Guerrilla warfare is an internal political battle fought on a violent front because the peaceful avenues present in a democratic society, have been closed. The political motivation must be kept alive during the fighting if the guerrillas are to achieve their aims, and not simply degenerate into a band of armed brigands.

The political background to the Rhodesian conflict has been described at great length in many places. Until recently, there has been undue concentration on the European constitutional manoeuvrings, but a number of studies have now been made of the political attitudes of the African majority. In the Fabian research pamphlet, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, I tried to deal with the political, psychological and international nature of the conflict between the Europeans and Africans since UDI. The Adelphi Paper by A. R. Williams *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment* has put the conflict in Rhodesia into its regional and historical setting. In this book, I am concentrating on the military aspects, and do not attempt another political analysis.

One of the major weapons that the regime has, is the control of the news media. It wishes to make it appear that all is quiet or under control. The reports of armed clashes are usually very brief, with the absolute minimum of detail. Trial reports are similarly dealt with. Here is the preliminary to a trial report in the *Rhodesia Herald* (30.9.71).

'Mr Horn, for the prosecution, applied for and was

granted the following orders under Section 403A of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

'The name, address or any other information likely to reveal the identity of any person concerned or mentioned in the proceeding, should not be published.

'No name of any political party or organization mentioned, should be published.

'No place, country or town mentioned in the proceedings, should be named.

'The evidence as to how recruits were to go for training and what steps they were to take to achieve this should not be published.

'Except for the Press and officials of the Court and other people whose presence was necessary, the proceedings should be held in camera.'

(Usually the report only briefly refers to the prohibition on detailed reporting). Only European reporters are allowed to these trials, so that there is no 'leakage' of information by word of mouth to the African population. Despite this control, a lot of interesting information is released in a piecemeal way. The real significance of it can only be seen by careful collation.

What follows is an attempted reconstruction of the war so far in Rhodesia. It is based primarily on white Rhodesian sources. The white Rhodesian press has usually underestimated the effectiveness of the nationalists, but until recently, little has been published by the nationalists themselves about the military side of the conflict, and the white press at least gives a minimum picture of the nationalist activities.

1 The Nationalists and Armed Confrontation

The political development of the nationalist parties since the African National Congress was reformed in 1956, has been described in a number of books and pamphlets. (See, for example, *Crisis in Rhodesia* by Nathan Shamuyarira). They began with constitutional objectives and worked within the constitutional set-up. However, their basic aim, 'One Man, One Vote', was so completely unacceptable to the white electorate that constitutional methods gave few results. Their members, and some of their leaders, increasingly began to look to extra-constitutional methods. It is probable that most of the violence at this stage was spontaneous, or locally based, but Chikerema claims that men were sent out of the country for training as early as 1960, although Chenu puts the date a little later. One of the reasons for the split between ZAPU and ZANU was ZANU's conviction that physical attacks on the whites and their property were necessary. ZANU must have started its training schemes shortly after its formation in 1963. In 1964, Chikerema went to a number of socialist countries on behalf of ZAPU to negotiate for increases in training facilities for ZAPU, and others made similar trips.

Immediately after UDI, the nationalist leaders seemed to have thought of guerrilla activity as a means of provoking a British intervention. For example, Chimutengwende describes how immediately after UDI he explained to villagers that the British Government had said that it would intervene militarily only if 'law and order' broke down in Rhodesia.² However, the very rigid control and formal censorship of the mass media stopped the rapid spread of

mass opposition, and the appearance of calm was maintained. When the regime did get into such serious trouble that it had to have external help, it was able to choose South Africa.

Until the Tiger talks in 1966 (and for some time after) ZAPU called for a British military take-over. After the British attempts to negotiate, the nationalists realized that there was no prospect of British forces landing in Rhodesia, and so they adjusted their public stance (and presumably their military strategy) accordingly. The proposals discussed on Tiger and Fearless were so unacceptable in the eyes of ZAPU and ZANU, that a Rhodesia controlled by the British Government now seemed to them very undesirable.

Guerrillas have been recruited from inside Rhodesia, (particularly before the banning of the parties) from the large immigrant community in Zambia, from other African countries (such as Botswana and Tanzania) and probably from countries such as the UK. According to one guerrilla, 'ZANU agents began recruiting intensively for guerrilla training' at the end of 1964. He went to a camp in Ghana for a nine months course — which was reduced to six months because of the threat of UDI.² Recruits are still being actively sought by the nationalists in Rhodesia.³ As a defence in their trials, some guerrillas have claimed that they were offered an academic course in Russia or Cuba — but this turned out to be guerrilla training instead. Quite possibly some men do misunderstand what is being offered. On the other hand, it is a convenient defence in a court of law (but one which does not very often convince the judge). Some take the decision to join the nationalists without prompting. The tens of thousands of school children, with several 'O' levels, who leave school each year and are unable to get a job, are producing many new recruits who make their way to Zambia. These young men are probably the best recruits the nationalists could have — although the regime is suspected of trying to

infiltrate their own agents into ZANU and ZAPU.⁴ Considerable pressure has been put on Zimbabweans in exile to join the guerrillas. One way of avoiding deportation back to Rhodesia (if the British Government will not give a refugee African an entry voucher to the UK) is to apply for acceptance under the guerrilla training programmes of one of the parties. One party official argued that just as the whites in Rhodesia had to do national service, so ought Africans to join their armed forces. Towards the end of 1968, both ZAPU and ZANU were accused of kidnapping people in Zambia and taking them to guerrilla training camps in Tanzania. There is some evidence to show that ZANU, on one or two occasions, abducted Zambian nationals by mistake. The Zambian Government reacted very strongly to these actions, charging some and expelling other officials of both parties.⁵ Since the recent offensive started in December 1972, ZANU have also been recruiting men from the villages in the north-east to join the guerrillas who are active there. (A large number of the villagers have acted as porters as well as supplying the guerrillas with food, shelter and information.) Men have also been recruited from Salisbury. In a trial in August 1974, it was disclosed that some members of the Harari branch of the ANC were 'arranging soldiers'. Anyone who volunteered was taken by bus to Mount Darwin. Presumably the volunteers would be taken by the guerrillas across the border to their base camps in Mozambique.⁶ From other reports, their basic training seems to take only one or two months. Judging from the earlier trial reports, the morale of most of the fighters is very high. Some crack under the strain of action and/or the interrogations and court trial.

It has been suggested that over ninety per cent of the fighting men in ZAPU are Ndebele (although they only comprise ten to twenty per cent of the Rhodesian population).⁷ Members of the ZAPU military command deny this. It is difficult to come to any conclusion from the

trial reports because names are so rarely given. However, recruitment appears to be evenly spread over the country. There is evidence of a number of guerrillas who have been supported by tribesmen in all parts of Rhodesia. Finally, Bowyer Bell, using figures he obtained from the regime, states that deceased 'terrorists' came from all the Rhodesian tribal groups, with a predominance of Ndebele. He further states that 'ZAPU's claim to be a-tribal has some substance in that its leadership and its battle groups are mixed'.⁸

A great deal of the training in the last five or so years has taken place in Tanzania, with further training (mainly of a more political kind) in holding camps in Zambia. Short training courses for young men (some still at school) who come out of Rhodesia and then return immediately, have also been held in Zambia by ZANU. Much basic military training, particularly in the early stages, has been done further afield. ZAPU men have been mainly trained in Russia, Cuba and Algeria, with some others in Bulgaria, North Korea and Zaire (Katanga province). ZANU men have been trained in China, Cuba, Ghana (until the fall of Nkrumah in 1966) and Egypt.

There are a number of accounts of training received outside Rhodesia. The most complete account available was given to the *Guardian* by a man trained for ZANU in China. He described how he was flown to China at the end of 1963. They were taken to a camp near to Shanghai, and there they trained for about one year. The course included shooting practice, sabotage and training in making and avoiding ambushes. They spent time discussing how to approach and politicize the peasants. The Chinese tutors showed a very detailed knowledge of Rhodesia (despite never having been there), but their basic point was that the trainee guerrillas had to be self-reliant. When it was suggested that the Rhodesian terrain was inadequate for guerrilla warfare, the tutor retorted 'If your country is flat and you haven't enough brains to defeat that, then you'd

better forget your revolution. You are not worth it.' The greatest fear was of air attacks. Apparently 'the thought of bombing always terrified everybody. We dug trenches and practised shooting down aeroplanes.' Later on in the training, different members were trained in different aspects. Some were trained as radio operators, others as first-aid assistants, others were taught how to make bombs etc. Finally they were given a several months' course in intelligence training—how to question people so as to get information for their own use.⁹

Other ZANU men were trained in Ghana by Chinese instructors. For example, from 1964 to 1965, Chimutengwende trained in a camp near to Kumasi with thirty-six others from Rhodesia. The conditions were primitive (but realistic for a guerrilla). They worked or trained from 8.0 a.m. till noon and 2.0 p.m. till 4.0 p.m. five days a week, and the rest of the time they had free. They were taught about sabotage: the use of dynamite and hand grenades, and how to make their own bombs. They did not spend a lot of time on weapons instruction because it was thought they would not be involved in 'positional warfare'. They were taught 'the principles of war and guerrilla tactics according to Mao Tse-Tung' and given lectures based on the Chinese People's Army, and its fight with the Japanese. The tutors had an amazingly good grasp of the geography of Rhodesia.¹⁰ One interesting difference between those trained in Ghana and in China itself was that the tutors in Ghana refused to talk about politics—while those in China did. In fact, trainees sent to China were specifically warned before-hand against the dangers of Communist propaganda.¹¹

A brief description of training in Russia was given by a ZAPU guerrilla in a trial in Rhodesia in 1968. He described how he had been sent, with eleven others, to Russia. Their training took place about twenty miles from Moscow. The classes, over a period of about four months, included a wide

variety of political and practical topics. They were given political science talks by a Russian (in English) which, according to the witness, were aimed at 'communist indoctrination'. They were given a thorough groundwork in many aspects of intelligence work. They were taught various photographic techniques, such as document copying and photography of important installations, as well as the use of photography for blackmail purposes. They were taught the rudiments of surveying as well as how to open letters and reseal them so that the recipient does not realize it. They were taught the use of codes and cyphers for sending information back, and they were given a run-down on the work of the CIA, MI6 and MI5, and the French and Federal German intelligence organizations. On the military side, they were taught the use of explosives for demolition, and the use of hand-grenades. They learnt how to use, strip and reassemble sub-machine guns, rifles and pistols.¹²

These trained personnel have been used in a variety of ways. Some have been sent in individually, entering by legitimate means from Malawi, Zambia and Botswana. Fairly large groups (with the individual members crossing separately) were sent over in 1965 and 1966. Some of them were to form the nucleus of guerrilla groups both in the towns and in the country areas. Others were told to wait for instructions, which would come by wireless or letter. Most of these men appear to have been caught very rapidly.

Other trained men have entered in what Chenu categorizes 'commando groups'. He makes an important distinction between 'commandos' and 'guerrillas'. Commandos are armed personnel who operate essentially from across a border, and who act almost completely independently of the local population. At the other end of the spectrum are the armed revolutionary guerrillas who are still part of the people. During the day, they are normal villagers or townsfolk, but at night, they are part of a small army. The French and Dutch resistance during the war

exemplifies this kind of guerrilla. Somewhere in between there are full-time guerrilla bands who are permanently based in the country, but who have a great deal of contact with the people. They are supported with food and information by the people. The nationalists in the Portuguese territories use these kind of guerrillas. A commando group aims to become a guerrilla group of this second kind.¹³ It is often very difficult in practice for an outsider to know what kind of group he is dealing with (as will become evident below).

The armed wings of the two parties are called, for ZAPU, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) and for ZANU, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). In this book, the guerrilla wings are usually referred to by the name of their parent party.

The Zimbabwe nationalists have attempted several approaches. As mentioned above, they have sent in individuals by legal and illegal means. They have sent in small groups of three or four, and, on one occasion, a column of over 100 men. ZANU have sent in a number of groups with seven members, while ZAPU seem to have favoured (between 1967 and 1970) groups of twenty. They have also sent in mixed ZAPU/ANC groups during the period of their military alliance with the South African ANC (1967 to 1969). The ZAPU/ANC groups had a fairly formal structure with a commander and a political commissar. From 1966 to 1968, they were even dressed in semi-military (and very recognizable) uniforms. Before 1973 ZAPU had sent in altogether far more men than ZANU, presumably because they had more to send.

The changing pattern of both ZAPU and ZANU strategy will be analysed in detail in the description (below) of the armed confrontations of the last eight years. In outline, they began by attempting to sabotage European property. After UDI, they tried to provoke an uprising by incitement from Zambia by radio coinciding with guerrilla attacks.

British involvement was the aim at this stage. The regime's control of the mass media and success against guerrillas, coupled with the British Government's attempted sell-out on Tiger and Fearless, finally convinced the nationalists that this tactic would not succeed. A major military campaign (probably modelled on the campaign in Cuba) was launched in 1967 and 1968, without appreciable success. Further serious clashes in 1970 were only partially successful for the nationalists (ZAPU).

The fighting which is taking place now in the north-east of Rhodesia reflects both a change of tactics and a change of conditions. These will be dealt with in greater detail later, but essentially the ZANU guerrillas were in the country and mixed with the people for some months before they attacked the regime's forces. They were able to do this because the Tete Province of Mozambique had been opened up to them by Frelimo and the African people had committed themselves to political opposition to the Smith regime by their response to the Pearce Commission. ZAPU is spreading further to the west along the Zambia border. It is mainly using the 'hit and run' tactic. Both groups, (but particularly ZAPU) make extensive use of land mines.

The long term objective of the fighting must be to gain political control of the country. The Smith regime has the military power at the moment. It must be able to show its black citizens that it can isolate and destroy the African nationalist guerrillas. It must be able to protect its white supporters from attacks by the guerrillas. At the same time, in a country where most Europeans do not have their roots, it must protect the things that these people come to and stay in the country for. If it cannot do these things, then it will be unable to stop the majority African population from supporting the guerrillas at least passively, and often actively. At the same time it will lose the confidence of the European population who have to maintain the security of the country. The Europeans will begin to wonder whether

they have a future in the country. When this happens, it will not be long before the nationalists win control.

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2 The Nationalist Parties in Exile

Since their banning and particularly since the beginning of the armed struggle, ZAPU and ZANU have had to operate from outside Rhodesia. Their main headquarters have been in Lusaka, with camps elsewhere in Zambia. ZAPU seems to have had more armed guerrillas and commandos than ZANU.

Until 1972, relations between the two parties were practically non-existent. Despite their oft-stated conviction that a united attack was needed in Rhodesia, they interpreted the implications differently. ZAPU maintained that ZANU was a minor breakaway with no real existence or support. Its members were encouraged individually to join the real party—ZAPU. ZANU on the other hand called for talks between equals with a view to forming a united front or a united party. The relationship was typical of that between a large and small party. ZAPU refused to appear on the same platform as ZANU and was closely associated with the South African ANC. Only recently, since the split in ZAPU, has this pattern changed.

The OAU Liberation Committee spent years of effort in trying, unsuccessfully, to get the two parties to join or form a united front. (Their attempts have been charted in some detail by E. M. Dube.)¹ The deep personal bitterness of the original split continued because the regime has kept the two detained leaders apart so that reconciliation could not grow.

ZAPU suffered severe military defeats in 1967 and 1968. The Smith regime rubbed these in with its propaganda attacks, and so increased distrust among the ZAPU

guerrillas in Zambia, and lowered morale. Furthermore, all communication between Joshua Nkomo and Lusaka stopped in 1967, due to the very rigid security arrangements in Gonakudzingwa, where Nkomo and his two main lieutenants were kept in a separate camp. The effects began to make themselves felt in April 1969, and by the end of the year the standard of discipline in the camps had dropped to a low level. Accusations were made that the camp commandants spent their time in Lusaka instead of the camps, used the guerrillas to build their houses, slept with girls etc. Dissension arose between Chikerema (Acting President) and Nyandoro (Secretary-General) (both Shona) on one side and Moyo (Treasurer), Silundika (Publicity), and Ndlovu (Assistant Secretary) (all Kalanga, Sindebele speaking) on the other side. The Sindebele group appear to have been supported by the Lusaka branch of ZAPU.²

In October 1969 Chikerema gave permission to a World in Action reporter and film unit to interview a guerrilla group on the banks of the Zambezi. This caused great offence to the part of the ZAPU leadership who did not know about the programme until it was shown in the UK in January 1970. It also embarrassed the Zambian Government. (Chikerema said about this incident: 'The Zambian Government has rightly taken exception to my authorizing the taking of the film in question without consulting them and without their knowledge. I have apologized to the President of Zambia.'³ J. Z. Moyo decided to bring matters to a head in February by issuing his 'Observations on our Struggle'.⁴ In this he analysed the situation in the camps and made a number of recommendations. He was particularly concerned with the indiscipline, and wanted a much clearer command structure, greater discipline, and regular meetings of the various committees to deal with administration training, recruitment, intelligence and 'the strategy of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe'. Finally he drafted a very optimistic

recruiting programme. Chikerema replied three weeks later with his 'Reply to Observations on our Struggle'.⁵ In this he justified his claim to be the residuum of power as a result of the decision by Joshua Nkomo at the People's Congress at Cold Comfort Farm in August 1963. He accused Moyo and his Sindebele associates of planning a coup against him. He ended by announcing that he had taken over complete control of all party functions including finance. Moyo and his associates (Ndlovu and Silundika) replied almost immediately denouncing this act by Chikerema, contesting his claims to be the sole fount of authority (which they said really rested in the National Executive) and disagreeing with his analysis of what happened at the Cold Comfort Farm Congress.⁶ In April an unsigned paper suggested that although Chikerema (as Acting President), did have ultimate control, he could only act with the Executive Committee. On this basis the trio conceded Chikerema's authority.⁷

However, there was still considerable tension, and George Nyandoro was given police protection for a time because he thought he was being hunted down by some Ndebele soldiers. On the other hand, some Shonas attacked Jason Moyo and George Silundika. On several occasions, the Zambian Government told ZAPU leaders to settle their differences. The local press were told by the Zambian Government not to report anything. However, a major fracas, resulting from a raid on Zimbabwe Freedom House by a body of Shonas on 20 April, could not be kept out of the press. Three Ndebele men were injured in this fight. According to other reports, six Shonas were injured, and four disappeared.⁸

President Kaunda called the five leaders together and told them to either work in harmony or be thrown out. After this, the two groups made a sincere effort to work together.⁹ The financial arrangements were accepted, and a number of men, whom Chikerema had told to go for

further training, agreed to do so. Many Ndebele as well as Shona members rallied behind Chikerema, and a large number of Shona members attended the funeral of an Ndebele soldier who had died of rabies.¹⁰

The truce was broken when Chikerema instituted talks in June and July with Nathan Shamuyarira (the External Relations Secretary of ZANU) who was backed by the ZANU National Chairman, Herbert Chitepo.¹¹ Nothing came of these talks until December 1970 when a curious report came from Salisbury which stated that Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole had agreed to stand down in favour of Robert Mugabe (the detained Secretary-General of ZANU) as leader of a new united party.¹² Silundika immediately denounced this move on behalf of his colleagues and Sithole later made it clear that he had not been involved in negotiations with Nkomo. He, nevertheless, reiterated his views that a new party 'to forge national unity is a must for Zimbabwe'.¹³ Chikerema maintained that he had direct contact with Nkomo, who supported his attempts to join with ZANU. Chikerema, therefore, continued his negotiations.¹⁴

At the meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee in February 1971, it was hoped that ZAPU and ZANU could be induced to link up again. Instead, the division between the two ZAPU factions was so wide that the OAU cut off financial aid until the split was resolved. Aid was restored in June even though the division had not been healed.¹⁵ When the leaders got back to Lusaka in March some of the men in the camps decided to take the law into their own hands and abducted twenty-one of the leaders (not including Chikerema). They also sent a letter to the OAU demanding an end to faction fighting. The Zambian police obtained the release of the abducted leaders. These feuds, fought out on its territory, were a severe embarrassment to the Zambian Government. They asked for assistance from the OAU to deal with the division.¹⁶ When this did not work

they gathered together all of the ZAPU guerrillas into a camp in the Central Province and tried to make them agree. They still could not get agreement so they arrested and detained over 150 of them in prisons in Zambia.¹⁷ At the end of July, they finally deported 129 men from ZAPU to Rhodesia. The Zambian Government claimed that the men deported were part of a South African/Rhodesian network set up in the early sixties to spy and to cause tribal and other trouble. If this was so, the screening was not done very carefully. One of those deported described a meeting addressed by one of the leading Zambian Ministers, Aaron Milner: 'He said he had been sent by the (Zambian) Government to address them. He told us that those not supporting "the leaders" should go to one side and a lot of us stood on that side.'¹⁸ According to the Rhodesian Commissioner of Police, Zambia had deported sixty Africans to Rhodesia in 1971. Four were then convicted of being involved in a guerrilla raid, and were sentenced to death, two were sentenced to eight years for possessing arms, twenty-two were sentenced to eight years for receiving military training, and thirty were sentenced to three to five months for minor offences. (Report of the Commissioner of the BSA Police for 1971.) According to press reports, a further two were sentenced to death.

The internal ZAPU factionalism may have been subdued by this action (though it still continued until the formation of Frolizi) but the split with ZANU remained. At the beginning of August 1971, after a delegate conference near to Lusaka, ZANU announced that it was discontinuing negotiations with ZAPU. The reason given for this move was that it was impossible to talk to an organization as grievously divided as ZAPU. However, this announcement also accompanied a ZANU reorganization of leadership. The members of the Central Committee (led by Nathan Shamuyarira) who supported the continuation of talks with ZAPU, were ousted at the conference. After the meeting the

ousted members publicly denounced the cutting off of talks. The Zambian reaction to the ZANU decision was one of acute disappointment and President Kaunda warned the parties that if they wanted to stay in Zambia they would have to unite.¹⁹

At the beginning of October 1971, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi) was formed. This claimed to be the desired united front. The chairman was Shelton Siwela, an ex-ZAPU guerrilla who had been on two guerrilla missions inside Rhodesia. The Secretary was Godfrey Savanhu, an ex-ZANU man. James Chikerema, Nathan Shamuyarira, and George Nyandoro were all on the Frolizi Council.²⁰

It was initially welcomed by the Zambian Government, but denounced by the rest of ZAPU and ZANU. It did not have the immediate support of the rank and file of these parties outside Rhodesia. The OAU was hesitant to give it official recognition—from its point of view there were now three parties instead of only two. It gained some initial support from within Rhodesia. Moto, for example, welcomed it as a move towards unity, and a number of chiefs wrote supporting it.²¹

Of far greater importance was the opposition of the African people of Rhodesia to the Proposals for a Settlement, which were announced at the end of November 1971. This opposition was spearheaded by the African National Council. (A full description of the formation of the ANC has been given in the pamphlet: *No Future Without Us* 1972). Of particular significance to the exile parties was the fact that while the top leadership (Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Canaan Banana) had no previously known political affiliations, a number of the executive were well known ex-detainees from ZAPU (e.g. Josiah Chinamano and Charlton Ngebetsha) and from ZANU (e.g. Edson Sithole and Michael Mawema). In the initial stages, the exile parties (and in particular, ZAPU and

Frolizi) suggested that they were behind the formation of the African National Council (ANC). There is absolutely no evidence that this was so. On the contrary, this united opposition to the Proposals inside Rhodesia acted as a spur to the parties outside.

A major step towards unity was made at the January 1972 meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee meeting in Benghazi, when ZAPU and ZANU made a 'declaration of intent to unite'²² Frolizi was to be asked to join this united front later, and the OAU stated its intentions to give money only to it. The declaration seemed to bear fruit two months later when a four day meeting, chaired by George Magombe of the OAU Liberation Committee at Mbeya in Tanzania, produced an agreement to form a joint military command. The joint command was to be 'responsible for planning and conducting the revolutionary war in all its aspects'.²³ This United Front did not include Frolizi, but both the Joint Military Command and Frolizi got financial support from the OAU. Frolizi was recognized to exist 'at the military level'.²⁴

The ZANU comment on the United Front is worth quoting at some length. The April (1972) issue of Zimbabwe News said: 'The formation of the ZANU/ZAPU United Front does not in itself guarantee victory. Nor does it mean that the struggle will be less bloody. The struggle will be as difficult as ever and victory will come only through a long hard struggle. Anyone who believes that struggling under the banner of the United Front will bring in a period of easy struggle, or that it will change the nature of the armed struggle from being a long struggle to being a struggle of quick victory must abandon such false hope.'

The article went on to point out that Zimbabweans will 'have to put the interests of the United Front above the interests of either ZANU or ZAPU' because 'a correct mental outlook will mean that after a frank airing of views the point of view of the majority will, in any discussion,

prevail over the point of view of the minority'. It called for discipline, and for 'study, criticism and self-criticism'. Finally it stated that 'the formation of the United Front has given ZANU and ZAPU the chance to jointly study the question of correct ideology calmly and seriously'. At this stage, ZANU clearly took the United Front seriously, and its main manifestation was a Joint Military Command (JMC) with ZAPU. However this did not result in joint military action. This was probably because ZANU was fairly advanced in its programme of infiltration of the north east of Rhodesia, which had begun before the JMC was formed. To have tried to involve ZAPU at that stage would have put the programme back. At one point the JMC considered training guerrillas from both parties together, so that joint groups could be formed at a later stage. However by March 1973, this approach had been acknowledged by the OAU to have failed, and the OAU reconciliation Committee was again working to persuade the two parties to join another United Front. This time a joint political council was agreed—but there is no evidence that this has been any more effective than the JMC.²⁵

One problem that the OAU has is that less than five per cent of the Liberation Fund is allocated to the Zimbabwe movements. Thus it does not have the financial leverage that a larger contribution to them would have.

Frolizi held a congress at the end of August 1972, and this resulted in a major change in leadership. James Chikerema became Chairman, and Stephen Parienyatwa became Secretary. Siwela and Savanhu fled shortly after the congress and the *Zambia Daily Mail* claimed that the election had reduced the organization to a 'Mrewa tribal association', although this was disputed by another report. Although it did send some guerrillas into Rhodesia in the spring of 1973 (including some coloureds—the only party which has so far used coloured guerrillas), it virtually collapsed in June 1973. Three members of Frolizi's seven

man national executive, with another nineteen ordinary members, rejoined ZANU. Included among them were Nathan Shamuyarira, and G. G. Parirewa.²⁶

Frolizi's application for recognition by the OAU Liberation Committee was finally rejected in November 1973.²⁷ Frolizi still exists sufficiently for it to attempt to get support from African governments. For example, George Nyandoro was reported as visiting Uganda in March 1974 to brief General Amin.²⁸

The quarrels and splits in the liberation movement may appear to be peripheral to the struggle inside Rhodesia. In one sense they are—for it is what is happening inside Rhodesia which is important. However, these divisions have had an effect on both the military and political effort. To some extent, divisions are inevitable. Writing about Nkrumah, Jitendra Mohan has said 'the history of a nationalist movement is inseparable from the struggle for succession, over the final disposition of power and its rewards once the colonial power quits the stage, which accompanies the fight for independence and in fact determines its pace and scope'.²⁹

If the struggle appears to be going badly, as it did in Rhodesia in 1967 and 1968, there is a tendency to seek scapegoats and to tear the organization apart in the search for the causes of failure. An exceptional leader at liberty might have been able to carry his party through this self-analysis. However, the exiled ZAPU leadership merely became hopelessly divided and even allowed a significant number of their guerrillas to be deported from Zambia to Rhodesia. The ZANU leadership divided, ironically enough, over the question of unity. In both cases, there was jockeying for position and the losers in each party joined the new party (Frolizi).

The effects of the divisions on the struggle have been twofold. There has been inefficiency in the direction of the guerrillas. A divided, fumbling leadership cannot be clear

in its aims and decisive in its directives. Secondly, its credibility amongst Africans as a real political alternative to Smith has been impaired. The regime has, of course, exploited this great weakness. Time and again, the divisions, both past and present have been used to discredit the nationalists.

Now that the armed struggle is really beginning to bear fruit, the question of unity does not seem to be so important. However, for the future it is. In Mozambique, Frelimo came to dominate the scene, and so Coremo became irrelevant. Thus, after the collapse of Portugal, Frelimo was the only choice for a Government. Similarly in Guinea Bissau, the PAIGC has totally dominated the scene. However in Angola, three movements, with one of the main ones split, are fighting among themselves. Thus the Portuguese Government, which needs only a small amount of encouragement to give them independence, is unable to. The unity which the ANC expressed at the time of the Pearce Commission shows that the African people are unitedly against Smith. This has resulted in a truce between ZANU and ZAPU. Whether it will grow into something more (which seems unlikely on past form) and whether one party will come to completely dominate the scene, is of importance for the future of Zimbabwe.

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- 18 Rhodesia Herald 9.11.71.
- 19 Rhodesia Herald 10.8, 17.8.71; Guardian 13.8.71; Radio Lusaka 11.8.71. The detailed *Guardian* report (13.8.71) was inaccurate in a number of respects. Although it is correct that there were strong feelings about the issues, there was not the amount of intimidation suggested. A number of delegates spoke and voted against the breaking off of talks. The letter from Sithole was written on paper with the official prison stamp in the top left hand corner. However, it had been stamped before he wrote (he wrote very closely around it) so that there is no evidence to suggest that it was vetted by the authorities before he sent it. He was not acting under instructions from the regime. Finally, he did not reject unity in the letter. What he did do was to deny that he had had direct contact with Joshua Nkomo.
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- 21 Times of Zambia 26.1.72; Libya News Agency 18.1.72.
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3 The International Relations of the Nationalists

Before UDI, and the real beginning of the armed struggle, a great deal of energy was expended by the nationalist parties in presenting their case abroad. A particular effort was made in Britain, and at the United Nations with the object of exerting diplomatic pressure on the colonial power. The effort was misdirected because neither the UN nor the British government had the power or the will to force a settlement acceptable to the Africans. The Tiger and Fearless talks finally convinced them that they were not going to gain independence by diplomatic pressure. (This aspect has been well documented.)¹

Despite this failure, and the subsequent determination by the nationalists to put their major effort into guerrilla warfare, they have continued to have links with and a presence in other countries. There are a number of reasons for this. Few guerrilla struggles have been successfully waged purely from within the country under attack. Until 1972, the Rhodesian nationalists did not have a base within Rhodesia which could be called in anyway secure. They had their political and military headquarters and camps in Zambia, in Tanzania, and latterly in Mozambique. This has resulted in the sort of difficulties for the host country which has been well expressed by Eduardo Mondlane, the founder of Frelimo: 'Any country which agrees to become host to such a military force, even temporarily, must face considerable problems. First in the internal problem posed by the presence of an armed force which is not directly under the country's control. Then there are the diplomatic and security difficulties to be faced as soon as the

government against which the military preparations are directed discovers the existence of such a camp'.² Zambia in particular has been subjected to a whole range of pressures — the closure of the border in January 1973, verbal abuse from both Rhodesia and South Africa, and the planting of mines on Zambian roads near the Rhodesian border. Wilkinson has identified thirteen guerrilla camps in Tanzania, including Bagamoyo (near Dar es Salaam) where the OAU Liberation Committee arms allocations are made, and six camps in Zambia.³

A second reason for international links has been the need to obtain money and equipment for the fighting. There have been two main sources of money for this purpose. Firstly from the Organization of African Unity via its Liberation Committee. This committee was set up in 1963, and a special liberation fund was established in 1964. All members of the OAU are supposed to make contributions on a scale related to their ability to pay. Until fairly recently, the workings of the Committee, and the disbursement of its funds have been secret and inefficient. At a special meeting in Accra in January 1973, its strategy was reformulated. It called for armed struggle in the countries of Southern Africa by unified liberation movements. In order to gain this unity, it proposed that 'united fronts' should be formed. If the parties would not unite within a given time, it suggested that it would either only support the dominant movement, or it would withdraw its support from all the movements concerned. The special meeting also announced that the 1973/74 Liberation Committee budget would be £1.4 million. (At the same time it said it was regrettable that certain countries had not paid their arrears to the fund.) The money was to be divided so that seventy per cent would go to the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories, fifteen per cent to the South African and Namibian movements, and five per cent to all the other liberation movements. The amount

allocated to ZAPU and ZANU was thus £35,000 each per annum, assuming that the OAU got all its subscriptions in. But one report suggests that as little as £0.5 million was collected for the year in question from member states. This may partially account for the final proposal from the Accra meeting that funds should be solicited from the Socialist states (such as China and the USSR), from the non-aligned (such as Guyana) and from other sympathetic countries (such as those in Scandinavia).⁴

ZAPU and ZANU obviously receive the bulk of their material support (for arms, clothing, food, etc.) from other sources. The USSR (and other European communist countries) and the Peoples Republic of China give this support. ZANU is supported by China. Chinese aid appears to be mainly in the form of arms and equipment. Much of the equipment and even the uniforms used by ZANU guerrillas are made in China. Zimbabwe News is clearly influenced by its admiration of the Chinese revolution. ZAPU, on the other hand, is supported by Russia. This is again shown by articles in the monthly version of Zimbabwe Review, which is produced in the Democratic Republic of Germany. This support seems to be used for its prime purpose as neither organization can afford luxurious offices in Lusaka. Both have their headquarters divided between the Liberation centre, and another office in the centre of the city. The ZANU connection with China has not prevented it from coming to an agreement with Frelimo, which has mainly been associated with the USSR.

A third reason for maintaining international relations has been to continue diplomatic pressure. This has the two-fold purpose of legitimizing their own activity, and keeping Rhodesia politically and economically isolated. In the UK, there have been support groups. For example, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Africa Bureau, and other bodies have consistently lobbied governments and the political parties. In Africa, this has been done mainly through the

OAU. However the major breakthrough for all of the liberation movements of Southern Africa came with the decision of the World Council of Churches to set up a 'Special Fund to Combat Racism' at the meeting of its Central Committee in 1969. The grants (US \$15,000 each to ZAPU and ZANU) were made for 'humanitarian activities', although there was no attempt to control their precise use.⁵ This not surprisingly provoked the fury of the South African government and the Rhodesian regime. The lead given by the World Council has been followed by a number of countries. For example, in 1971 the Scandinavian countries decided to widen their official development aid policies to include cash and humanitarian aid to the liberation movements.⁶ In the spring of 1972, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the President of the African National Council of Zimbabwe, spoke to the UN Security Council while the Pearce Commission was in Rhodesia testing African opinion. He took the opportunity to ask for sanctions to be tightened.⁷ In April 1973, the UN and the OAU held a joint conference on Southern Africa in Oslo. This allowed diplomats from a wide range of countries, such as Australia, Ghana, Iran, Hungary, and Austria (though not from Britain or the USA) to meet and discuss many aspects of the liberation struggle.⁸ This favourable diplomatic climate has continued. However the Zimbabwe liberation movements clearly see it as secondary to the guerrilla activities in Rhodesia. While the diplomatic response does not *depend* upon success in the field by liberation movements, it is considerably helped by it. For example Bishop Muzorewa was given a hearing by the Security Council because of the overwhelming African opposition to the Proposals for a Settlement.

The fourth reason for international links is the large number of Zimbabwe African exiles. There are two main concentrations—in Zambia, and in the UK. There are smaller numbers in the USA, in other African countries,

and in both Western and Eastern Europe. Both ZAPU and ZANU have part time representatives in the UK to try to act as a focus for these exiles, in addition to their diplomatic duties. The nationalist headquarters in Lusaka act as a focus for those in Zambia. The stated aim of most of the exiles in Britain is the extension of their education with a view to returning to Rhodesia. The nationalists try to gain recruits from these exiles. It is impossible to say how successful they have been.

All of this international activity outside Rhodesia, is dependent upon the success of the struggle (whether armed or peaceful) inside Rhodesia. Without a firm base inside their country, the external missions would become meaningless gestures of frustration. With it, they have become a mouthpiece of importance.

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4 The Rhodesian Security Forces

The white Rhodesian security forces comprise the Army, the Air-Force and the British South African Police, each with their reserves. There are close links between the police and the army. The police are involved with the army in actions along the Zambezi, and the army is used, on occasions, under civilian control. In 1966, a joint counter-insurgency organization was set up. The army and the police have many Africans in their ranks, but the combatant parts of the air-force (and the air-arm of the police) are all white. To these forces must be added the para-military South African police detachments which were first sent north in large numbers in 1967.

Year	Army	% of total expenditure	Air- force	% of total expenditure	BSA police	% of total expenditure
1964/64	6,040		5,834		10,348	
65/66	6,420	4.4	5,996	4.1	11,570	7.9
66/67	7,908	5.4	5,410	3.7	12,480	8.5
67/68	8,854	5.5	6,694	4.0	12,822	7.6
68/69	9,419	5.0	5,895	3.1	13,843	7.4
69/70	10,228	5.1	6,197	3.1	14,610	7.2
70/71	10,856	5.1	8,392	3.9	14,989	7.0
71/72	11,888	5.1	7,930	3.4	16,738	7.1
72/73	15,568	5.4	8,662	3.0	18,066	6.3
73/74					25,390	5.3
74/75					31,198	5.8

Source: *Annual estimates of expenditure, Monthly Digest of Statistics*

The expenditure on the security forces is tabulated below. Other departments (in particular the Ministry of Internal Affairs) have expenditure related to security. This has increased greatly since the front line on the North East of Rhodesia was opened by ZANU in December 1972.

Defence expenditure can thus be seen to have been fairly static as a proportion of total government expenditure, although the figures suggest that expenditure, particularly on the army, is beginning to rise. There are also the hidden costs of calling up members of the territorial force. The employers of the conscripts must suffer considerable financial loss but it is impossible to put a figure to this.

The Army

Since UDI the numbers in the army have not been published. At the time of UDI, it had an establishment of 3,400 men, divided into the paratrooper Special Air Squadron (SAS) (European), the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) (European), and the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) (African, but with European officers). In addition there were 4,000 European reservists in four active and four reserve Territorial Force battalions of the Rhodesian Regiment.¹ The Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment was formed on 1st July 1972, although it was based on an existing corps. Presumably it was based on the French Panhard armoured cars which Rhodesia is reported to have purchased from South Africa where they are made under licence. They are a new version with one 90mm and two machine guns.² There are a number of other army units, including the Rhodesian Corps of Engineers, with a complement (1974) of thirty officers and 675 others, and the Rhodesian Army Service Corps.³ Since UDI the numbers have risen (at least, in terms of the establishment). Howman, then Minister of Defence, announced on 30 January 1969 that the paratroopers were to be doubled, and

the RLI was to be increased.⁴ He did not increase the Rhodesian African Rifles. Despite this, there is a severe shortage of Europeans in the army. The Report of the Secretary for Defence (etc.) for 1970 said that recruitment had dropped by fifteen per cent, and that they had a shortage in almost all spheres. In the 1971 Report, the Chief of the General Staff said that there were continuing shortages of both officers and European other ranks in the regular army. Recruitment for 1970 and 1971 had dropped by twenty-five per cent compared with the previous two years. There were also not enough officers in the Territorial Force. In 1972 the European strength of the army continued its decline, with 'a high loss of trained and expert personnel after ten and twenty years service'.⁵ An extra gratuity for those who stayed on past their ten or twenty year period of service was introduced in March 1973 in order to check this.⁶ In July 1973, \$1 million was set aside to build improved married quarters for members of the Rhodesian Light Infantry.⁷ A further pay increase was announced in September 1973.⁸ A second battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles was announced in February 1974.⁹ Shortly after this, the Minister of Internal Affairs (Lance Smith) announced the setting up of a local African militia, under the District Administration, with specially trained African District Assistants who would be like 'military NCOs'.¹⁰ By September 1974, over 1,000 District Assistants had been given rudimentary army training, and could be considered to form part of the Rhodesian Security Forces.¹¹ Another increase in pay was announced in May. This was specifically designed to persuade national service men to stay in the army, with the long term object of forming another RLI battalion.¹² As a result of this intensive campaign, Mr P. K. Van der Byl (the present Minister of Defence) was able to tell the RF Congress in September 1974 that the Rhodesian Armed forces were up to strength.¹³

Recruits for the regular army (SAS, RLI and the officer corps of the RAR) come from Rhodesia, the UK, South Africa and other European countries. Howman has claimed that eighty per cent of the security forces are Rhodesian, though whether they were Rhodesian citizens when they were recruited is another matter.¹⁴ Recruiting drives occur frequently in Salisbury and Bulawayo, and the Rhodesia Herald regularly features life in the army (partly, of course, to bolster up the 'nation at war' feeling). British recruits come from a variety of sources. Some of the soldiers sent by the UK to guard the Francistown radio station in 1966 joined the Rhodesian army. The Rhodesia Herald featured one such recruit, Sgt Tom Clayden, who had spent seventeen years with the Royal Gloucestershire Regiment. Within eighteen months of joining the Rhodesian army he was a recruiting sergeant.¹⁵ The Regime tries to avoid the ban on advertising in the UK by direct contact with local newspapers. At the beginning of 1970, the *Aldershot News* featured a large article with the headline 'Join Ian's Army; it's a Great Life'. One of the local reporters then went to Rhodesia (half financed by the Regime) and wrote a follow-up report.¹⁶ Alan Coren of *Punch* described a British Army officer he met on a plane, who was travelling to Rhodesia from the Middle East, where he had been a military adviser. He was going to fight in Rhodesia as a mercenary. Apparently the Rhodesian army is 'crying out for top chaps'. He commented to Coren: 'You'd be amazed if I told you how many soldiers wind up in Rhodesia . . . one of the few places left in the world where a chap can do some real soldiering'.¹⁷

The Africans in the army are important to the Regime—without their tracking and bush skills, the army (and the police) would be in great difficulties. (However, the Europeans are increasingly being trained in these skills so that they are not so dependent upon Africans.¹⁸ The regime claims the existence of the Rhodesian African Rifles

as evidence for the support of the African population in the defence of their country. In their propaganda pamphlet 'Zambezi—Red Frontier' they quote a *Guardian* report of an interview with some of the African members of the RAR. Their reporter, John Worrall, asked an African sergeant-major (with fourteen years' experience) why he fought, and received the answer 'I am fighting for Rhodesia. It is my home . . . They come with Chinese grenades and guns and the people are frightened of them. I am sorry for some of them, but this communist thing is no good for Rhodesia'.¹⁹ In fact, the Africans in the Rhodesian African Rifles only come from a very small area of Rhodesia. According to a report in the *Rhodesia Herald*, 'the vast majority of RAR troops are drawn from Rhodesia's East Victoria region. Recruiting is kept within the family as much as possible, and most of the soldiers are from the Vakaranga tribe, part of the Mashona, and are related to each other in some way'. The army also offers the opportunity of a good and well-paid job with security and good conditions, at a time of considerable African unemployment. The regime recently spent about £75,000 on two blocks for forty-eight African army families—with another three blocks to come. An army spokesman said at the time: 'Although there is no need for recruitment of African soldiers at the moment, this will be an inducement to recruitment'.²⁰

However, the nationalists have claimed that some African members of the army have refused to fight in the Zambezi, and as a result, 113 soldiers were imprisoned in a camp near Salisbury, in February 1968.²¹ The Pearce commission found, to its surprise, that African members of the security forces rejected the Proposals for a Settlement. A group from the RAR, interviewed in the Mashonaland North Province, said that they rejected them because of 'unjust and racially biased treatment'.²² There has been further evidence of disaffection by the African troops. According to Zambian sources, Rhodesian African troops

have refused to assist in the collecting of collective fines in the Chiweshe area in February and March 1973. These fines were imposed because of the support the villages in question were supposed to have given to the guerrillas. There have been reports of a secret court martial for similar offences.²³ It seems possible that some of the secret trials reported by the press as having taken place, are court martials. Comments by General Walls, the Commanding Officer of the Army, on the Rhodesian African Rifles are illuminating. He said that they had done very well considering the 'tremendous pressures' on them. 'It must be appreciated that the terrorists are using all possible means to "get at" African soldiers, policemen and airmen'.²⁴

Prior to UDI, most of the arms supply (and some of the military training) came from the UK. Most of the contracts were stopped at UDI, although some links remained for a time. The SAS kept contact with her sister squadrons in the UK for several years through their magazines. It has been difficult for the army to get up-to-date arms. The Report of the Secretary of Defence (etc.) for 1970 said: 'Despite sanctions and other procurement difficulties, the routine re-equipment of the army has continued at a reasonably satisfactory rate. However, the requirement for more support weapons, to provide a better balanced force, still remains.' The 1971 and 1972 Reports repeat this statement in almost identical words.

The shortage of manpower in the regular army has been partially balanced by increases in the length of national service, and the size of the Territorial Force. In 1966, the period of 'Peace Training' was increased from 137 to 245 days, and at the end of 1970, it was decided that males between eighteen and twenty-five years, whether alien or not, could be called up. National Service takes the form of four-and-a-half months training, and then the rest of the time is spent on operational duties in the bush, and elsewhere. In the Defence Act passed at the end of 1972, the

regime increased national service training from 245 to 365 days, and gave itself the option of increasing the period of compulsory membership of the Territorial Force from four to six years. In November 1972 it enlarged the catchment areas for weekly parades of the Territorial Force from 17 km to 30 km radius from the main (European) population centres, Bulawayo, Gwelo, Salisbury and Umtali. This included both those resident, and (a new provision) those employed within the designated areas.²⁵

Since the beginning of the offensive in the North East of Rhodesia, the use of non-professionals has increased dramatically. 1973 and 1974 have been years of gradually increasing use of National Service men and members of the Territorial Force. In 1973 and probably in 1974, members of the Territorial Force were called up for about one month's service every six months.²⁶ This has put a considerable burden on industry and commerce in the country—employers have of course not been very pleased to lose their white employees regularly away from their desks for a month at a time, and so have not cooperated with the 'Ministry of Defence' as well as the regime would have liked.²⁷

In March, the 'Minister of Law and Order' (Lardner-Burke) announced that men could do their national service in the BSA police as well as in the army and air force.²⁸ In June, the 'Minister of Defence' announced that he was going to take powers to deal with draft dodgers.²⁹ As a result of this promise, all employers (including government departments) were required to send lists of all their male European employees to the 'Ministry of Defence' stating whether they were registered under the Defence Act. The object of this exercise was to up-date their chronically out of date records.³⁰ At the end of July, the regime decided to call up members of the Army Reserve. Most of the members of the Reserve are in the thirty-eight to forty-eight age range, and the object of this move was to release

younger men from sedentary jobs to the front.³¹ The Rhodesian Front congress was told in September 1973 that there would be an increase in the number of men called up between eighteen and twenty-five.³² This took till February 1974 when it was announced that the National Service intake was to be doubled. At the same time, anyone over the age of twenty-five who had been in Rhodesia for five years or more would be liable to be called up for one month's service a year. However, in order not to frighten prospective immigrants, there is a five year period of grace.³³ A month later, it was announced that all police reservists would be called up at least once a year for operational duties. Previously members had volunteered for duty as and when they wished.³⁴ In June, it was announced that men could volunteer to do their national service in the 'Ministry of Internal Affairs'. They would have military training, and would be used to give 'back-bone' to the African militia and the District Assistants used to guard the protected villages.³⁵ In August, it was reported that the Ministry of Internal Affairs was recruiting men to join the Civil Defence. This has a non-military job—but would act in the event of any of the major services being destroyed, a serious fire, or a major strike.³⁶ In October 1974, the system whereby students automatically deferred their national service was amended. In future, anyone who wanted to be deferred had to gain special exemption in order to do so.³⁷ Finally, in November 1974, the Defence Act Amendment Bill was read for the first time. This bill stipulates that young Rhodesians called up for national service have to get permission to leave the country. Furthermore, if they no longer live in Rhodesia after their call up, they are still liable for service. This action must have been provoked by young men trying to avoid service.³⁸

Apart from the desperate need for manpower in order to meet the need of the border offensive, The regime has tried to reduce the use of the Territorial Force, and also the need

to call up the Reserve Army. This has been very disruptive of the industrial and commercial sector, and has been very fiercely criticized by industry. At the same time, the use of the Territorials and Reservists has undoubtedly provoked further emigration, as the regime has itself recognized.³⁹ With the extension of the vulnerable border with Mozambique right down to South Africa, it is likely that the security forces will need to increase their white manpower even more.

The Air Force

The strength of the air force was 900 at UDI. The aircraft it has are as follows:

No.1 Squadron: Hawker-Hunter day-fighter/ground attack aircraft. At UDI there were 12, acquired in 1963. Apparently in 1971, there were 26 in all.

No.2 Squadron: Ground training and Vampire T11 advance jet trainers. At UDI, there were 12, acquired in 1954. Two have crashed, and another disposed of to a museum.⁴⁰ Another 2 'jet trainers' which crashed may have been Vampires.

No.3 Squadron: Dakota C-47 transports, acquired 1959.

No.4 Squadron: Trojan light transport and strike aircraft.

No.5 Squadron: Canberra light bombers. At UDI there were 11, acquired in 1959. 2 have crashed.

No. 6 Squadron: Basic and advanced training in armed Macchi AL 60s. Seven of these were obtained in 1967.

No.7 Squadron: Alouette 3 helicopters. At UDI, there were 8, acquired in 1962. Four at least have crashed.

It is very likely that the regime have acquired replacements for these helicopters because they are quite crucial to their operations. At UDI there was also a reconnaissance squadron of 13 Provost T52, acquired in 1954. They are probably attached to No.6 Squadron. (They are also

reported to have 12 BAC Jet Provost trainers.)⁴¹ The state of the aircraft is a matter of some concern to the regime. In 1971 the then 'Minister of Defence', Howman, accused the Centre Party of giving away state secrets by quoting a two-year-old report from the *Sunday Mail* which suggested that the condition of many of the Rhodesian military aircraft was poor.⁴²

In order to try to obtain further aircraft, and also the spares necessary for the present ones, the regime has set up a 'Defence Procurement Board'. It can raise money by issuing bonds, as well as relying on taxation.⁴³ Essentially it operates in the second hand army market. One near success by the Rhodesians was revealed by the *Guardian* newspaper, when it uncovered the attempt by Jordan to sell thirty-one Hawker-Hunters to Rhodesia via the arms dealer, Munther Bilbeisi. This sale was only stopped as a result of very strong pressure by the Egyptian government on the Jordanians. There is reason, however, to believe that a Jordanian Tiger-cat missile system was sold, via South Africa, to the Rhodesian Security Forces.⁴⁴

The British South Africa Police

At UDI, the strength of the BSA police was 2,072 Europeans and 4,943 Africans. They also had 19,586 European reservists and 6,153 African reservists. The number of Europeans has dropped since UDI and the 1971 Report of the Commissioner of the BSA police said that there was a severe shortage of manpower. The shortfall continued in 1972. Few patrol officers were being attracted into the service, and it was clear that the full establishment would not be attained as long as most of the recruits had to come from Rhodesia. Recruitment in South Africa had been a failure because the salaries offered were not high enough, and recruitment elsewhere was very difficult. There has been adverse comment on the BSA police from

police magazines in the UK—though the Herald claimed that, after a tour of Rhodesia, the editor of one of these magazines had changed his mind. On the other hand, it is also claimed that the Chief Constables of some of the police forces in the UK have been prepared to give testimonials to applicants to the BSA police. But sanctions have been substantially successful in this field.⁴⁵ As was noted above, part of the shortfall is now being met by national service men.

The BSA police started off as a paramilitary defence force for the Pioneer column, and took part in the Matabele war in 1892, the Jameson Raid in 1895 and the Matabele and Mashona uprisings in 1896 and 1897. However, for the next sixty years, they did not have a military function. (They did have a much wider responsibility for political control than the British police do. For example, one of the main sources for a history of nationalist politics in the inter-war period is the reports made by constables who attended most political meetings held in Rhodesia. Detailed synopses of the speeches of African leaders such as Masoja Ndlovu, and Job Dumbutshena were written down.)⁴⁶ In the 1950s and early 1960s the Rhodesian Government found it necessary to exercise more direct physical control over the political movements among Africans. For this purpose, the BSA police recovered the paramilitary function it exercises today.

The police patrol the Zambezi valley and escarpment along with the army, and have been involved in mixed engagements against the nationalists. In 1964, many new police stations were built, mainly along the border with Botswana, and (later) along the Zambezi valley. A special Zambezi River Patrol was also set up, but was discontinued about 1971. Police training includes 'endurance training and anti-terrorist work' and new recruits undergo a short course which is 'conducted in one of the more remote areas of the country where the ability of the individual to live

under exacting conditions can be thoroughly tested'.⁴⁷

Many European recruits before UDI were non-Rhodesians. In 1964, the European recruits were as follows: UK 86, Rhodesia 65, South Africa 11, others 10. Since UDI the proportion of UK recruits has, of course, dropped drastically. African membership is, in tribal terms, very much wider than in the case of the army. In 1965, there was preponderance of Karanga among African recruits, followed by Zezura and Ndebele (of which there were thirteen per cent), with smaller numbers of Manyika, Korekore, and Shangaan, and finally a few non-Rhodesian Africans.⁴⁸ A number of the African police were (and possibly still are) supporters of the African nationalist cause, but there are also those who have very firmly aligned themselves with the regime. Some African police have given the tip-off to nationalist officials, before detention and restriction orders have been served. On the other hand, there have been a number of cases involving African police where suspects have been so severely beaten up that they have died as a result of their wounds. This has happened with the knowledge and consent of their European officers. European members of the police force have also been implicated in some of these attacks.⁴⁹

The South African Reinforcements

In 1967, the security forces in Rhodesia were reinforced by a detachment of South African paramilitary police. The argument as to whether they are police or army is quite academic. In Rhodesia, at least, they have exactly the same function as the Rhodesian army. There have been various estimates at the numbers involved, which range from about 300 to 10,000. At present, the generally accepted number appears to be about 2,000 to 3,000. This number represents the active front-line troops. They rest, train, re-equip etc. in South Africa. They therefore probably represent a force

which is at least equal in total size to the Rhodesian regular army. In 1968, the SA Government budgeted an extra £730,000 for these reinforcements, of which £250,000 was for subsistence, £467,000 was for motor transport, and £8,000 for the motor boats for patrolling the Zambezi.⁵⁰ They also brought aircraft with them. A Daily Telegraph correspondent reported in September 1967 that they had brought four Alouette helicopters and two spotter aircraft with them. One of these latter, a Cessna, crashed near Gwelo in July 1969.⁵¹ In July 1973, half a dozen South African helicopters were reported over Salisbury—and it is safe to assume that they have considerably more in use. Some, at least, are larger than the Rhodesian Alouettes.⁵² In the second half of 1974, South Africa announced the result of a reappraisal which it had undertaken because of the increased severity of the fighting in Rhodesia, and the change in Portuguese colonial policy. A volunteer 'police' corps was to gradually take over all duties along the South African borders and Rhodesia, and it was to be given extra benefits. This decision had been taken, according to the South African Minister of Police, because the 'fight against Terrorism in Rhodesia was becoming a matter of conventional warfare, (and) the service given by South African policemen took place under highly dangerous conditions'.⁵³

White Co-operation in Southern Africa

Until the military coup in Portugal in April 1974, and the subsequent moves towards a genuinely independent African government in Mozambique, the military co-operation between Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal was close. The presence of the South African security forces in Rhodesia was the most advanced form of this co-operation. It also took the form of a series of top-level consultations, probably held quarterly in each country in turn. For

example, in February 1971, Major-General H. G. Van den Bergh (Head of the South African Bureau for State Security) with two aides, and Major S. Pias (Head of the Portuguese Security Directorate, the re-named PIDE) with security officers from Angola and Mozambique, met with Rhodesian officials in Salisbury.⁵⁴ Up to 1971, this co-operation progressed quite smoothly. There was an exchange of intelligence information, and men wanted in one territory, have been captured in another territory. For example, Benjamin Ramotse was abducted from Botswana by Rhodesian police, and transferred to South Africa in 1970. Moffat Hadebe was captured in Mozambique and handed over to the Rhodesian authorities for trial. Rhodesian army patrols entered Mozambique for 'friendly contact with border authorities'.⁵⁵

The blowing up of a Rhodesian army jeep near to Mukumbura in Mozambique in April 1971 by a Frelimo mine was a sign that a new stage in the battle for Mozambique had started. From that time, the Frelimo offensive in the Tete province of Mozambique became a cause of great concern to the Rhodesian regime, and probably also to South Africa. Rhodesian troops have since operated deep in Mozambique territory, ostensibly to attack ZANU bases. There is evidence to suggest that the Rhodesian army was very brutal in its treatment of the civilian African population in Tete. The Rhodesian authorities expressed their concern about the deteriorating situation so strongly that the Portuguese Prime Minister publicly rebuked 'some of our neighbours'—i.e. the Rhodesian regime—'for their great fright'.⁵⁶

The fall of the Portuguese regime had radically changed the political geography of Southern Africa. Rhodesia is now a white salient into Black Africa. There has been a series of ministerial visits to South Africa since April 1974, and the regime is hoping that it will be able to talk to the new Mozambique government. However it has shown its

real estimate of the situation by moving Joshua Nkomo from his place of detention near to the southern border of Mozambique, to prison in Salisbury.

The Tactics of the Security Forces

The physical defence of Rhodesia is the particular responsibility of the armed security forces. Until about 1969 or 1970 the only border which need to be defended was that with Zambia. With the escalating offensive of Frelimo in the Tete province of Mozambique the border with Mozambique along the Zambezi escarpment has had to be patrolled. Since the military coup in Portugal, the whole of the Mozambique border has become suspect—and the opening of a major new barracks at Inyanga has underlined the regime's concern for this eastern border.⁵⁷ They have were between two and five thousand troops along the border with Zambia before the December 1972 offensive. The lower figure is the more likely because, until very recently, the Rhodesian security forces (even with the help of the BSA police and the South Africans) could not sustain the number suggested in the higher figure. Obviously, when there were battles with the guerrillas (as in August 1967 and March and April 1968), the number rose.⁵⁸ The number in operation on the border now must be in the region of four to five thousand.

The tactics have been based upon the assumption that the local population were prepared to supply information to the army patrols. The patrols themselves operate in the Zambian border area, from a series of camps about seven miles apart, and they go out in patrols of between two and six men for up to twenty days at a time, with about ten days off in between. If they come across evidence from any source of what might be nationalist guerrillas and commandos, they radio their base and call up extra troops, who can be brought in by helicopter.⁵⁹ The area is then surrounded by troops, bombed from the air and saturated

with gun-fire. In this way they hope to destroy the guerrillas before they can begin to operate. In dealing with the villagers, they use the 'iron hand in the velvet glove' approach. This has worked while the villagers were prepared, for one reason or another, to support the regime. On the one hand, when patrolling the villages on the border the army took great care to appear as helpful defenders. National service men were told again and again that they must pay for all they took, respect the villagers, and never threaten without specific reason. Thus one or two from a patrol might visit a village, without their arms, to give minor assistance (e.g. medical aid), and to ask if the villagers had seen any 'strangers'. Their object was to make a contrast with the guerrillas who came demanding assistance and food, as well as bringing danger to any village which supported them. Information was rewarded.⁶⁰ In contrast to this, any village which did not give support and information to the regime's forces was dealt with. For example, one reported method used to inculcate fear in the villagers was to send in an African posing as a guerrilla. If his presence is not reported immediately, then the velvet glove is removed and the village is given a going over. It is clear that, at least in the north east, the African people have rejected the approaches of the security forces, who have responded with considerable violence. Examples have been reported very widely (e.g. in the 'Appeal to Conscience by Christian Leaders' of 15.8.74), and will be dealt with in greater detail later. As a result, the security forces have had to operate blind in this area. They probably have got some of their information from spotter aircraft. To the south and west of Lake Kariba, the people were not so well politicized by the nationalists in the early 1960s, and thus have not been as prepared to help guerrillas as those further south. To the east is a large area of uninhabited game reserve. Here both the guerrillas and the security forces can move without

interference from local people. Further east again, the area is well populated, and more favourable to the nationalist cause. This was shown by the support given by Africans in this area to ZAPU guerrillas in 1968/69 after the destruction of the ZAPU/South African ANC forces in April 1968. The sensitivity of some of these areas is shown by the fact that the Pearce Commission reported that 'there were a small number of Tribal Trust Lands which they (the Commissioners) were unable to visit because of representations made by the Rhodesian authorities on security grounds'.⁶¹

The Political Offensive

The military front is not the most crucial for the regime. The 'hearts and minds' campaign is undoubtedly the more important battle—and it is one which the regime seems to have lost. The most obvious sign of this was the rejection of the 'Proposals for a Settlement' in the spring of 1972, which was so clearly recorded by the commission under Lord Pearce. This rejection was not a flash in the pan. My own study 'From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe' describes in some detail the political offensive of the regime against the African population since 1965, and their reaction.⁶² The support of the African population for both the African National Council and the Nationalist Movement, since the Pearce Commission is quite obvious. The support for the ANC is basically a support for an African organization which is against the regime. It is combined with a commitment to the armed struggle by most of the rank and file. A very small sign of the rejection of the Smith regime is shown in the way in which a tea-party, arranged by Ian Smith to meet some Africans, flopped. Between 100 and 150 African businessmen, lawyers, doctors, civil servants and journalists were invited to meet him in Seki in the middle of October 1974. Only thirty-six turned up.⁶³ It is clearly no longer in

the interests of any sensible African to be associated with the Smith regime.

The Regime's Undercover Service Abroad

The regime is fighting abroad. It claims to have an excellent intelligence service. For example, Bowyer Bell (on evidence put to him by the regime) states that 'there is no way to over-estimate the importance of Rhodesian intelligence, particularly in Zambia. Both ZAPU and ZANU have undertaken extensive precautions but apparently with only limited success'.⁶⁴ This view is widely held—but is a major overstatement of the position. As will become clear in later chapters, the regime's security forces only rarely had adequate intelligence of major or minor incursions before they occurred.

However, they do have an intelligence network. In Britain a man was gaoled in 1967 for passing Cabinet papers relating to Rhodesia to the South Africans. In 1971, considerable circumstantial evidence was produced by the BBC purporting to show that a John Ferrers-Smith was the head of a Rhodesian spy ring in the UK. This Ferrers-Smith denied.⁶⁵ There are certainly a number of Africans in the UK who act as informers for the regime and try to watch the activities of Zimbabwe Africans and nationalist bodies in Britain. They have monitored meetings of Zimbabwe students, and they have managed to obtain many of their addresses. They then send divisive letters back to Rhodesia in the name of the unknowing student, as well as circular letters to them. One printed letter, sent late in 1971, in the name of an Ndebele was headed 'Zimbabwe's News-sheet on Ndebele Affairs and for the Safe-guarding of Our Interest'. It was received by a large number of people, including Shonas with obviously Shona names (to whom no real Ndebele organization would have sent such a letter). The person whose name was used in the letter knew nothing

about it. Further addresses stolen from the UK offices of ZAPU in 1969 appear to have made their way to Rhodesia, and many Zimbabwe Africans have received pro-regime letters from Rhodesia (particularly during the time of the Pearce Commission).⁶⁶

Headed notepaper from left-wing or liberal organizations in the UK, such as the Fabian Society, the head office of the Labour Party, and Amnesty International, has been stolen and used to try to discredit African exiles among their comrades in Rhodesia, or to try to cause further trouble between the exiles themselves. In the early part of 1967, a forged letter on Fabian Society notepaper was sent to ZAPU in Lusaka saying that the Society was considering changing its support to ZANU because of an official ZAPU statement which, so the letter said, the Fabian Society disagreed with. A copy was sent to ZANU.⁶⁷ In the early part of 1972, a letter was sent to Bishop Muzorewa on Labour Party notepaper under the signature of the Assistant General Secretary. The letter suggested that the London correspondent of the African National Council should be replaced. This letter was again a forgery, on paper that was over four years out of date.⁶⁸ Although the forgeries can be quickly exposed, they can also easily fool the unwary.

The regime has attempted to infiltrate the nationalist parties in Lusaka. In February 1969, ZANU discovered a man whom they believed to be a spy of the regime, working at the ZANU office in Lusaka.⁶⁹ A more detailed account of Rhodesian espionage was given by Richard Chirimuuta in an interview with the Guardian. In 1968 he agreed to work for the regime as a means of getting out of Rhodesia. He had been in Lusaka before, and had worked in the ZAPU publicity department. He was trained for three months in Salisbury, and sent off to Zambia in January 1969 (via Botswana) with secret ink, a Salisbury telephone number and a Salisbury address. He was to be paid by results, mainly into a Salisbury account. The regime hoped that he

would get accepted by the nationalists. They were chiefly interested 'in the movements of guerrilla forces, the troop movements of the Zambian army and in the timing of guerrilla crossings of the Zambezi'. When he got to Zambia, he immediately contacted the Zambian Special Branch, and became a double agent. He succeeded in fooling the regime for about one year, and gave the Zambian police any telephone numbers that he was given by the regime. As a result, a number of people working for ZAPU and ZANU who were really Rhodesian agents, were captured and deported to Rhodesia.⁷⁰ Following a successful parcel bomb which killed a member of the African National Congress of South Africa in the spring of 1974, another parcel bomb was sent to ZANU. It exploded, destroying their office at the Liberation Centre in Lusaka, but fortunately did not kill anyone. ZANU issued a statement attributing the explosion to the Smith regime.⁷¹ Shortly after this, a ZAPU worker, Ethan Dube, was kidnapped by the Rhodesians from Gabarones in Botswana, where the regime believe that ZAPU have an intelligence gathering base.⁷²

The offensive against Zambia (and to a smaller extent Tanzania) has taken other forms. There has been a constant political barrage. The South African broadcasting corporation have a special service for Zambia, broadcasting in Chinyanja as well as English, and this is apparently listened to by a large number of Zambians. (A detailed analysis has been given by Vernon McKay in an article called 'The Propaganda Battle for Zambia'.)⁷³ The South Africans have threatened more than this. In October 1967, Mr Vorster said to the Zambian Government: 'If you want to try violence, as you have advised other states in Africa, we will hit you so hard that you will never forget it.' A year and a half later, the South African army journal *Commando* was discussing how long it would be before South Africa started making Israeli-like attacks on Tanzania and Zambia.⁷⁴ There has been action as well. In June 1968,

saboteurs destroyed the Luangwa Bridge, in the east of Zambia. The oil pipeline from Tanzania to Zambia was sabotaged and cut on the Tanzanian side of the border at the very end of 1969. There have been regular complaints by the Zambians that the air force (and river patrols) violate Zambian air and water space.⁷⁵ After the border closure in January 1973, a number of mines were planted by the Rhodesian security forces, but with the connivance of a number of local Zambians, at Chirundu and at Kazangula.⁷⁶ As this southern part of Zambia has traditionally not supported UNIP, the ruling party, Smith may have been trying to capitalize on the supposed opposition to the setting up of the one party UNIP state. He may have hoped that the disturbance caused by the mines combined with the loss of trade due to the border closure would provoke serious civil disturbances. If so, he was wrong. The knowledge that Rhodesia and South Africa do have the physical ability to honour their threats to make an Israeli-type attack on its territory, must have some effect on Zambia's support for the nationalist parties.

The regime claims to know exactly what goes on in the nationalist parties inside Zambia, but this is doubtful. If it did have such efficient sources, it would not have allowed a group of over 100 guerrillas to remain active and undisturbed for nearly three months in the Zambezi valley. Most of its knowledge of the guerrilla camps, training, etc., comes from interrogation of prisoners taken in armed combat, or returned by the Zambian, Botswanan and Portuguese authorities, or from African deserters.

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5 The Armed Struggle

Before UDI

Revolutionary and violent opposition to white rule began before UDI. In July 1964, Petrus Oberholtzer, (a farmer) was killed by members of the ZANU 'Crocodile Group'. In 1965, a group of three ZAPU men were found guilty of bringing large quantities of arms into Salisbury, and receiving military training in China. Shortly after, a ZANU guerrilla, who also had been trained in China, was found guilty of dynamiting a railway engine. A sub-chief, known to support the white government, was killed in October 1964, on orders from ZAPU. One group of Africans, without specific instructions, attacked a European family with knives and explosives in July 1964, and another caused a bomb explosion at a Catholic mission in September 1964.

But nationalist preparations for UDI were probably more in the nature of contingency plans, rather than carefully worked out policy. The trials of nationalists just after UDI—for example, the twenty-four ZAPU members charged in February 1966 with attending guerrilla training courses outside of Rhodesia—show that ZAPU tried to set up an underground before UDI.¹ The evidence after UDI suggests that they were not very successful.

From UDI to mid-1967

UDI provoked an immediate response from the African population—but this response mainly took the form of civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations, and the like. A major strike took place in Bulawayo towards the end of November 1965, which was only broken by large scale arrests, and the use of police and the army (see (3) for fuller description of the immediate post UDI atmosphere). Reactions were

similar in QueQue and Gwelo. In the Gatooma area, according to a police witness at a trial held in March 1966, a wave of railway sabotage, stoning, arson attempts, and 'intimidation' resulted from UDI.³ Attempts were made on plant and equipment belonging to Wankie colliery, and property belonging to European farmers was attacked and destroyed.

This kind of haphazard resistance to the regime has continued right up to the present, and has been described in some detail in my Fabian Pamphlet *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, and so will not be dealt with here. However, it is essential to recognize that the armed struggle, initiated in the main by the exile parties, has not been conducted in a vacuum. The visit of Lord Pearce to Rhodesia, where he and his colleagues tested the views of the African population, made this quite clear.

The nationalist parties were partly responsible for the spontaneous response to UDI through the broadcasts they made from outside, and as well as through the explosives and weapons which they made available to the Africans. A number of guerrillas in Rhodesia were preaching a 'gospel of action', but the nationalist parties' main concern was military opposition of a more organized kind.⁴

The first sign of action by nationalist commandos came when the Dar-es-Salaam office of ZAPU claimed, at the beginning of March 1966, that 'fierce guerrilla fighting' had taken place in Nkai reserve in western Rhodesia. They said that the white farmers had been driven out of the area by spontaneously formed guerrilla bands, while the Rhodesian security forces had retaliated by destroying African property and livestock. The reports were vigorously denied by the regime.⁵

This was followed shortly afterwards by the infiltration of a group of thirteen or fourteen ZANU guerrillas, about whose existence there is no doubt. They entered Rhodesia across the Zambezi by canoe on 1 April 1966, and split into three groups. Two groups went off in the direction of

Umtali and Fort Victoria, taking with them arms, explosives and pamphlets. Their objects were to blow up the Beira-Umtali pipeline, and to gain the support of the African population for a 'last Chinduduma' as a sequel to the 1896-97 uprisings. One of their pamphlets said 'The time has come for us, their sons, to fight for the last time. The enemies are Smith and the Boer robbers who grabbed our country on November 1st 1965.' The police only became aware of their presence a fortnight after they had crossed the border. They caught some at Umtali, others at Headlands, and the rest at Fort Victoria. There were fierce struggles in all three cases.⁶

According to the regime, the remaining group of seven decided to attempt an attack on the town of Sinoia on 27-28 April. They attached a plastic bomb to a pylon carrying electricity to Sinoia (and thence to Salisbury). Their intention was to blow up the line, black out both Sinoia and Salisbury, and disrupt seventy per cent of the country's power supply. They had hoped to reach the centre of Sinoia under cover of the confusion. Unfortunately for them, the explosives did not go off, and were found by the police. A large group of police closed round them, and after fierce fighting, they were all killed. The police claimed to have no casualties.⁷ However, ZANU claimed that their guerrillas had been responsible for the death of five police, as well as the destruction of several aircraft.

At the end of May, another ZANU group killed a farming couple, Mr and Mrs Viljoen. The incident, which shook the Rhodesian farming community, took place between Hartley and the Zwimba TTL. The group again had seven members. Statements at the trial are conflicting, some suggesting that they entered in April 1966, but others that they entered in July 1965 and recruited further members inside Rhodesia. In any event, they had come to Hartley district, and set themselves up in a well-concealed but very commanding cave at the foot of a kopje. Using this as their

base, they made contact with villagers in the area who supplied them with food. They also tried to recruit people to join their band. On the very night that the Viljoens were killed, two members were on a recruiting tour.

The incident brought the full might of the army and the police down on them. Two were wounded almost immediately after the death of the Viljoens, one fatally. The others did not panic, and remained at their base in the Hartley area till almost a month later when they were betrayed by one of the local people. They then made their way north towards the Zambezi Valley, but about a month later, towards the end of July, they again clashed with the security forces about a mile from the Zambezi. In the ensuing battle, one guerrilla was killed and between one and three members of the RLI were wounded. One guerrilla was never captured, but the other three turned back into Rhodesia and were finally caught in September 1966 in the Mount Hampden area near to Salisbury. They were living with local people, and an informer must have seen their guns. This ZANU group had the beginnings of a true 'guerrilla' band because it had very close contact with the local people in both Hartley and the Mount Hampden areas.⁸

The seriousness of the situation, and the effectiveness of the news blanket operated by the regime, were highlighted in a talk given by William Harper, then the 'Minister of Internal Affairs' on the African service of the Rhodesian radio at the end of August. He said: I want to make this point. We have shot whole gangs of terrorists, not one surviving when they resisted arrest.' When this talk was broadcast on the European service, the *Rhodesia Herald* said: 'The Minister's announcement would seem to indicate more anti-terrorist activity than has been officially reported up to now.'⁹ The *Herald* was right to question the bland official pronouncements which occurred so very infrequently.

It was disclosed at a trial in 1967 that a series of four different ZAPU groups had entered Rhodesia in July and August 1966.¹⁰ One group of five, (probably ZAPU), were arrested in early August in the north east near to the border with Mozambique.¹¹ A second group, (certainly ZAPU) entered near to Gunono (Gonono). One member left border with Mozambique.¹¹ A second group, (certainly ZAPU) entered near to Gunono (Gonono). One member left his gun near the school there, others hid some of their guns in the Mt. Darwin area before splitting up, some going to Mtoko and others to Salisbury. It is possible that both these groups entered via Mozambique. Members of these two groups were arrested shortly after arrival with (in some cases) a fight.¹² Another group of ZAPU or ZANU were captured in the Zambezi Valley at the end of July. Their brief was to recruit men to 'fight against the Europeans'.¹³ At the end of August, a group of three nationalists were arrested in the Tjolutjo area, close to the Botswana border, but about 200 miles from Zambia. They were part of a group of nationalists who, at the beginning of August, had crossed through Rhodesia into the very north of Botswana. They were then driven by a European about 200 miles to a point on the Rhodesian/Botswana border. Shortly after this the party divided, and the three arrested men had obtained the help of a local man who hid their weapons. Because they were wearing distinctive green camouflage jackets, they were arrested in an anti-guerrilla sweep.

A group of twelve, probably ZAPU, entered the Binga area to the west of lake Kariba in the middle of 1966. It divided into two, but after a few days one of the groups ran out of food and water. Four members were sent to get supplies, but two were betrayed by a Chief's Messenger and were arrested. They were persuaded to lead the police to their camp. The two who had stayed behind tried to return to Zambia, but were arrested before they got there. The other group was surrounded by the RAR, and surrendered

without a fight. Altogether, only one man managed to escape arrest.¹⁵

Less conventional methods of attack were also used. ZANU arranged for a European woman to fly into Rhodesia, and visit five different hotels. She left a series of incendiary bombs in cupboards in the hotels, and departed before the police were able to identify her as the culprit. The regime claimed little damage was done.¹⁶

ZAPU tried to make use of opposition to the regime in the University College in Salisbury, and a cell of some European lecturers and some Africans from Salisbury was set up. They brought in hand-grenades and explosives from Zambia. It is quite likely that some of these were distributed and used. For example, it is probable that their hand-grenades were used when a cafe in Salisbury was attacked in August 1966, and five people were injured. Another hand-grenade attack in the same month was made on a European flat. The owners were out at the time, so no one was injured. At his trial in February 1966 John Conradie said that he was a member of a group comprising one other lecturer and two Africans. It also seems that he was associated with Ivan Dixon who worked in a local firm. Giovanni Arrighi, another lecturer, may have been associated with this group. At the trial of Nesbitt Garikayi, a ZAPU supporter, it was stated that Giovanni Arrighi and John Conradie had given a ZAPU official money to buy paints and brushes. Garikayi then daubed 'ZAPU' and 'Nkomo' on European cars in Avondale. Arrighi along with another eight lecturers was detained and deported before this was known. Conradie was arrested just as he was about to visit his mother in South Africa. Apparently, shortly before their arrest Conradie and his comrades were planning a major operation to coincide with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference—but one of the group was arrested before this happened. Conradie's house was searched, and the arms were found. Conradie was gaoled for twenty years.¹⁷

Another of the ZAPU underground was a Salvation Army major, Phineas Shava, who had smuggled arms from Zambia to his home in Fort Victoria, in a lorry-load of fish. He distributed some of these arms by motor-cycle to a cell in Salisbury.¹⁸

Another six ZAPU commandos entered Rhodesia across the Zambezi in September 1966, and were involved in an engagement with RLI patrol four days after they had crossed. It seems that the contact was accidental as the guerrillas thought the Rhodesian patrol was a herd of elephants! However, according to the regime, in the subsequent engagement, two of the nationalists were killed and one wounded. ZAPU, (from their office in Dar es Salaam) in a statement issued at the end of September 1966, claimed that a clash occurred on 7 September, when Zimbabwe guerrillas near to Karoi, attacked a police Land-rover with hand-grenades. They reported that three white police were killed, and one African injured. The statement went on to say that in September a power pylon from Kariba was destroyed, causing disruption of the power supplies to Salisbury. On 13 September, a police reservist was killed and two others injured when a mine, planted on a white farm exploded.¹⁹

At about the same time in September, a ZANU commando group entered Rhodesia, just slightly to the west of Kariba, near to Chirundu. They marched some distance and then decided to try to get a lift. They unwisely stopped a pantehnicon. When the African driver realized that the hitch-hikers were nationalist commandos, he drove off in panic. The leader of the group shot and killed the man in disgust, and the lorry crashed off into a tree. The security forces immediately sealed off the area, introduced escorts for the last twenty miles to the border post with Zambia at Chirundu, and started a major search for the culprits. They eventually captured all seven.²⁰

Shortly after this, in October, a misleadingly reported incident occurred in which three members of the SAS and a

member of the BSA police were killed 'handling dangerous explosives found in a terrorists' cache'.²¹ At the time, the regime passed off the incident saying that the men were 'accidentally killed in an explosion in a recent exercise on the banks of the Zambezi river near Chirundu'.²²

In fact, it seems likely that the explosives were part of a nationalist booby trap, although they could have been unstable gelignite. Soon afterwards, the occupants of a Zambian canoe were mistakenly identified as nationalist guerrillas by the Rhodesian forces, who opened fire, and killed one. The Zambian Government protested vigorously to the British Government but to no effect. The regime claimed that the canoe had been putting out from a place frequently used by the nationalists as a crossing point.

The final action in 1966 took place at the end of November in the Gomoza area of Lupane. A group of eight men, sent in by ZAPU had come into the area from the south. They remained there for some time. One member had a shooting accident, and, with a companion, travelled to Bulawayo, where he was captured. The other went on to Salisbury (presumably to make contact with other ZAPU people) and was arrested there. Neither gave the rest of the group away, and the security forces were not aware of their existence. These six remaining members recruited two full-time members from the local villages, and another seventeen villagers from the area gave them assistance and received training. Their intention had been to move on to bigger things. The group were very careful as they lived in very well constructed and camouflaged hides. These dugouts were so well hidden that the police only discovered the camp when one of their members actually stood on top of it and thought the soil seemed more resistant than normal.

The group was finally discovered because of a herdsman from a different village who was looking for lost cattle. The man saw one of them digging another hole, and went back

to tell his kraalhead. The kraalhead notified the police and then went to investigate. Three of the guerrilla group were waiting and decided to teach the unfriendly tribesmen a lesson. They shot and killed the kraalhead. The men who had come with the kraalhead scattered and the leader of the guerrillas left a note in Sindebele, threatening death to the police informers.

The guerrilla group were not able to resist the subsequent all-out effort which was made by the BSA police. At first the group leader managed to lose the BSA police tracking patrol by good use of the terrain. However, the police had some luck when they arrived at a suspect village literally minutes before two of the guerrillas, whom they ambushed and caught. With the information they obtained from these two, they were eventually able to arrest the others. This was one of the more effective of the ZAPU groups. Its chief mistake was to over-estimate its own strength vis-a-vis the police. In the subsequent trial, the basic motivation of the group came out when one of them said: 'We want freedom and we are going to get freedom by fighting this man (i.e. the regime) who is refusing Africans freedom.'²³

The battle was joined again in May 1967, when a group of nine entered the country via Lake Kariba. They found the going very difficult, and after about six miles or so, they abandoned their arms and equipment. Their main objective was to 'destroy railway lines, Government buildings and banks with a view to crippling the economy.' They were particularly upset by the attitude of the villagers. One of them said: 'I was surprised to see the African villagers supported the present Government and its operations to exterminate guerrilla warfare. I am not going to regret anything because we are letting each other down and this will take us a long time to liberate this country.' However, another saw his role in a historical perspective: 'I was carrying weapons to come and fight the whites, the war that was left by our forefathers.' When they were first

arrested, the police did not find them very co-operative—but in the end they talked. One who was not as committed as the others, maintained that he had been tricked into taking training, and had run away from Mbeya, the training camp in Tanzania. He was finally imprisoned for three weeks before agreeing to cross over.²⁴

Shortly afterwards, a group of four ZANU commandos tried to get a lift into Salisbury in the back of a pantechnicon. They had stopped it fairly near to Kariba, and (according to the driver) forced him to let them in. They had not gone far when the army stopped the lorry. In the ensuing gun-fight, all four guerrillas were killed and there were some army casualties.²⁵ Until the border closure the Rhodesians padlocked vehicles like this at Chirundu on the border with Zambia (after carefully frisking them) and only opened the padlock in Salisbury. If it had been tampered with, they shot the vehicle up. They also have a series of road blocks where vehicles must stop or be shot at.

ZANU claimed that their military wing killed nine members of the Rhodesian security forces near to Kariba in the middle of May. They say this was followed on 31 May by the ambush of a Rhodesian convoy with anti-personnel mines. They claim that on that occasion also, nine men were killed and others were wounded.²⁶

In the middle of June, a further incursion (ZAPU or ZANU) of twenty-one men was discovered when three nationalist fighters were caught shortly after crossing the Zambezi. Another was killed in a clash, and five other members of the group were captured in the Lomagundi district, halfway between Salisbury and the Zambezi.²⁷

A group of five ZANU guerrillas crossed the Zambezi on 23 June. Some time later, three of them approached an African, saying that they were chicken buyers. They said they were making for a European farming area. After staying with him for two days, they told him they were ZANU members, showed him their pistols, and gave him

ZANU pamphlets. They then left, and do not seem to have been caught until the middle of October. It appears that they stayed with another man, who was later charged with harbouring a 'terrorist'. When captured, one of the guerrillas was forced to talk, and gave both of his helpers away. (It is possible that this group was part of the group described in the previous paragraph.)²⁸

The Wankie Battles: July to September 1967

It was clear by the middle of 1967 that the regime had not been significantly shaken by the commando and guerrilla attacks so ZAPU entered into discussions with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), about joint action. The ANC were interested in the route from Zambia to South Africa.

At the end of July, the first joint ZAPU/ANC units crossed the Zambezi to the west of Victoria Falls, and started to make their way through the border area. ZAPU's intention was to infiltrate a large group into the centre of Rhodesia in order to start up a series of guerrilla centres.

According to the regime, about eighty men crossed, probably in a number of different groups. The groups remained divided, and began separately to pass down towards the Wankie Game Reserve. The regime was completely unaware that any crossing had occurred until nine days later when they arrested a member of one of the groups near to Wankie (which was about seventy miles from their crossing point). They became alarmed when, four days later, they arrested another guerrilla at Dett (thirty miles further on). They then surprised another who escaped by car (only to be killed a few days later, near to Bulawayo). From their interrogation of the two men they had caught, they realized that a major crossing had occurred. An RAR detachment was rapidly moved to the Wankie area, and the first major clash occurred in the middle of Sunday 13

August. A group of twenty-two nationalists, concealed in thick bush, ambushed an RAR patrol led by Patrol Officer Hopkins. He described the incident: 'We did not see them until they opened fire. The whole action was confined to about 300 yards but because of the difficult country, and our limited force, we could not surround them. There was firing all afternoon and it kept movement to a minimum. It was a tricky situation.' During the night most of the nationalists left, leaving four dead and a fifth seriously wounded, who was killed the next morning making a move for his gun. Two of the RAR patrol were killed and at least three wounded. Hopkins' patrol followed this group (which was making for the Botswana border) and had another engagement in which they claimed to have killed another eight of the nationalist guerrillas. Five of them died when a hand-grenade accidentally exploded, detonating other explosives. Six were captured immediately after this engagement, but the leader was only caught some time later.²⁹

During the course of this and subsequent engagements, the regime tried to frighten the nationalist commando groups by showering them with leaflets calling on them to 'surrender—or die'. The leaflets offered an amnesty to any African who buried his weapons and then walked towards the security forces shouting: 'We do not want to die—save us—we are here.' They were printed in Shona and English. They do not appear to have had much effect as there are very few reports of nationalists surrendering because of them, and they are not mentioned in any subsequent trials. The regime also flew sorties over the Zambezi, dropping leaflets on the Zambian side of the river.³⁰

Another RAR patrol ran into a nationalist ambush on 22 August while it was following a specially laid false trail. In the subsequent attack, two of the RAR were killed and the patrol had to retreat. They tried to attract the attention of an aircraft overhead but instead, attracted nationalist fire.

Later the air-force did try to bomb the nationalist position, but with little effect. The security forces decided to bring in reinforcements, and two new platoons of about fifty men took up the trail of the nationalists. At about 5.0 p.m. on the same day, the two platoons started to make camp but were attacked with a barrage of automatic and machine gun-fire, and hand-grenades by the group they were trailing. According to the RAR platoon commander, '... there was chaos ... I thought we were not in a good position to defend ourselves. Hand-grenades were being thrown into the camp. I thought we had lost the initiative and I ordered withdrawal.' Altogether, two men were killed and eight wounded, some seriously. Another man was killed as a result of an 'accident'. Two nationalists were killed. The nationalists had been operating (on both occasions) from very well-built hideouts. Before they went, they took some of the RAR guns, and two of the wireless sets which they used to monitor the security force movements. However, not all the commandos were able to stand the pace and altogether, five men left the group during, or immediately after this fight, including the ANC commander.

A week later, the security forces were taken to one of the nationalist bases by a captive and made a surprise attack on it, killing four members. According to the regime, the bases were also strafed by the Rhodesian Air Force with great success.³¹

At this point, the South African Government decided that the Rhodesian forces were under such pressure that help was needed. The presence of ANC men, which had been confirmed by a joint statement from Oliver Tambo of ANC and James Chikerema of ZAPU on 19 August 1967, gave them the excuse. South African forces were flown to the Wankie area where they provided a backing which allowed the Rhodesians to throw all their forces into the fray.³²

Meanwhile, another ZAPU/ANC group made its way down to the south, and a major clash was reported at Tjolutjo township, about sixty miles from Bulawayo. According to reports at the time, fierce fighting began about the 24 August, and the South African forces were reported to be involved in it. Further fighting was reported a few days later about twenty-five miles to the west of Bulawayo. These reports gave little indication of the casualties sustained by either side (although they did imply that both sides had suffered losses).³³ A subsequent trial report (which took place in South Africa) gives a more detailed picture of both engagements. The group was making its way south through Wankie, camouflaging itself at night against detection by aircraft. After obtaining food from an elderly man in a nearby village, they were attacked by Rhodesian security forces. They immediately retaliated and, despite the destruction of one of their three sub-machine guns by a hand-grenade, they later counter-attacked, driving the security forces away. They captured guns and equipment, some of which they could not carry. So they hid them. They lost four dead, and had two wounded, but moved away from the area as rapidly as possible. In the next engagement, neither side suffered any casualties, and both sides retreated from each other. After this, three of the ANC members separated from their group. One was arrested at the end of December in Plumtree. Another was repatriated to Durban where he got a job until he was arrested by the police.³⁴ Another ANC man, possibly from this same group, stayed in the Plumtree area for some time until he was helped by a Zimbabwe African, Jeremiah Makubale. Makubale was visiting his home town after a long period in South Africa, and he helped the ANC man avoid the security forces. At the end of November 1967, they travelled together to Johannesburg, where they were eventually arrested by the South African police.³⁵

One group, (possibly the one above) built a series of six camps along the Rhodesia/Botswana border. According to a security officer: 'Each appeared to have been chosen by someone with great knowledge of guerrilla warfare.' The camps carried stores of rifles, sub-machine guns, booby-trap explosives, plastic explosives as well as books on guerrilla warfare and leaflets calling on Africans to fight for liberation. One of them was made as a concealed pit with a wooden roof, covered with grass.³⁶

There is some evidence for a further attempted infiltration in the middle of August, across Lake Kariba to the 'Sengwa area'.³⁷ This possibly refers to an area south of the Sengwa Sound. The crossing may refer to a group of twenty-one guerrillas who, according to trial reports, were spotted and attacked immediately after crossing. Six of them escaped immediate capture by jumping into the water and clinging on to tree roots. They then tried to make their way to Rhodesia, and one of their number was killed in a skirmish with South African troops. The other five were caught. Another eleven of them decided to try to get jobs on farms, so they carefully hid their arms in a cache. One lost his nerve, and gave himself up to the army. Some others were arrested while getting water or trying to get jobs. In one incident, a European farmer tried to arrest them—but was threatened by the others who then drove off in his land-rover. Four members of the original group of twenty-one were not accounted for.³⁸

Although the nationalist commandos' relations with the local people were not always good, and they seem to have positively avoided contact with the tribesmen near the Zambezi: in September 1967, a certain Jairos Nyamsika was found guilty of assisting a commando with food. When the commando returned five days later (without his arms) he was seen by two African hunters who reported his presence to a European. He challenged the guerrilla who turned and ran. The European then shot him in the back.³⁹

European sources have been used for practically all the information described above. However, Sechaba, the monthly journal of the South African ANC, has published an account of the Wankie operations by an un-named ANC fighter. After crossing the Zambezi, his group (both ZAPU and ANC, and about thirty in number) made for the Wankie Game Reserve, successfully avoiding the regime's forces. They crossed the main road to Wankie (which was being patrolled) one by one, in the short intervals between lorries. To start off with, they found the going bad and were easily exhausted.

They finally got to the game reserve having successfully avoided all human contact. Here the group divided, and his group went further into the game reserve in a south westerly direction. They encountered a number of problems—in particular they ran out of food and water and had some difficulty in getting game. They also did not have an adequate map. They suffered from hunger and kept losing each other. The security forces were aware of their existence from captured members of other groups, but the nationalists followed what was happening to the other groups on their transistor radios. On one occasion the detachment was hidden by the side of the road and saw a convoy of trucks stopping right opposite them. The white officer got out, looked for anything suspicious, and then moved the convoy on. They eventually emerged from the game reserve, weak from lack of food, and walked straight into an intensive search for them. They managed to buy some food from the local villagers, but their presence was betrayed. This resulted in an engagement in which, according to this account, eighteen members of the RAR (two white officers and sixteen Africans) were killed. Four nationalists were also killed and two wounded. The rest captured arms, food and radio sets. Using information from the radio sets and from one of the locals, they managed to avoid the security forces. The account claims that, in an

ambush designed for them, the security forces succeeded in ambushing their own men.

They observed at a distance, an attempted air attack on them and later had another encounter with the security forces. They claim to have killed more of the regime's forces than on the previous occasion, but they lost two of their own group. Afterwards, they heard on their radio that a high-ranking officer had been killed in an ambush.

After this engagement, the ZAPU and ANC men divided because they had different objectives. The ANC group went down through the Tjolutjo and Nata TTLs, more rapidly now because they did not have their wounded comrades with them. They learnt from the local people that the roads and (more importantly) the water points were being actively guarded. The land was also very open along the Plumtree-Bulawayo road, so that the group decided to cut past Plumtree on the Botswana side of the border. However because of lack of cover, they had to follow the Matemba river some way into Botswana. Before they could get back to Rhodesia, they were arrested by the Botswana border police and some were sentenced to two and others to three years imprisonment for entering the country illegally, with arms.⁴⁰

Further reports in the Rhodesian press show that another clash occurred at the beginning of September, when three nationalists were killed; one member of the security forces was killed and another injured.⁴¹ Nine nationalists (probably including the ANC men above) were arrested in Botswana and charged with illegal entry. One died of wounds received in Rhodesia.⁴²

According to the regime, the tally by the middle of September was thirty-one nationalists dead and thirty-two captured, with seven members of the security forces killed, another killed in an 'accident' and at least fourteen wounded.⁴³ The reported engagements took place in the Zambezi Valley (west of Kariba), the Wankie Game

Reserve, the Hartley/Gatooma area and the Tjolutjo area. The battles showed up weaknesses and strengths in both the Rhodesian security system and the nationalist tactics. The intelligence services employed by the regime in Zambia were unable to warn the regime that an attack was imminent—but once they had a clue as to the whereabouts of a commando group in Rhodesia, they had the military strength to hold on till they either lost the group or destroyed it. When it came to the test, they had the physical backing of South Africa as well. Whole groups were given away by one member trying to get food and being noticed and arrested. Also, the figure-of-eight pattern on the soles of their shoes made tracking very simple. However, the regime did under-estimate the military skill of the commandos and the security forces walked into several ambushes which forced them to fight in unfavourable positions. Of course it is impossible to say how many ZAPU and ANC men were finally able to get to their destinations and stay there undiscovered. Chenu quotes a high-ranking Rhodesian army officer as saying 'about one in fifteen gets through to become an underground agent'.⁴⁴

Three other incursions occurred in 1967. At the end of September, a nationalist group (ZAPU or ZANU) tried to cross the Zambezi but was seen by the security forces. They turned back after wounding one of the Rhodesian soldiers.⁴⁵ Another minor, but undetected incursion must have occurred at the end of November when a group of South African ANC men crossed from Zambia to Botswana via Rhodesia. They intended to make their way to South Africa but were arrested by the Botswana police before they had gone very far.⁴⁶

Towards the end of 1967 (or the beginning of 1968—the trial record is very unclear), a group of four guerrillas entered, probably to the east of Kariba. As some of them had been trained in China, and had a book of Mao's thoughts, they were possibly a ZANU group. A transport

driver who did the Salisbury to Lusaka route twice weekly, picked them up, and drove them to Salisbury. Until their arrest, he looked after them. He had already brought in three parcels of weapons from Lusaka. The guerrillas stored the weapons and explosives they had brought with them with another man. This man claimed, at his trial, that he had been threatened—and his defence was substantially accepted by the judge. Apart from weapons, the four had brought in policy booklets, leaflets of their party and two flags with the following words on them: 'All whites must be killed, we are to free Zimbabwe with bloodshed' and 'Zimbabwe for black and not for whites, to kill Smith and his running dogs'. It is not clear how long they were in Rhodesia before they were picked up—but it cannot have been more than about two months. The four guerrillas were quite unrepentant at their trial. One argued with some cogency, that he did not see 'how it becomes possible that if I fight with a man, that man conducts my trial'.⁴⁷

The Zambezi Escarpment Battles: December 1967-April 1968

At the end of 1967, the ANC/ZAPU high command launched its next major attack on Rhodesia. It decided to send in another large group but, in view of the failure of its previous large group sent to Wankie, it decided to prepare the ground very carefully.

A three-man reconnaissance was made in November 1967, followed by a larger one (twenty-eight members) towards the end of December. The latter group entered across the Zambezi, well to the west of Kariba, made a more extensive reconnaissance and established a base camp in the vicinity of the Chigwasa river. They returned to Lusaka and made a report. The leaders decided to act immediately.

At the end of December 1967 and the beginning of January 1968, about 150 nationalists, ZAPU and ANC,

crossed the Zambezi near to the entry of the Chewore River. They used rafts, (some of which capsized) taking arms for themselves and for others in Rhodesia. They set up their first camp about eight miles from the Zambezi, where they were soon visited by one of the ZAPU leaders, who told them not to fight at once but to build 'lots of bases and recruit lots of people'. They were also visited by one of the ANC leaders. Radio communications were to be used to start the fighting. They made six camps in all, three of them included dugouts in which were stored rifles and carbines, grenades, rocket-launchers and booby-traps. According to the security forces, the camp sites were well chosen, with a good supply of water, and well shaded by the dense undergrowth.

From information gained from interrogations, Morris claims that they got most of their food from Zambia and a platoon of approximately thirty-five, (including ten women) was employed ferrying food across the Zambezi to them. They also shot a lot of game, and bought food within Rhodesia. For example, at the beginning of March, four nationalists bought food from a store run by a European farmer. Communications with Zambia were so good that they were able to send one guerrilla back for disciplining.⁴⁸

While this large scale infiltration was taking place, two smaller groups entered Rhodesia, causing the regime considerable concern. One group crossed over the Zambezi between Kariba and the Victoria Falls and the other crossed to the east of the Kariba Dam, near to Chirundu. These may have been to reinforce the main one near to the Chewore river, (and were discontinued when they were discovered), or there may have been an attempt to distract the security forces from the area of the main infiltration.

The first public information was a communique from the security forces on 28 December 1967, claiming that some guerrillas who had crossed 'in the past week' had been captured. A South African paper said that 'in some areas,

such as the Tjolotjo and Nyamandhlovu tribal reserves there is reported to be a total ban on movements of unauthorized persons'.⁴⁹ Road blocks were operating only fourteen miles from Bulawayo. The reports of what was probably the trial of the first of the smaller groups suggest that it either comprised four men, or only four survived. They crossed into Rhodesia and camped in a dense forest. The next morning, the leader and one other left the rest to reconnoitre the area, but got lost. They were tracked by a sergeant of the Special Air Service, who managed to surprise them. They surrendered immediately. One of the other two was arrested by an African civilian, and the other one was discovered by a white farmer hiding in a hut. They had already hidden their arms. This group had been told to organize the people to fight 'bad' Europeans, and they had brought eight slabs of TNT with them, hoping to disrupt vital services.⁵⁰

On 2 January 1968, two guerrillas were captured by the security forces at Makuti, but one escaped almost immediately. They had been part of the group of about ten men who had crossed near to Chirundu. Shortly after this, the security forces clashed with the nationalists. One guerrilla was killed and several were captured. At least two from the first group escaped to Botswana where they were charged with illegal entry—but allowed to go to Zambia after sentence. The communique issued by the regime on 9 January, stated that 'final mopping-up operations' were taking place. However, the Times reported on 11 January that 'at road blocks on the Victoria Falls road, which are manned by police armed with automatic weapons, people are now being asked to give names and addresses and say where they are going'. The regime was clearly not satisfied—but no further public communiques or reports were released. A report of the trial of nine members of what was probably the second group said that 'the men were rounded up in various parts of Rhodesia' by both the

security forces and the police. Besides weapons and ammunition, the guerrillas carried flags, note books containing instructions in English on 'terrorist and guerrilla warfare', 'confrontation pamphlets' of a banned political party, and the 'Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-tung'. One of the nine maintained he had been hijacked and forced to take guerrilla training but the judge did not accept his story. Another of the nine was only sixteen years of age, and so was not sentenced to death. (There is some evidence from the trial report to suggest that the group was ZANU—but the date of the action suggests that it was a ZAPU group). The security forces remained totally unaware of the infiltration to the east of Chirundu, in spite of the interrogation of their prisoners.⁵¹

To return to the main group; it was not till the middle of March, nearly three months after the operation had started, that the regime discovered its presence. The guerrillas were not spotted from the air but were discovered by a game warden who noticed tracks with the familiar figure-of-eight sole marks. He called the police who investigated them. (Later it was discovered that this police patrol had been under observation and would have been ambushed itself if the guerrillas had not been under orders not to make contact). An emergency call went out in Salisbury for all units to report and troops were airlifted by helicopter to the area. The regime still did not realize how long the guerrillas had been in the country. In their first communique, they stated: 'There has been an infiltration of terrorists from Zambia and security forces are now in contact with them.' Various rumours were circulating—one, for example, said that an African chief in the Kariba Dam area had seen twenty canoes full of guerrillas crossing the river.

The first clash took place on 18 March, between a group of eleven guerrillas and a platoon of the RLI in which the RLI tried to ambush the guerrillas. In the ensuing fight, all eleven guerrillas were killed and the security forces lost

three soldiers. A mixed RAR and RLI group were, at the same time, following the spoor of some other guerrillas to their camp. They did not realize they had reached it until a burst of fire hit them. A breakthrough was attempted without success as the camp was on a hill and very well defended. The regime then ordered in the Air Force which blasted the camp out of existence. Its air power was an enormous asset to the regime and caused some confusion among the nationalists. However, most of the nationalists managed to get out of the camp in time and they regrouped into four sections and made off in different directions. The bombing was not very accurate as, according to the security forces, four of their own number were wounded by bombs.⁵² The security forces followed the four groups in a 'search and destroy' operation. In one incident at the very end of March, described later in a trial report, an RLI patrol tried to surround a group of seven guerrillas sheltering in a wood. They made one sweep through the wood, and the guerrillas retreated successfully, except for Sly Masuka, who was too exhausted to escape. In the second sweep, Troopers Binks and Wessels approached where Masuka was hiding, so he shot and killed both of them. The patrol stopped and Masuka was able to escape. He was not captured for a further month, and during this time he obtained food and shelter from 'various people'. His responsibility for the death of the two soldiers was proved because he kept his rifle with him, and the bullets matched.⁵³

The Rhodesian security forces were now under great pressure. At the beginning of April (less than a fortnight after the fighting started) the Rhodesian Minister of Defence, J. H. Howman, welcomed the offer of more South African forces with the words: 'I think it is absolutely splendid news. My immediate reaction is one of gratitude. It is comforting to think that one has such loyal neighbours who are always prepared to give help when needed.' Four

days later, a company of the Territorial Force was suddenly called up for a fortnight of full-time service. The excuse given was that they wanted to take advantage of the action so that members of the force could 'gain first hand experience in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations and to give them valuable training for this type of warfare.'⁵⁴

Immediately after the first clashes between the nationalists and the security forces on 18 March, a further detachment of about thirty nationalists was sent over the Zambezi to provide reinforcements. They marched south to join up with their comrades. Another group of eleven tried to infiltrate to the west of Lake Kariba. It was probably from ZANU, taking advantage of the action in the east of Rhodesia. However, it was discovered immediately and four were killed and (from trial reports) three were captured. In a preparatory hearing in Bulawayo, one said: 'We entered Rhodesia from Zambia as an armed band to make war. We were not forced to enter the country. Our intention was to fight the minority Government in order to achieve majority rule.'⁵⁵ The regime also reported that four or five nationalists were captured by tribesmen. The Air Force scattered 'surrender or die' leaflets, and a number surrendered because of them. A few simply deserted their groups (or got separated from them in the flight from the security forces). The total number who surrendered willingly was probably only nine, the number convicted at a special trial held at the beginning of July. Reports make it clear that tribesmen were being offered cash rewards (for example, £5 per head) as an added incentive to the fear of reprisals if they did not report the 'strangers'.⁵⁶

Fighting continued for about two months with results which differ according to the source of information. Communiqués issued by the nationalists (ZAPU and ANC) talk of heavy casualties among the security forces and large numbers of the dead being buried secretly. They claim that the fighting was taking place just north of Salisbury. The

communiques describe some specific incidents—for example, seven members of the security forces were killed in a clash near Karoi in the middle of April and a little later, four Alouette helicopters were destroyed. Their communique of 6 May, states that African civilians were being killed and then claimed as nationalist dead. They cite three examples where relatives of the victims were threatened with detention if the news got round. They also claim that the masses of the people were 'playing a decisive role in helping the ZAPU/ANC guerrillas'.⁵⁷

According to the security forces, the clashes took the form of a series of battles between individual groups. By the end of June, the regime claim to have killed fifty-seven of the nationalists and captured at least thirty-three. The overall commander, Moffat Hadebe, remained at liberty for at least five months. He and a companion (John Mandiwengerayi) were finally captured in Mozambique. Felix Choga (who was political commissar to one of the platoons) remained at liberty for about the same length of time. He was ambushed in a dry river bed near to the Zambezi, and his companion was killed before he could fire. Choga was himself wounded in the leg. The regime claim that only five of their own men were killed in the whole of the operation (plus another killed in an 'accident'). The figures for injuries are less definite, but at least nine were wounded.⁵⁸

Detailed accounts of some of these engagements have been given by nationalist fighters actually involved. In an interview with Patrick Keatley in Zambia, one ZAPU guerrilla described how his platoon had crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia using ropes. They were fed by villagers with game, rice and mealies.

In mid-April they were spotted from the air, bombed (without effect) and then followed by a Rhodesian infantry platoon. This they ambushed inflicting several casualties. The man Keatley spoke to, commented: 'We have had

many more actions now and our spirits are good. The villagers never betrayed any of us; they look on us as protectors, now that the Special Branch has started taking hostages and questioning and shooting them.'⁵⁹

Another report is one given by an ANC member of the group under Moffat Hadebe, to Sechaba. He describes how they crossed over the Zambezi and set up a series of camps. They had wireless communication between the bases and their HQ. Apparently they had been planning to make an assault from all the forward bases, but instead, they were attacked by the security forces. They became separated from the HQ platoon and because of the breakdown in radio equipment, did not realize that there had been a battle and some of their comrades killed or captured. His platoon was attacked but he claimed that they killed several of the security forces and sustained only a few casualties themselves. They were unsuccessfully bombed and then split up into smaller units of eighteen to twenty-four men. His group got lost due to inadequate maps and became separated from the rest of their platoon. They therefore marched for about two weeks until their food was almost finished. They sent some of their number to get food from a nearby village, but they were stopped by the police who wanted to see their passes. As a result of this, the police killed one of them in the ensuing battle; a further four were killed and so (according to the writer) were twelve of the security forces. They then moved on as fast as possible (with mealies as their main food). They were again surprised by the Rhodesian forces, and were forced to divide into yet smaller groups. His party finally arrived at a village which was fairly friendly. This was about three months after the initial attack by the security forces. They were helped by 'Old Man' who gave them food and information. Old Man was in his mid-twenties and had served a period of detention. It was this detention that politicized him. They were not able to become part of the village because of the

danger of informers. However, they were able to contact old members of ZAPU and begin to organize sabotage. They also found one of their group who had been surprised by the Rhodesian forces earlier, and who had been injured and cared for by the villagers.

Disaster struck them in a somewhat indirect way. The people with whom their injured comrade had been staying, wanted the group to consult the local maswikero (spirit medium). After considerable discussion—especially over the possibility or otherwise of offending the villagers, they decided to send the injured man, with a guide, to consult the maswikero. On the way back, they were met by the Special Branch who were suspicious. They interrogated the guide, who gave away all he knew. Old Man was shot and the whole area saturated with police and army. The guerrillas were not discovered for some time and despite the trouble which they had brought on the village, they were still supplied with food. They were just about to move on when they were again attacked by the security forces, who must have somehow found out where they were. In the ensuing battle, two of the guerrillas were killed and the writer was seriously injured. The guerrilla detachment had to move on and the writer was left behind to be cared for by the villagers. Eventually, his wounds healed and he was able to make his way to Zambia.⁶⁰

Some of the ZAPU/ANC commandos who had come in in January 1968 remained at liberty long after the clashes in March and April, and started training the local population in the use of arms. A group of four nationalists, two ZAPU and two ANC moved to the Mrewa district (about fifty miles east of Salisbury, and a long way from the original fighting) because one of them had relatives in the area. They set themselves up in a cave. The entrance was concealed with mango trees, and the fire was so contrived that the smoke did not rise vertically. They brought with them, and stored in the cave, grenades, ammunition, entrenching tools and

rifles. The two ANC members left for South Africa shortly after. The remaining two made contact with the local people, obtaining food and information from them. One of their contacts went to Salisbury to get clothing and a map of Rhodesia for them from ZAPU men who had been in restriction. The two guerrillas then spent over two months training seven (dropping to five) tribesmen in the use of guns, and how to crawl 'like a cat, like a snake and like a child'. Then, at the beginning of 1969, one of the tribesmen was arrested, and was made to give the guerrillas away. The police found the cave, and captured some of the guerrillas' equipment. The men were only captured some time later on a European farm. They escaped but were re-captured on another farm. This time only one managed to escape and the other was brought to trial and sentenced to life imprisonment.⁶¹ The one who escaped, went to the north of the Mrewa district, near to Chitsungo. There he made contact with one of the villagers and stayed with various people for a total of three or four months. He didn't hide that he was a guerrilla. At a subsequent trial of one of the helpers, a graphic description was given of an earlier meeting: 'The visitor was made to stand at our meeting, and told to go and get his weapon so that the rest of the people could see it. The visitor did so and went to get the gun where he had buried it. He brought the gun to them and one of the accused took the gun in his hands and showed it. This was to make them certain the visitor was a freedom fighter and this was a gun which he had brought from Zambia, where he had been trained. All of us cheered at this and said we were satisfied as we had seen the gun and we now believed he was a freedom fighter, and we then dismissed from this meeting and went to our huts.' At another meeting, the guerrilla explained that he was a member of the group that had crossed over the Zambezi in early 1968. He wanted to train them to fight Rhodesian soldiers to become 'freedom fighters'. He spoke to visitors

from other villages. One member of the village introduced him to an acquaintance from another village. The guerrilla told this man that he had come into the tribal reserves to train people to fight. However, the man was not prepared to bring him to his village because he was afraid of trouble. This ZAPU guerrilla was finally arrested on 9 December 1969, nearly two years after he had entered Rhodesia. He had hidden his gun and ammunition well away from where he was living and aroused suspicion by looking for them. He was captured by a large group of children (from the local school) led by their head teacher. They attacked him fiercely and finally knocked him out. He was dragged to the local headman and then the local chief (Chief Chitsungo) handed him over to the police.⁶²

Another two ZAPU guerrillas moved down to the Sinoia area (after the original fighting in the Zambezi Valley) because they had originally come from there. They made a tentative contact with at least one kraal (village). One villager who had been an enthusiastic ZAPU man in the past, acted as their agent, although they also received food and clothing from the kraal head. The agent persuaded seven men to go to training sessions where the guerrillas taught them how to use guns with and without bayonets, and how to crawl through the bush. They used sticks and dummy guns for other exercises. The agent also arranged for one man to go to Salisbury to obtain money and clothing. The guerrillas arrived at the end of 1968 and the training continued for three weeks and four days, but stopped because someone who had been helping the guerrillas, was arrested. The agent then asked them to go away—which they did until later in the year when things had quietened down. When the guerrillas came back they again obtained help from the whole village via their contact, with the same person as before visiting Salisbury for them to contact 'disaffected elements'. Shortly after this, the police realized that something was happening, and

arrested the agent and a number of others—some of whom were persuaded to act as witnesses for the regime by being offered indemnity to prosecution. The guerrillas escaped and there is no evidence that they were ever caught.⁶³

One of the problems in describing the progress of the fighting in Rhodesia is the conflict between the communiques from the security forces and from the nationalist headquarters. Most writers give the regime's communiques more weight, but there is some evidence to suggest that figures are manufactured. Herbert Thomson (then President of the National Association of Coloured People) alleged that the security forces were killing African villagers in the Zambezi Valley while tracking nationalist guerrillas. He claimed that, in one incident, the security forces had put guerrilla uniforms on the villagers, told them to run, and shot them.⁶⁴

In a visit to Rhodesia at the end of 1968, Nicholas Tomalin described some unmarked graves near to the little town of Miami, ten miles north east of Karoi. According to the regime, these are graves of dead nationalists, buried like this so that the place will not become a place of pilgrimage. However, he was told a story which suggested that the other Africans were buried there as well: Apparently, a nationalist came to the village begging for food. While he was being given it, the chief's son went to get the security forces (both for the reward and because of the penalties for harbouring guerrillas). When the army arrived, they fired indiscriminately, killing twelve civilians as well as the nationalist. This report was strongly denied by the regime.⁶⁵

These engagements followed the big invasion in December 1967, and shows the importance of the regime's air power against a base which is isolated—unless it has effective anti-aircraft armament. The nationalist bases were not able to stand up to the combined military and air power of the regime, and so the initiative passed into the hands of the Rhodesian security forces, and the nationalists

remained on the run until they became twos and threes. Only small groups were able to remain and operate for long in the country without detection. Their survival depended on the help they received from sympathetic villagers.

The Kariba Battles, July-August 1968

Zapu and the ANC decided to make another large-scale infiltration and, on 12 and 13 July, three groups crossed the Zambezi. Altogether, ninety-one commandos were involved. One group of thirty-eight crossed at the Chewore river and went south towards Mount Darwin. At the other side of Kariba, a group of twenty-five crossed at the Gwai river, and made for Hartley. The next day, a third group of twenty-eight crossed in the area of Chirundu, also bound for Hartley, via the Kuburi hills.

After a fortnight, the first party was spotted by helicopters, and the commander ordered them to split up into three groups. One group of five was arrested in the compound of an African village, and in the village store. They said in their trial that they had been told to dodge the security forces. They were to leave their weapons in the bush while they went into the 'kraals' to recruit members for sending back to Zambia. Another of the groups was involved in a serious clash with the security forces. According to the regime, nine of the guerrillas were killed and three were wounded. The security forces claimed that they had no casualties. Again the group's object was to 'organize and recruit people in Rhodesia, and to fight'. The third group also clashed with the security forces. A lieutenant in the Rhodesia Light Infantry said at their trial that the guerrillas 'put up a courageous fight. (They) continued to fight from dug-in positions, knowing they were surrounded. The security forces were fired on by automatic and semi-automatic fire. They suffered no casualties. After the action, there were seven terrorists dead. One man was badly

wounded.' J. B. Bell claims that there was another group of seven which never made any contact. He does not quote a source. Another man, who probably came over with this first party, detached himself from his group after one of the clashes with the security forces. He was captured about one and a half months later in an unspecified game park. He was given away by his clothes and boots, which were obviously guerilla issue. The nationalists carried political pamphlets as well as considerable quantities of ammunition and explosives. One quoted in a subsequent trial (it was printed in Shona and Sindbele) was headed: 'War of Freedom in Zimbabwe and South Africa.' It referred to 'sellouts like Judas Iscariot and Tshombe' and said that every black man should get a weapon to fight for freedom. Africans should leave work, stop drinking beer and join in 'the war of freedom'. It asked that the note be passed on to friends and relatives, and concluded that the leaflet was 'brought to you by the people of Zimbabwe and ANC of South Africa'.⁶⁶

The group which entered near to the Gwai river was very quickly spotted by the Rhodesia security forces. There were at least two clashes within eight days of their entry, and in the second, the air force was used (with success) against the guerrilla position. In one incident (described in a trial) a captured African guerrilla was forced to lead a security platoon to the guerrilla base. The man was told to give the platoon advance warning of the presence of his compatriots, but instead, he shouted a warning to his comrades when he was about twenty feet away. He was killed for doing so, but was unable to save his comrades, three of whom were killed, and the others captured. In the same trial, a guerrilla described how he and another man were sent by their group to find water and food. When they could not find food or water, and then found that they were lost, the man decided to try to get to his home but he was arrested before he could reach it. The regime took the

incursion very seriously, as the Guardian reported that 'large convoys of black troops and white troops have been passing through (Bulawayo) in the past two days'.⁶⁷

The third group had to start its journey through excessively thick undergrowth, and the two guides immediately lost their way. They spent the first two days going round in a circle back to the Zambezi. They made a fresh start, but succeeded in losing one of their members who was then captured by the Rhodesian security forces. This was their first knowledge of the crossing, though they claim that on this occasion they knew it was imminent. The South African forces were guarding this sector. 100 members of the RAR and RLI, and fifty-eight members of the police (mostly South Africans) were used in the attempt to destroy the group. They were tracked from behind and an attempt was made to anticipate the direction in which they were going in order to ambush them. The security forces were repeatedly relieved, so they were always fresh. Two days later, a patrol was ambushed by the guerrilla group, who were well placed on the sides of a deep gully. Another South African patrol attempted to 'sweep down' on to the guerrilla position but they were hit by a burst of fire from about fifteen yards, and were pinned down. Two men were seriously injured in the first burst. At one point in the engagement, they were taunted: 'Come in, you Boers, and get us out.' The ZAPU/ANC position was bombed from helicopters, but as there were caves in the gully side, this was not very effective. Shortly after this, another South African was injured, and then Daniel du Toit was killed trying to draw fire to himself. He was the first member of the South African security forces acknowledged to have been killed in action. The South African patrol remained in position until nightfall, and then extricated itself. Altogether, six of the guerrillas were killed. They continued next towards Hartley, but were ambushed twice by the security forces, losing another thirteen men. One of them

deserted the group and was picked up on the Kariba-Salisbury road. The others then made for the Kariba Game Park where a further five were killed and one captured. Only one man appears to have escaped.^{68*}

Altogether, according to the regime's figures, thirty nine nationalists were killed and forty-one captured.⁶⁹ Eleven were not accounted for. Not all were captured near the Zambezi. For example, four guerrillas who came over at the Gwai river, and two of whom were members of the ANC, were helped by Africans in the Zwimba TTL. This was despite the presence of the security forces in the area. Apparently, the police 'were manning road blocks in the area and were clearing up stragglers or remnants of a group of about 100 terrorists who had earlier crossed the Zambezi into Rhodesia'.⁷⁰

A ZANU group of fourteen provided the last reported engagement of 1968 when it crossed Lake Kariba on 7 August and almost immediately clashed with the security forces, who claimed to have killed four and captured the other ten in the ensuing five days, with no casualties of their own.

In the subsequent trial of eight of these men, one of those charged, said: 'The African people of this country know that I am fighting for the truth and the whites outside Rhodesia know I am fighting for my rights . . . Because we are not accepted as sons of Zimbabwe, we are being insulted by being called terrorists. If this word means a wild person who kills other people, what is the white man to be called since he came into this country, killing people, and he is still doing so?' However, two of the accused appear to have been

* The account of this action given by J. A. Bell⁷² is misleading in two important respects. He says that 100 members of the RAR were used and fifty-eight members of the Rhodesian (BSA) police. In fact, the RLI were involved (two of their members were seriously injured) and so were the South African forces. He states that a member of the Rhodesian forces was killed. In fact (as stated above) it was du Toit, a South African.

far less willing recruits. One claimed to have been forced by the ZANU commandos to act as a porter for their belongings.⁷¹

The only other group to infiltrate in 1968 was a group of ZAPU agents who did not cross the Zambezi clandestinely, but came across legitimately, probably in ones and twos. Twenty-one members of ZAPU were convicted of taking guerrilla training in Russia, China, North Korea, and Egypt. One of the witnesses said that he had crossed with others via Livingstone (in Zambia). Another witness said that there were 'ZAPU treasurers in different parts of Rhodesia. Their duty was to supply money to men who had been in Zambia and who returned to Rhodesia. He established codes with them—a circle with a line through it'. He went on to say that 'one man came to him for money to buy a camera. He wanted it to copy documents and sent prints to Zambia. In 1966 he received a message that 600 men were wanted in Zambia 'so they could come back to Rhodesia in big numbers'. It seems that they were arrested in the first half of 1968, probably through the evidence of informers or deserters.⁷³

1969, A Quiet Year

The infiltration of large groups by ZAPU and ANC over the previous two years, had not been an outstanding success and with 1969 came a change of policy. The ANC continued its link with ZAPU till the splits in ZAPU became serious in 1970/71.⁷⁴ Groups were vulnerable and too difficult to conceal, either in the countryside or among the population. The tribe in the area around Lake Kariba is the Tonga with whom the Rhodesian regime keeps close contact through the DC. The tribesmen have been given government aid and now have a trade in fishing.⁷⁵ They are thus not very sympathetic to the nationalists. The nationalists did meet with goodwill from other tribes. In 1965 and 1966, ZAPU

had sent in twos and threes and some of these infiltrated very successfully, as did some members of the large bands who got separated from their comrades. This method was now adopted as official policy. In an interview given by James Chikerema (then vice-President of ZAPU) to Gus MacDonald of Granada TV in October 1969, he explained the long-term emphasis in ZAPU tactics. 'We will go to our own areas and infiltrate ourselves in the population and organize our masses.' The instructions for the ZAPU infiltrators were 'not to fight unless engaged and to move swiftly towards villages where they change to civilian clothes to recruit, train and arm ZAPU underground for future rebellion'.⁷⁶ ZANU say they continued to send small groups over the border throughout the period of the ZAPU large-scale attacks.

An insight into the infiltration techniques used by ZAPU, was given by a World in Action team who spoke to, and filmed, one group which was responsible for reconnoitering the crossing points of the Zambezi. They crossed the river with standard fishermen's boats. They also monitored the movements of the security forces, brought food and weapons into Rhodesia which were stored at various caches, and guided the combat infiltrators for about 100 miles through the particularly dangerous border area. Some of the group remained in Rhodesia for a considerable time. For example, the commander of this ZAPU group claimed that the longest period he had spent inside Rhodesia was six months—mostly reconnoitering routes for crossing the border area.⁷⁷

An American journalist, Earl Warren Howe, claims to have entered Rhodesia with a ZAPU/ANC group early in 1969. He was taken to a village near to Karoi which was used as a 'relay' station for the ZAPU guerrillas. The headman there, told him that he had been ordered by the South African troops in the area, to wait three days before he reported the presence of any 'terrorists' so that the troops

did not have to fight. Howe stated that the bulk of the population in the north east of Rhodesia had thrown in its lot with the nationalist resistance.⁷⁸

Evidence of this new policy of merging with the population is provided in trials which took place in August and October 1969. In May, an unarmed ZAPU intelligence officer entered Rhodesia and went to a village in northern Matabeleland to stay with his aunt. He spoke to the kraal head and five others with the object of setting up a ZAPU cell. The purpose of the cell was to prepare for future attacks. He left after ten days for Bulawayo, leaving detailed written instructions hidden in a torch. He was caught in Bulawayo because he had been responsible for the destruction of the Pumula township post-office in September 1966. In his trial, it transpired that he had escaped to Botswana after this incident, where he was detained for a while before he went to Lusaka. There he rejoined ZAPU and (presumably) received guerrilla training before he was sent back into Rhodesia. His main intelligence job was to judge whether the people were ready for armed struggle. He was instructed to find suitable sites for armed caches and to locate places for crossing the Zambezi. He showed his dedication by refusing to testify against the tribesmen at their trial.⁷⁹

A few other incidents were reported in the press. At the very end of the previous year, members of a European Salisbury family narrowly missed death when they were shot at through the window of their house.⁸⁰ A ZAPU supporter in Rhodesia was gaoled for illegally possessing commercial explosives. He admitted previous convictions of blowing up telephone lines and setting fire to buildings.⁸¹ A European traveller from Malawi was injured when his car was shot up near to Mtoko. The guerrillas responsible were assisted by local villagers and were not caught.⁸²

However, the most dramatic episode of the year was the trial of the leader of ZANU, Ndabaningi Sithole, who was

found guilty of trying to arrange for the assassination of Smith, Lardner-Burke, and Howman.

It was alleged that he had asked an associate outside of prison to arrange for three hard-core criminals to kill the three white leaders. However, the letter was intercepted by the duplicity of the courier used by Sithole and the plot was discovered. At the end of the trial, Sithole said that he wished to 'dis-associate my name in thought word and deed from any subversive activities, from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence'.⁸³ This appears to have been a ploy, as shortly afterwards, in a letter successfully smuggled out of prison, he called for an intensification of the armed struggle for the liberation of Rhodesia 'even at the cost of our lives'.⁸⁴

The Victoria Falls Attacks January-April 1970

At the beginning of 1970, at least two groups of ZAPU guerrillas crossed the Zambezi. One of these groups made several attacks on the Rhodesian and South African security forces, and on installations. These engagements hit the headlines because the nationalists were unusually aggressive. The regime claimed, in a communique, that altogether there were only 'about twenty' who crossed.⁸⁵ Other reports suggested about 100⁸⁶ and these reports are probably nearer the truth as the total number of nationalists announced as having been killed, captured or put to flight comes to thirty-eight. A number returned to Zambia, and a number will have remained in Rhodesia.

The first public indication that another attack was under way was a communique issued on 4 January by the security forces which said: 'A party of terrorists from Zambia crossed the Zambezi river into Rhodesia and the incident is being investigated by the security forces. On Saturday, 3 January 1970 a Rhodesian police patrol boat, clearly marked, was fired on in the vicinity of the crossing. Small arms and

automatic weapons fire came from the Zambian bank of the Zambezi, where a party of about twenty men was seen. This unprovoked attack resulted in a police patrol officer receiving a slight flesh wound in three places.⁸⁵

A much fuller account of this particular incident was given in an interview with a Johannesburg businessman who was fishing at the mouth of the Gwai river. He had seen the damaged police boat, and spoken to one of the members of the security forces who 'told me they had been fired on from less than fifteen yards'. He said he had seen the spot where the commando group had landed from a glass fibre dingy, and he had heard the security forces from his boat, searching for nationalists.⁸⁷

The claim by the regime that the patrol boat had been shot at from the Zambian side is very unlikely. The Zambezi is wide at that point so the boat would have been out of range (unless it was (illegally) over in Zambian waters). The security forces would then have been very well prepared for the nationalists when they did cross the river. In fact, they made no further contact till the guerrillas attacked them a fortnight later. Furthermore, when I. D. Smith was pressed at a broadcast press conference about the regime's statement that the firing had come from the Zambian side, he admitted: 'I'm not quite clear of the details.'⁸⁸

The course of the subsequent engagements has been described both by a series of ZAPU communiques, and also a series of much less informative communiques from the security forces. Trial and other reports also throw some light.

The first ZAPU report claims that on 5 January, a South African patrol was ambushed and three men were killed. The incident took place near to Makuti, to the east of Kariba, and ZAPU say that as a result, the security forces closed the Makuti-Sinoia road because it was dangerous to Europeans. On 16 January, another ZAPU commando group attacked both the Victoria Falls airport, and a South

African patrol nearby. Five members of the Rhodesian security forces were killed at the airport, and thirteen of the South African patrol. (These two incidents will be described in greater detail below.) On 21 January, ZAPU claim that seven Rhodesian and South African members of the security forces were killed in a battle N.W. of Bulawayo and on 24 January an RAR platoon was ambushed to the north east of Bulawayo. ZAPU claim that two members of the platoon were killed, several were injured and the rest were scattered. On 26 January, another ZAPU commando group killed three Rhodesian soldiers. The ZAPU zone commander reported that he had broken contact, and had returned to base. He also commended the local population for their help. The final communique issued by ZAPU, claimed that on 31 January, five Rhodesian soldiers were killed in the Midlands province, and that another ZAPU commando group had clashed with the Rhodesian security forces near the Salisbury-Bulawayo railway. There were no deaths but the regime's casualties were far heavier than their own.⁸⁹

Not surprisingly, Rhodesian sources tell a different story. Three Africans, who may have been in one of the ZAPU commando groups, were reported to have applied for political asylum in Botswana at the very beginning of January.⁹⁰ Shortly after, a 'suspected terrorist' was killed near to Lupane. ZAPU claimed that the man in question was an unarmed courier, but he may well have been a member of a ZAPU group operating in the Lupane area.⁹¹

However, the major incidents were the concurrent attacks on a South African patrol, and the Victoria Falls airport. According to the regime, the attacks were carried out by a ZAPU commando group of twenty men. After crossing from Zambia, they made a base in the hills in the Victoria Falls area. On about 17 January, the group split into two. Fifteen surrounded a South African patrol of fourteen men which was camped for the night at Chisuma. They opened fire with guns and hand grenades at about 2.30 a.m. They

destroyed the wireless equipment (so that the South Africans could not call for help) and tried to over-run the camp. According to the regime, four of the South Africans were injured, one very seriously indeed and one ZAPU guerrilla was killed. ZAPU claim three more South Africans were killed.⁹² While the South Africans went to get help, some of the ZAPU men went to a local village where one of them had a relative and were given food, a shovel (to cover up footprints) and information about the whereabouts of the security forces. The others went to another village to collect food. The fourteen guerrillas went back to their base in the hills.⁹³

The other five attacked Victoria Falls airport. According to the regime, only 'superficial damage' was done. According to ZAPU, they 'killed five and inflicted heavy damage on the airport buildings and destroyed two helicopters and one light plane, disrupting the communication system.

There was clearly more damage than the Rhodesians were prepared to admit. When two reporters (Peter Siedlitz of *Der Spiegel* and G. A. Naidoo of the Johannesburg *D. um*, both of whom happened to be in Victoria Falls) asked questions about the incident, they were immediately detained, their luggage was searched and then they were flown to Salisbury (Siedlitz) and Bulawayo (Naidoo).⁹⁵

An eye-witness says that the windows were repaired very rapidly but the roof repairs took some time. The damage was extensive. In a subsequent trial report, it was alleged that one nationalist had fired forty-nine rounds with his light machine gun. The group of five returned to their base and rejoined their comrades. They subsequently blew up a railway line at two points, (probably the Wankie-Victoria Falls line), and ambushed an RAR platoon, killing an African private.⁹⁶

The regime reacted to the attacks on the airport and the South Africans, by attempting to seal the border. The

occupants of two Zambian villages in the Livingstone area complained that over the night of 22 January 1970 six helicopters patrolled their area with searchlights trained on the ground. The Defence Ministry also announced that A Co. 2nd Battalion the Royal Rhodesian Regiment (the part time Territorial Force) which was already on border patrol, could not be stood down as previously planned. In fact, they stayed on for an extra two weeks.⁹⁷

Clashes continued. One man was killed and three wounded when an RLI patrol was ambushed. The last communique by the regime on this series of engagements was issued on 2 February, but on 10 February, Smith had to admit that there was still 'a mopping up operation which had to take place'. According to the Annual Reports of the army, and of the BSA Police for 1970, they continued operations dealing with this and other incursions until March or April. At some stage in February or March, they captured another group of ten men who had entered from Zambia with arms of war.⁹⁸

At a trial in 1973, an ex-ZAPU guerrilla described how he and his colleagues had attacked the emergency transmitter building at Kariba Airport with rockets and automatic weapons. The attack took place on 2 March 1970. They had meant to destroy some of the planes, but fired at the transmitter building instead because they thought that there were some Europeans in it.⁹⁹

Other Action in 1970

While these major incursions were taking place, guerrillas continued to infiltrate in small numbers. Two nationalist intelligence officers were charged in January with entering Rhodesia 'by evasive means', 'to organize an underground political movement and to recruit men to take military training'. They made several stops in Rhodesia, staying with relatives. With one, they left their medical supplies and notes on military training.¹⁰⁰

In another trial in April (from which African reporters were excluded), two nationalists were charged with entry with arms of war. They had become detached from their group and then got lost.¹⁰¹ Another two were charged in May with bringing arms into Rhodesia, and storing them in a base camp in the north west, 'a considerable distance from their point of entry into Rhodesia'.¹⁰² Another man was charged in May with entering the west of Rhodesia with arms.¹⁰³

There is also evidence of local help being given to nationalists. In April an elderly African, from a village near the Botswana border, was charged with having given an armed nationalist guerrilla (who was his nephew) food and lodging, and then having arranged for a guide to take him over the Botswana border.¹⁰⁴ In May, three tribesmen (probably from Matabeleland) were charged with not reporting three nationalists who came to their village fully armed.¹⁰⁵ In the same month, another three, and again probably from Matabeleland, were charged with harbouring nationalist guerrillas. The guerrillas moved into their area, hid their weapons in a forty-four gallon water drum and stayed there for some time until one of the villagers informed the police.¹⁰⁶ In August, three men were charged in Bulawayo with recruiting young men for military training outside Rhodesia. They appealed and were acquitted on the grounds that they were the unwitting tools of the main person responsible, who was an official of one of the nationalist parties.¹⁰⁷ In September, a man was charged with assisting two nationalist guerrillas, and trying to introduce other Africans to them so that they could be given training. The two guerrillas concerned, who later returned to Zambia, lived in a cave in the area. They gave themselves away by shooting at a car on a nearby road, and so were unable to really start a training scheme.¹⁰⁸ Finally in November, an African in the Salisbury area was found guilty of having gelignite and a detonator in his possession.

He claimed that it had been planted on him — but this shows that gelignite is getting into the hands of Africans.¹⁰⁹

Two other reported incidents reveal underground activity. In September, an African was burning some old books and clothes at the back of his home in Harari, when the whole dump exploded violently. Two youths had to be taken to hospital for treatment. It was obviously a secret store of explosives.¹¹⁰ Shortly after, a dug-out was found between Tafara and Mabruku townships in Salisbury. According to the *Rhodesia Herald*, experienced investigators believe it is typical of underground hide-outs used some years ago at Lupane, halfway between Bulawayo and the Zambian border by Zambian based terrorists. It looked professionally built. It is believed an infiltrator from the north could have settled at Tafara to cause trouble. The majority of residents at Tafara (population 10,000) are from Malawi. The dug-out would have been an ideal place in which to hide in the event of a police raid. It was perfectly concealed with veld grass covering sticks which lay across two trenches. Entry to the dug-out was through a trap-door and a piece of drain-pipe had been bedded to a side wall to form an air vent. The two trenches were connected by a workman-like doorway. It was found when someone happened to stand on its roof and it caved in. It seems it was not in use at the time. The police tried to suggest it was 'just a hole in the ground' but the *Herald* disputed this. The police then suggested it was made by children.¹¹¹

Arthur Chadzingwa, treasurer of Cold Comfort Farm, was brought to trial at the beginning of 1971 for possessing a letter sent to him by a University friend in Zambia. The letter was probably the fruit of much discussion and is worth quoting to show the kind of thinking among African exiles. It advocated infiltration of 'young men of tested wisdom' into the police force in order to subvert its ideals. It went on: 'ZAPU men in the army could supply us with

information of the whole organization of enemy forces . . . Movements and deployments of enemy forces could be betrayed to us.' There was an appendix summarizing this, and putting forward other ideas. It suggested that a monthly courier service could be set up between Lusaka and Salisbury, which could be replaced by radio contact when things improved. It went on to say that 'the organization should be run in such a way that in every district there will be places where militants can be kept while they teach others how to use weapons.' It asked for information for the Zimbabwe Review and suggested a special recruitment campaign in Bulawayo, implying that Salisbury was all right.¹¹² This campaign never took place as the leadership was, by this time, deeply divided.

1971; The ZANU Underground

No incidents initiated by ZAPU were reported in 1971. ZANU was more in evidence, and a number of plots were discovered by the police. In July 1971 (while Lord Goodman was in Salisbury), the Salisbury police announced that they had discovered nine cases of arms at the store of Stuttaford's Van Hire. In actual fact, they picked up twenty-three cases, and the suggestion made in the press that at least two cases had been distributed to ZANU branches is untrue. The cases contained rifles, machine guns, grenades, ammunition and explosives. The store foreman, Denys Mangwana, had arranged for them to come on lorries from Zambia. This distribution had been planned by Betserai Mazivere, an accountant at the Bible Society in Salisbury. The cache of arms, and the people involved in the plot were revealed by a police spy.¹¹³ To stop arms from being brought in this way, the security forces instituted a much more rigorous searching procedure at Chirundu on the border between Rhodesia and Zambia.¹¹⁴

At about the same time, the police found evidence of a well organized training scheme for school boys to go to Zambia in their holidays. This again was organized by ZANU supporters, and altogether about eight school children and a teacher had been to Zambia to a camp about twenty miles from Lusaka. There they were given political instruction and were taught the use of arms and explosives. Most came from two Roman Catholic schools, St Ignatius, Chishawasha, and Mount St Mary's, Wedza.

Since 1969 Martin Mwale, the teacher in question, had been holding political discussions in the school with ten to fifteen boys. After going to Zambia himself in 1970, he encouraged the boys to go to train as freedom fighters. He was assisted in this by one of the senior boys. Two men were responsible for being the contact with the school, and at least one had spoken to the group, explaining how training could be obtained. A third person, Vitalis Zhuwara was responsible for escorting the boys to Botswana. From there they went to Zambia. At his trial Martin Mwale said he had become involved because he 'was highly critical of the Government and saw no hope for the black man except through violent revolution'.¹¹⁵

In another trial, Edison Paradza, of Gwelo, was found guilty of both taking training, and planning to take others for training. He had first become politically aware in 1962 or 1963 under the influence of a teacher at his school—but he had not been actively involved. However, in 1970 (he was then twenty-two) he was contacted by this teacher (who had moved to the University College), who suggested that he could obtain guerrilla training under the auspices of ZANU in Zambia. He agreed, and actually went to Zambia. The first attempt failed because his contact had gone to Ghana, but on his second visit to Zambia, he successfully made contact with ZANU. With two others, he was taken to a camp in the bush twenty miles from Lusaka. They were there given lectures by ZANU on political theory, and

trained in the use of arms and explosives. They returned to Rhodesia after two weeks. In the meantime, the University lecturer was busily recruiting others for training. Paradza agreed to escort ten of these recruits to Zambia but was arrested (in May 1971) before he was able to do so. He is now serving a fourteen year gaol sentence.¹¹⁶

The ZAPU leaders did try to launch an attack on Rhodesia on the lines of the crossings in 1967 and 1968. They ordered their guerrillas over the Zambezi in March—but 112 of them (including trainees and trainee candidates) refused to do so. This was at the height of the split within ZAPU, and many of these men were subsequently deported by Zambia to Rhodesia.¹¹⁷

1972: The Pearce Commission

Undoubtedly, the work of the 'British Commission on Rhodesian Opinion'—usually called the Pearce Commission—was the major event of the year. The Pearce Commission acted as a microphone for the African population to express their abhorrence of the Smith regime. Because it worked largely in public, with reporters in attendance, the regime was unable to clamp down on the means of communication in the rural areas. Normally, it is impossible for reporters to move around the tribal trust lands. Few people, including Africans themselves, realized how widespread the disaffection with white rule was. It was a revelation to many Africans to discover that their fellows in other parts of Rhodesia, even including the majority of chiefs, were completely against Smith. Furthermore, their expression of opinion was listened to. The British Government (albeit reluctantly) did *not* ratify the Proposals for a Settlement. The Smith regime is still not recognized as a legal or effective government. Rhodesia is still isolated diplomatically and economically from the rest of the world.

The major response of the Africans during the Pearce

Commission's time in Rhodesia was peaceful. The African National Council, which spearheaded the rejection, was committed to non-violent opposition. However, the thinly disguised violence of the regime's efforts to keep Rhodesia white did provoke civil disobedience and occasional violent outbreaks. There were major riots in January in Shabani, Gwelo, Salisbury, Fort Victoria and Umtali. The Shabani riot was caused by bad management at the mine at a time of high political excitement. The manager sacked some workers for going home after they had previously been told they could go off. The management then refused to discuss the situation with any of the African workers. In the subsequent rioting at least one African died and much property was destroyed.¹¹⁸ This riot provided a lead for more political rioting elsewhere. The basic fear of Africans in the towns was that the wholly European Pearce Commission was in the pocket of the regime. This fear resulted in large crowds trying to see the commissioners. When they were not allowed to see them, and met the police instead, violence was inevitable. It was due to the African National Council leaders that the situation quietened down. Their non-violent, rational approach was largely accepted by Africans.

But there was widespread unrest. Eight men were gaoled for damaging a cattle-dip in the Ndanga Tribal Trust Land at the end of April. Two others were found guilty of damaging a dip, destroying a gate, and cutting down two fences. The magistrate described these offences as 'deliberate malicious acts aimed at the symbol of authority in the Trust Land.' Forty-seven more Africans appeared in the same court next day on similar charges. According to the Rhodesian police, this was part of an organized pattern of civil disobedience by cells of the African National Council in the Fort Victoria area. It is quite clear that many of the members and leaders of these African National Council cells had been members of the nationalist parties.

For example, a youth, questioned during the trial of five men accused of killing a policeman who was guarding a dip, said that this group were prepared to obey its leader because he was an elder who knew about the (banned and unnamed) party.¹¹⁹ In the Shabani area, a farmer had about four miles of fencing (worth about £350) cut down at the end of January. He had moved his fence to enclose some African land that he had claimed he owned. He had obtained permission from the local DC—but there is no evidence that the DC consulted the Africans concerned who were actually using the land.¹²⁰ In another trial, five Africans were gaoled for stoning police at a bus terminal in Makokoba township, Bulawayo, in March. They were part of a crowd of about 700 people.¹²¹

The nationalist parties were active during the year as well. During 1972, ZANU began to build up arms, ammunition and men in the north east of Rhodesia. This campaign will be dealt with in the next chapter. There were attempts to infiltrate guerrillas into, and gain recruits from, the country. The successes are, of course, not known—the press only reports those captured.

On 10 February, three guerrillas crossed the Zambezi near to Chirundu. They came by taxi with a large quantity of arms, ammunition and explosives. The taxi crossed the border alone, and they carried the material across the river, and joined the taxi inside the country. They were driven to within seventeen miles of Salisbury where they were dropped off. They buried the arms in the bush, hitched a lift to Salisbury, and joined their relatives. It was this that caused their downfall for the police knew that the three men had left Rhodesia for guerrilla training. Their relatives had been ordered to report them if the men came back. Although their parents did *not* inform on them, the police were on the lookout, and picked them up quickly. They were eventually sent to gaol. The guerrillas had been told to 'try to disrupt the Pearce Commission by shooting

Europeans in the street and placing mines. It was part of our work to organize the Africans and tell them that we were fighting for the country'. The nationalist leaders wanted to take advantage of the January riots by causing further disruption.¹²² In the middle of April another African was charged with entering Rhodesia with a group of guerrillas. This group brought rifles, a machine gun, an anti-tank rocket-launcher, pistols, thirty hand-grenades, anti-personnel mines, TNT demolition slabs, and 6,396 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. There are no other reports of this group.¹²³

Evidence of an attempt to set up the groundwork of a guerrilla network was given in a trial of a man who was arrested at the end of April. He had entered some time before, bringing with him a number of guns, some ammunition, and explosives. He had been taught how to keep the weapons in good condition, and also how to use explosives. He was only trained for three days, so that he was not taught how to fire the guns. When he got to his home, in a tribal trust land probably fairly near to Salisbury, he hid them in the ground. He dug them up and cleaned out the guns at fairly regular intervals. He gave some of them to a man who said he was taking them back to the headquarters of the nationalist party in question, outside of Rhodesia. (It seems more likely that they were to be distributed inside Rhodesia, and this was a blind so that if the keeper of the weapons was caught, he could not give anything away).¹²⁴

A teacher, Ananias Kupe, was arrested in June for being in possession of four guns, seven grenades and ammunition. It seems likely that he entered Rhodesia some time previously (maybe several years) across the Zambezi. Apparently, the leader of his group got lost, and Kupe was eventually arrested. He claimed that he went to Zambia 'to further his education', not realizing that he would end up taking guerrilla training in Moscow.¹²⁵

A new phase began in August with an attempt to blow up the Victoria Falls-Bulawayo railway. According to the regime, 2.8 kilograms of TNT were placed in a culvert one and a half miles south of Victoria Falls, but it failed to detonate. They said that a ZAPU membership card was found on the scene. ZAPU, however, claimed that on the morning of 3 August, they blew up a goods train bound for the north. They said that the driver and fireman were killed and traffic was interrupted for two days. ZAPU pamphlets were left on the scene, and the Rhodesians retaliated by a six-hour bombing raid in the vicinity, with no effects. On the same date, another train was derailed on the Salisbury-Sinoia line—according to the regime, this was due to rocks thrown on to the line by baboons. ZAPU claimed at the time that they were also responsible for this derailment, though Jason Moyo, speaking at the end of September, did not mention it.¹²⁶

This attack was the beginning of a new approach by ZAPU. The internal splits and feuds described earlier had resolved themselves by the end of 1971. In late 1971, according to an interview by T. G. Silundika, the military side of ZAPU was thoroughly reorganized. A reorganization had been one of the proposals made in the document which precipitated the split in February 1970. The armed wing was named the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA). According to Silundika, it had a High Command of six members, but decisions about general strategy were taken by ZAPU's Revolutionary Council. Because of bitter experience, ZAPU apparently take great care to screen politically and educate their recruits, in order that 'no volunteer is armed prematurely, and that the political aspect of our strategy remains of primary importance for ZPRA militants'.¹²⁷

They try to avoid direct confrontation, and use sabotage as their main tactic. They lay land mines along the lines of communication, and also along tracks from the series of

camps used by the security forces from Caprivi to Feira along the Zambezi. According to Edward Ndlovu, the National Secretary of ZAPU, the sabotage is done mainly by groups of men inside Rhodesia. However they are supplied with the materials for their sabotage, and occasionally are helped by men from outside of Rhodesia. He claimed (in April 1974) that the ZPRA had lost no men at all since the summer of 1972. Apparently the ZPRA were active in the Mt Darwin and Mana Pools area during the whole of the second half of 1972. The politicization of the Tonga people on the southern shore of Lake Kariba is gradually being accomplished. Many people in the Wankie area have become politically conscious because of the way in which they were uprooted from their homes in the 1950s and moved into the Wankie area. They are mixing with the local people who are in turn being politicized. Apparently the Matetsi area has been very thoroughly politicized.¹²⁸ Certainly this politicization should not be too difficult to accomplish. One of the Pearce Commissioners in January 1972 was asked by one old man on the shore of Lake Kariba 'Is it not clear to you that we are being oppressed?'¹²⁹ ZAPU's area of operations extends from the Victoria Falls to the Mana Pools Games Reserve and the Sipolilo area.


At the very end of August, a car with five occupants hit a land mine in the Mana Pools National Park and the driver was injured. According to the regime, a hand-written note was found near the scene, stating that ZAPU was responsible. They closed a large area (including the Sapi Hunting Area, and the Chewore Game Reserve as well as Mana Pools) for several days while they tried to track the guerrillas down. ZAPU claimed that they had also blown up a Rhodesian military truck, and killed all the occupants. The Rhodesian security forces were unable to catch the guerrillas responsible, and the regime warned Zambia that if she did not prevent 'terrorists' from operating from her country 'then the consequences must rest squarely upon

their shoulders'.¹³⁰

The next incident was reported at the end of October. The regime announced that a Rhodesian soldier 'died as the result of the injuries he received when the army vehicle in which he was travelling, detonated a land-mine'. Another soldier was injured. The report made no mention of where the incident took place, and the *Daily Telegraph* (London) immediately suggested that this had happened in Mozambique. A report from Lusaka stated that a Rhodesian army truck with at least six soldiers aboard, was blown up ten miles north of Impampa in the Binga district. ZAPU leaflets were found in the area, and ZAPU stated that they were responsible. However, next day the *Zambia Daily Mail* ridiculed ZAPU's claim to be responsible. The regime finally revealed (in January 1973) that the incident had taken place exactly where ZAPU said it had, and said that tracks had led from Lake Kariba to the place where the incident occurred. Again the security forces made no arrests of guerrillas.¹³¹

There were other casualties to members of the security forces during the year, which may have been accidents, or may have been the results of unreported incidents. In April, three African soldiers from the RAR were drowned. On 24 September, a European soldier received a leg wound 'on border control duties in the Zambezi Valley'. When asked for further details by the *Rhodesian Herald*, the Ministry of Defence refused to enlarge on this statement. Another soldier was admitted to Salisbury Hospital a few days later with a fractured leg sustained 'while deployed in the border area'. Finally, a soldier was killed and two injured in an accident on a field firing-range, again at the very end of September.¹³²

Further evidence of the recruitment activities of the nationalists came at the end of the year. At the very beginning of December, three Africans were convicted of attempting to recruit guerrillas. Two men had visited the



Infiltration of African nationalist guerrillas into Rhodesia, 1966 to 1970
(approximate date of entry with probable route)

officials of a nationalist party outside Rhodesia, and had agreed to recruit young men from Rhodesia. The third man (who was very much older) had acted as courier. They recruited nine men altogether before they were arrested. It seems that one of their contacts, possibly one of their recruits, did not get on with the nationalists abroad, so that when he got back to Rhodesia, he gave the three men away.¹³³

Mr Ian Smith himself summed up the anxieties of the regime faced with this serious of incidents (and knowing far more than it was prepared to reveal), in an interview on 4 December. He said that 'the position (as regards the security situation) is far more serious than it appears on the surface, and if the man in the street could have access to the security information which I and my colleagues in Government have, then I think he would be a lot more worried than he is today'.¹³⁴ Even he did not realize how serious the situation was.

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6 The Conflict Escalates

December 1972

In the early hours of 21 December 1972, the Altena farm in the Centenary area, owned by Marc de Borchgrave, was attacked by a group of ZANU guerrillas. The house was occupied by the European farmer's mother and his four children. One child was hit in the foot. The guerrillas laid a mine in the approach road, and also raided and burnt down an African trading post about a mile from the farm. In reporting this attack the next day, the *Rhodesian Herald* commented that this was the first attack on a European farm since May 1966, when the Viljoens were killed (also by ZANU men).¹ The de Borchgraves moved to the nearby house of a friend, Archie Dalgleish, while their house was repaired. Two days later, in the early hours of 23 December, ZANU launched its second attack—on the Dalgleish property, Whistlefield farm. According to the regime's communique, Marc de Borchgrave and another of his children were injured. A store on the farm was damaged, and the huts of six of the African workers were destroyed. Again the road to the farm was mined, and this time an army truck was blown up. One soldier died a week later, and three others were badly injured.²

The security forces declared Centenary a 'restricted area'. It is about 50 miles from the Mozambique border, and 75 miles from Salisbury. They also called up members of the territorial force 'to assist with the conduct of current operations, particularly those related to the protection of lives and property'.³ The day before the attack on Whistlefield farm, a joint operation by the Rhodesian and

Portuguese forces on the border with Mozambique had resulted in the death of two guerrillas.⁴ On 28 December, however, they announced that another army truck had been blown up, and three soldiers injured. At the same time the security forces announced that they had disarmed a number of mines, captured one guerrilla, and recovered a quantity of 'offensive material of communist origin'.⁶

The ZANU version was, not surprisingly, a little different. Their 'War Communique No. 1' stated that on 21 December, as well as attacking the Altena farm, ZANLA had killed fifteen members of the security forces with bazooka and mortar fire in a battle seventy-five miles from the Mozambique border (possibly in Chiweshe TTL). They claimed that Whistlefield farm had been turned into a Command Post after the Altena attack. They attacked it on 23 December, killing twenty-five soldiers. The same day, a truck with thirty-five soldiers was destroyed, and thirty-one killed. Four days later (27 December) ZANLA forces were claimed to have destroyed two trucks, killing an unknown number of troops, as well as the three soldiers mentioned by the Rhodesian side. On 28 December, they stated that they had destroyed a locomotive engine near to Umtali.⁷ Their communique made the point that the fighting was following 'the long-established ZANU strategy of fighting from secure areas established in the countryside after thorough and extensive political mobilization of the masses of the people'.

ZANU's Strategy

The Special Conference Issue of Zimbabwe News (the official organ of ZANU) reported an important analysis by Herbert Chitepo, the National Chairman of ZANU, of their armed struggle. ZANU hold these conferences every other year, and conclude with elections for membership of the 'Dare Ne Chimurenga' (Supreme Council). This one was

held on 14-16 September 1973. Chitepo started by admitting that in the past they had emphasized military attack at the expense of political struggle. The change of strategy had come about between 1969 and 1972. 'We have since tried to correct this tragic error by politicizing and mobilizing the people before mounting any attacks against the enemy. After politicizing our people, it became easier for them to co-operate with us and to identify with our programme and objective.'⁸

The north east of Rhodesia had a number of attractions for ZANU. It was one of the areas which was, in any case, politically aware. For example, the issue of the Mangwende Chieftainship had taken place around Mrewa in the late 1950s. The Tangwena people, who refused to move from their lands, come from the same general area. ZANU may also have made some reconnaissances. It was not considered as crucial by the European administration as the areas along the Zambian border. Mozambique was a 'friendly' country—even if parts were being 'subverted' by Frelimo. Thus the Ministry of Internal Affairs had neglected it. For example, one border area had been visited fairly regularly by a doctor before UDI, mainly to treat youngsters for Trachoma. Since UDI, this had not been done. When it was decided to start up again in early 1973, it was too late.⁹ Fundamentally, no doubt, the neglect arose from the European conviction that 'the African' was not capable of taking action on his own behalf. Max Hastings, reporting the views of a farmer couple in the Centenary area, said 'They do not hate the Africans, they merely have a contempt for them'.¹⁰ In the same way, there is talk about the 'K factor'. Brutally translated, this is the 'Kaffir factor'—i.e. the innate cowardice of Africans.¹¹ However, an example of the support in this area for guerrillas (ZAPU this time) who survived the Spring 1968 battles on the Zambezi escarpment has been given earlier. The rejection of the Proposals for a Settlement merely expressed this basic

sympathy with the nationalists. The lack of European contact meant it could flower without interference.

Another attraction was the nature of the border with Mozambique. There is no physical barrier (apart, apparently, from a two strand fence in some places), unlike the Zambezi in the case of Zambia. Furthermore, the people both sides of the border are Shona, and there is much coming and going. The boundary is one of the many meaningless borders which Africa's colonial past has produced.

The final and crucial factor was an agreement with Frelimo that ZANU be allowed to use the Tete province as a launching pad for the next phase. By April 1971, Frelimo had sufficient control of the Tete Province that a Rhodesian patrol car could be blown up across the border in Mozambique.¹² By the autumn, the road to Tete and Malawi from Rhodesia was so dangerous that the Rhodesian authorities were obliged to announce that travellers used it 'at their own risk'.¹³ Frelimo and ZANU must have come to an agreement at about this time—although no formal statement has ever been issued. However, the friendliness of relations between the two is exemplified by the presence of a Frelimo representative at ZANU's September 1973 conference.¹⁴

ZANU sited their main base camp in Mozambique fairly near to the Zambian border. According to Gerald Hawkesworth, who was held prisoner in it in March 1973, they had 600 guerrillas in it, including the women fighters. They probably move it frequently because of the danger of detection and bombing.¹⁵ ZANU guerrillas were sent into the north east from early 1972 on. According to one, they 'engaged in political work, preparing our people for a bitter and protracted struggle'. They used the grievances of the people (personal tax, contour ridges, poor soil, small plots of land, destocking of cattle, etc.). They found that people felt these grievances deeply—but their difficulty was 'fear of the enemy'.

Apparently getting over this fear was not simple or easy. 'We tried to answer their questions as frankly and humanely as possible. We never lied to them. We told them that, yes, Smith was well armed and had weapons. But we also told them that although we had fewer arms, we were to fight with those weapons until our country was free. We also told them that as long as they supported us, fed us, protected us, the enemy could not defeat us. We also told them that because Smith had no support from the people, he is not powerful.' The local people were sceptical at first—but the success of Frelimo in Mozambique made them believe that the ZANU guerrillas really could do what they said.

The long business of transporting equipment then began. Guns, machine guns, bazookas, mines and so on had to be transported and hidden in caches over the whole area of the north east. According to Venter, by February 1973, just two months after the offensive had started, the security forces had captured 400 tons of equipment.¹⁶ At the same time, as the equipment was brought in, ZANLA set up a whole network of contacts and information posts. Only when this had been done, were the ZANLA cadres prepared to start the battle.¹⁷ The guerrillas were also able to get the support of a number of spirit mediums in the area. The best known of these, nationally, is the Nehanda medium. A previous medium of Nehanda was involved in the 1896 Chimurenga. Support of these mediums reflects clearly the support of the people. Mediums do not exercise a hierarchic authority (as priests do, in Christianity, for example) but they try to articulate the wishes and feelings of the people. (If they happen to divine the people's feelings incorrectly, their words are rejected as 'not coming from the spirit'.) Especially since the chiefs have become so closely identified with the European authorities, they have come to act as the major voice of the people. (For an interesting account of traditional Shona religion as practised in this area of Rhodesia, see 18). According to a trial report, one at

least of the mediums accompanied the guerrillas as they moved from village to village, and went with them to Mozambique as well.¹⁹ This must have been a help to the guerrillas because the mediums are aware of what is happening over a wider area than most ordinary villagers. The area which was infiltrated and politicized in this way went from Sipolilo in the west to Mtoko in the east²⁰ and down to Chiweshe and Madizwa TTLs in the south.

The Europeans were aware that something was happening. For example, Wilf Nussey, reporting from Tete in June 1972, said: 'The Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union, now regarded by Rhodesia as the most militant of its enemy groups, liaises closely with Frelimo and is believed to have sent some of its own men into Tete near Rhodesia, presumably to attempt infiltration and subversion in Tribal Trust Lands just across the border.'²¹ According to Venter, local European farmers suspected that something was up. One reported hearing machine gun fire, and found empty shells and an abandoned camp site. Some Africans reported strangers 'from the North'.²² The security forces must have suspected something because a missionary reported from the north east in the first half of 1972 that 'the place is just bristling with soldiers. They're patrolling the area the whole time and often call in at the mission station. Helicopters and fighter planes fly overhead most days'.²³

However, despite this, the European authorities completely underestimated the seriousness of the situation. Mr F. A. Alexander, an RF 'MP' for the Sinoia-Umvukwes area spoke in a debate in the House of Assembly at the end of March 1973. He said: 'There is no doubt that . . . the forces and the people of this Centenary area were caught by surprise.' Despite all of the activity by the authorities, said Mr Alexander, they failed to realize an attack was imminent. Furthermore 'at the outset there was certainly a lack of co-ordination . . . between the Army, Police, the Air Force and the Police Reserve'. He went on to say that

the position of the Police Reserve and the Police anti-terrorist units had still not been clarified.²⁴ This then was the situation in the north east of Rhodesia in December 1972 when ZANU decided it was time for action.

The Closure of the Border

In his New Year message for 1973 on the radio and TV, Ian Smith said about the 'few incidents . . . on the north eastern border': 'Fortunately our security forces were quickly on the scene and have meted out to the terrorists salutary retribution. As we have done in the past, once again this year you will all join me in saying a prayer of thanks for our security forces, whose constant vigil on our borders plays such an important part in helping to preserve Rhodesia.'²⁵ His complacency was shared by the white population when the daughter of a prominent tobacco farmer and President of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association, Mr. Vic Hurley, were married. The wedding was held on the 4th January near Centenary, and the Rhodesian Herald proudly reported that there were no troops, no police and no private security guards.²⁶ However, on the same day as the wedding, another mine was detonated by an army truck, and three more soldiers were injured. In the communique announcing this, the security forces claimed to have captured more guerrillas and equipment—later they stated that three were arrested.²⁷ Three days later they decided to increase the number of territorial units to deal with the threat.²⁸ On 8 January, in the north west of Rhodesia, a South African truck detonated a mine near the Victoria Falls. Two of the South African occupants were killed, and another five were injured. Three of the injured were Rhodesian, all the others were South African. The mine was the responsibility of ZAPU, who left pamphlets near the spot. As a result, the South African Commissioner of Police, General G. Joubert, paid a visit to the scene of the incident. He said later that he

had 'discussed plans and a strategy to be employed in certain situations'.²⁹ The next day, on the other side of Rhodesia, ZANU attacked Mt Darwin village itself. According to Gerald Hawkesworth, they put a shell through the District Commissioner's office, and sprayed the club with bullets. They dynamited Mufuli Bridge near by.³⁰ According to ZANU, they also attacked the Mt Darwin police station, killed twenty-five soldiers in a 'packed officers' mess', killed twenty soldiers in the destruction of the Mufuli Bridge, and damaged the office of the District Commissioner.³¹ The Rhodesian communique, on the other hand, reported that a 'bridge south of Mt Darwin was slightly damaged last night by terrorist action. Elements of the same gang carried out an unsuccessful attack on Mt Darwin village at about the same time'.³² The visit of General Joubert, as well as the knowledge that they were doing no better against ZANU than the Portuguese (whom they had so severely criticized) were doing against Frelimo, must have rattled the regime. Without any consultation with South Africa or Portugal (they did not even consult General Joubert while he was there), it decided to act against Zambia, and it closed the border to all goods (making an exception for copper a few hours after the initial announcement). The regime stated that 'all road and rail traffic to and from Zambia will be stopped and border posts will remain closed until satisfactory assurances are obtained from the Zambian government that they will no longer permit terrorists to operate against Rhodesia from their territory'. In justification for this, the regime said that they had given numerous warnings that they would take this action. In particular on 13 November, they had warned the Zambian Secretary for Transport, Mr P. A. Siwo that road and rail traffic would be stopped if they did not cease supporting the guerrillas. If this warning was made, then the regime did not use the time well to prepare for the stoppage, and Zambia did.³³

At first the whites supported the move—for example, the Rhodesia Herald talked about the action as a 'body blow' to Zambia. But the extreme right wing Rhodesia National Party demanded that Smith switch the Kariba power off, and viewed the exception of copper with concern. On the other side, the Rhodesia Party, (slightly to the left of the RF) 'doubted the wisdom' of the move, and blamed recent racial legislation for the African disaffection. The African National Council correctly predicted that the Zambian Government would refuse to send copper through Rhodesia. As time went on, and as the extreme annoyance of the South Africans and Portuguese (who immediately started to find ways round the blockade) became clear, the doubts of the white Rhodesians became more strongly expressed. The ineffectiveness of the blockage as a means of stopping guerrilla action soon became obvious. The economic hurt to Rhodesia was quickly calculated. The illogicality of Rhodesia trying to operate sanctions on others was underlined a few days later when Mr Vorster said: 'We do not initiate boycotts, and we do not reply to sanctions with counter-boycotts'.³⁴

The regime also decided to punish Zambia by planting mines over the border. With the help of Africans living on the Zambian border, they planted a series of mines at Kazangula near the point border between Rhodesia, Namibia (South West Africa), Botswana and Zambia, and also near the border crossing at Chirundu. There have been no reports of any mines exploding elsewhere.

The closing of the border had no obvious effect on the guerrilla actions in the north east of Rhodesia. The security forces announced on 12 January that the bodies of two land inspectors employed by the Department of Lands had been found, and that another, Gerald Hawkesworth, with his 3/4 ton Mazda pick-up truck had disappeared. With Hawkesworth, were two African employees of the regime. They were packed into the truck and driven some miles

away. The truck was abandoned (where it was found a day or two later) and the party made for the Mozambique border. According to the two African employees who escaped, they made several stops at Rhodesian African villages where the guerrillas used Hawkesworth as an example of how white Rhodesians 'were being defeated'. Hawkesworth was taken north through Mozambique to the main base camp of ZANU near the Zambian border and arrived there about five weeks later. The regime were unable to locate Hawkesworth, either while he was in Rhodesia, or when in Mozambique. However they were able to prosecute some of the villagers as a result of evidence given by the two Africans who escaped. Hawkesworth wrote a letter to his mother, and also a letter expressing support for ZANU. (He said later that 'although not under physical duress, I felt that if I did not agree, I would be dead'.) Chitepo was able to use the letter to his mother as direct evidence that he was a ZANU prisoner. Hawkesworth spent about a month in this camp before he was clandestinely moved to a prison in Mbeya, Tanzania. He was released at the beginning of December 1973.³⁵

The security forces thought that the disappearance of Hawkesworth, with the truck, was a prelude to an attack on, or attempted infiltration of Salisbury. On 13 January, all approach roads to Salisbury had road blocks because it was thought that the guerrillas wanted to get into one of the African townships there. The security forces continued to be very worried about the townships. For example, at the end of January the police arrested 400 Africans in Harari (mainly members of the youth wing of the African National Council) because they thought they were storing arms and ammunition. In fact, all they had been doing was holding meetings 'to discuss various matters and make our people politically conscious'.³⁶

Smith spoke to the nation on 18 January, and started by saying: 'There have been some unusual developments over

the past few weeks'. For the first time, the regime admitted that the local African population had been largely supporting the guerrillas. He suggested two main reasons for this: intimidation by the gun, and the support of a 'few witch doctors of doubtful character and of little substance'. He was forced to say that he thought it would be some time 'before things return to normal'.³⁷

The regime announced on 22 January that four guerrillas had been killed, and on 24 January, they claimed that another seven were killed, and some others wounded. On this second occasion, they announced that another mine had been detonated, and three more South Africans injured. The same day, ZANU guerrillas struck again at the farmers in the Centenary area. The home of Mr Chris Kleynhams was attacked with rifle and rocket fire, and Mrs Kleynhams was killed instantly. Her husband was injured in the leg, and had to be taken to hospital. The attack on his farm was significant because it showed how good the guerrilla intelligence was. Kleynhams had said, after the attack on Whistlefield farm, that 'the terrorists are nothing, only a pin-prick in our side . . . Their organization is completely useless'. Furthermore, the troops who had carried out a security sweep of the area had been withdrawn about a fortnight earlier, after it had been declared 'clean'. This attack changed the attitude of the farmers in the area overnight. In a report from Centenary village about a week later, Christopher Munnion said: 'The talk is not of crops but of guns and mines'. Some had built sand-bagged bunkers for their families to sleep in. Their wives were being trained to use pistols. Dirt roads and tracks were being prodded for mines. (A donkey had been killed by a mine the day before Munnion was in the village.) The ex-Kenyans among these farmers were agreed that the situation was more menacing than the MauMau threat they had previously experienced. The other evidence of this nervousness was a petition that the regime close down the St

Albert's Jesuit mission to the north of the area, which the farmers (certainly without foundation) thought was behind the attacks. They claimed that there was a guerrilla camp in the mission grounds.³⁸

Guerrilla activity continued unabated. On 1 February, the regime announced in a communique that another farm store had been destroyed.³⁹ Three days later, Rhodesia opened her border with Zambia because they 'were satisfied their objectives in closing the border . . . (had) been achieved . . . as a result of messages which (had) been received'. These messages according to the regime, meant that Zambia would stop nationalist commando units from crossing her border and attacking the Rhodesian security forces. Zambia denied that she ever gave an undertaking of this kind. More to the point, Zambia did not open her side of the border. President Kaunda expressed the view of his government when he said he would not be caught by Mr Smith's 'trick': 'How do I know Smith won't turn the blockade on again. It would be stupid for Zambia to depend on some abstract assurances.'⁴⁰ Since that time, the only large volume of goods to officially pass through the border at the Victoria Falls rail crossing, has been material destined for Zaire.⁴¹ However it is probable that there is a certain flow of material between Rhodesia and Zambia. For example, A. J. Venter noticed some lorries going from Rhodesia via Tete to Malawi, and from there on to Zambia.⁴² The main flow has stopped, Rhodesian railways have made a big loss, South Africa has had to send goods for Zambia by other more expensive and less politically safe routes, and Beira has lost even more trade. With time, Rhodesians have got used to the closure, but it has not helped her to deal with the economic problems which have grown as a result of the frequent call-up of staff. Nor has it helped with the prospect of sanctions being applied by a Mozambique government.

The Regime's Political and Administrative Offensive

The border closure was an attempt to force Zambia to withdraw its support from the nationalists. When that did not work, the regime was forced to look at ways of dealing with the guerrillas inside the country. In doing so, they had to consider the undoubted support the guerrillas had from the African population. On the political front, they have had very little to offer the Africans. Their basic position is probably exemplified by a comment made to an English reporter in August 1973 by a farmer in the north eastern area of the country. 'You ask why we don't mount a "Hearts and Minds" campaign to keep Africans loyal. What can we offer them? Our only hold on them is that they look to us, as their bosses, to pay and feed them. But once you start talking about equality—well, what would they need us for?'⁴³

The official policy towards Africans is to offer them two African 'Parliaments' for Mashonaland and Matabeleland, with responsibility for education, health and development. The members of these 'Parliaments' will be chosen by the Provincial Assembly of Chiefs, with two extra members chosen by the Chairman of the African Councils in the two areas. Mr Smith explained his attitude quite clearly to the Rhodesian Front Congress in September 1972: 'The previous mistake of introducing European concepts in the election of African Councils must be avoided. The regional authorities must be dominated by Chiefs assisted by people acceptable to Chiefs.'⁴⁴ He did not add that the Chiefs were appointed by the regime (after consultation with Africans) and could be deposed by it. This policy offered nothing to the mass of the African people, and was not national government in any case. At the end of a very long series of negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa, all that Smith was prepared to offer was an extra six seats in the Rhodesian Parliament, bringing Africans up to twenty-two seats against the Europeans' fifty seats. At present, eight of the

African seats are not even elected on a constituency basis, but by chiefs, headmen, etc. This was, (not surprisingly) rejected unanimously by the ANC executive.⁴⁵ The 'moderate' Rhodesian Party offered twenty-five seats, with forty-one still effectively retained by the Europeans.⁴⁶ The re-election of the Rhodesian Front in July 1974, which has every European seat in the Parliament, showed that the European electorate agreed with the view of the farmer quoted above.

The regime decided to initiate a series of regulations which would give them greater powers, and would also provide a much more extensive administrative cover.

On 19 January, the 'Emergency Powers (Collective Fines) Regulations' empowered Provincial Commissioners to impose collective fines on a village if they believed that someone who had committed a specific offence lived there. The offences given were murder, arson, malicious injury to property, and contravention of certain sections of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The person who had committed the offence did not need to have been convicted. Furthermore, if the officer authorized to collect the fine (which could be in stock or moveable property) thought a fine ought to be imposed, he could impound property for up to three days. There was no provision in this regulation for appeal to the courts.⁴⁷

In a statement on 2 February, probably aimed more at the European community than the African one, the 'Ministry of Information' warned people that rumour mongers could be sent to prison for up to seven years. It asked for people who heard such rumours to report them to their local police station. So far no one has been charged with such an offence.⁴⁸

On 8 February, all schools, churches, clinics, African shops and grinding mills were closed in Chiweshe TTL in order to do an identity check on the local residents. The churches were reopened on 12 February. The clinics were

reopened on 15 February. The Howard Institute secondary school and two colleges were reopened at the end of February. The primary schools were reopened in the middle of April. There was no clear announcement of when the shops and grinding mills were reopened.⁴⁹ In the Chesa Purchase Area the community facilities were also closed down and a leaflet distributed from the air calling for information about guerrillas. Its last paragraph read: 'The speed with which you inform the police and soldiers is the speed with which your schools, grinding mills and beer halls will be reopened'.⁵⁰ The two St Albert's schools were closed on 24 February, reopened on 11 March, closed again on 15 March, and reopened finally a month later in the middle of April.⁵¹ No doubt there were other areas where the same thing took place, but it did not come to the notice of journalists.

On 15 February, the regime published an emergency regulation which increased the maximum penalty for aiding guerrillas or failing to report their presence, from five to twenty years imprisonment with hard labour. It also increased the powers of magistrates so that they could impose increased sentences for contraventions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. These regulations were later introduced as a Parliamentary Bill to bring the main legislation into line with these new provisions.⁵²

On 24 February, the regime announced that Africans living in most of the Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia did not need to carry 'identification documents'. However in the Sipolilo, Darwin, Mrewa, Mtoko, and Inyanga districts they were required to carry them. The measure as a whole was introduced to control African movement in to the urban areas. It has come into further use as a means to control movement in the areas which had been infiltrated by ZANU.⁵³

Almost the same day, the regime announced that it was setting up four new administrative districts in the north

east. The four districts set up were Mótasa, Mudzi, Rushinga and Centenary. They were taken out of the Umtali, Mtoko, Darwin, Mrewa and Sipolilo districts which were thus reduced in size. The reason for this move, according to a commentary on Salisbury Radio was that 'there has been a breakdown in contact at grass-roots level in that part of Rhodesia because the administration has been spread too thinly'.⁵⁴

On 9 March 1973, the Rev Fred Rea accused the regime of using a 'deliberate campaign of counter-terrorism'. The whole question of atrocities, by the guerrillas and by the security forces, is a continuing theme in the propaganda of both sides. It will be dealt with in some detail in a later section. There is little doubt that Mr Rea's accusation was soundly based.⁵⁵

The security forces had a range of leaflets with which to attack the guerrillas, and undermine support for them. In one, the regime quoted the medium of Mhondoro Mutota who said that the mediums of Nehanda, Chidyamawuyu and Chiwodza Mamera had been captured by the guerrillas, and called on the people to work with the soldiers. Another said that there was a drought because the spirit Chiwawa was supporting the guerrillas. Unfortunately for the regime, the north east was one of the few areas not affected by the drought, so the leaflet must have been counter-productive.) Several leaflets used shock tactics, with pictures of the bodies or faces of people said to be guerrillas.⁵⁶ Yet another listed the benefits of helping the soldiers and the penalties for helping the guerrillas.⁵⁷

In an attempt to deal with the problem of mines on dirt roads, the Minister of Transport said on 15 March, that the Secretaries of the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs, along with the police, were preparing a priority list of roads which they thought ought to be tarred 'in the affected areas'. In particular, he wanted the road between Umvukwes and Centenary tarred as a matter of urgency.⁵⁸

To impress Africans all over Rhodesia with the power of the armed forces, seven African chiefs representing every province of Rhodesia were given a tour of the 'Terrorist troubled' north east. They were led by the Provincial Commissioner.⁵⁹ The loyal support of African leaders is a favourite theme in the African Times. For example, the issue for 7 November 1973 had as its front page news that 'over 1,000 chiefs, headmen and kraal heads throughout Rhodesia (had) expressed overwhelming support for the government in its fight against terrorism'. It gives regular items of news with expressions of support for the regime and its fight against 'terror', although it is not at all clear how real their expressions are. Also regular items give the number of guerrillas killed by the security forces, or sentenced to death in the courts.

On 3 May, the regime published a bill which made it an offence for anyone who reveals in print what a person, charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act with subversion, is alleged to have said or done — unless the person is found innocent. This represented a further muzzleing of the press.⁶⁰

A major new step was announced on 17 May. Regulations were brought into force to make a 'no-go' area along the northern border of the country. 'A number of tribesmen' were to be moved. Any property left behind which might be of use to the guerrillas was to be destroyed. Compensation would be at the discretion of the Minister of Law and Order. The regulation also included new powers of curfew. The justification for this was that Africans living along the border had been so intimidated by the guerrillas that they were unable to live a normal life. This attempt to make a 'cordon-sanitaire' and free-fire zone was described by the Rhodesian Herald as: 'A great shock'.⁶¹

On 23 May, the 'Minister of Internal Affairs' announced that the regime would be spending \$4 million on 'development' in the north-eastern border area, mainly on

projects such as the new administrative districts, and new roads. There were proposals to increase water supplies and build new dams; these were needed for the protected villages for the Africans moved from the border area.⁶²

The State of Emergency was renewed for another year on 21 June 1973. The African MPs, who all voted against it, said that the regime should look at the reasons for the violence which was taking place.⁶³

On 27 July, the 'Minister of Law and Order' announced that the regime was considering increasing the penalties to be imposed for helping guerrillas — despite the fact that they had already been raised once at the beginning of the year. He said that these measures were needed 'because it (was) obvious that some people living in the affected areas (had) not yet got the message that the government means business when it says it is going to eradicate terrorists'.⁶⁴ When the bill was introduced in September, it introduced the death sentence for harbouring guerrillas, for not reporting their presence, for undergoing guerrilla training or recruiting them, or for encouraging anyone to undergo training. The bill also gave the 'Minister' power to prohibit a person from attending a public meeting for a year instead of just three months. Many of its provisions operate outside of the country as well.⁶⁵

In the middle of December, the regime felt ready to show the press what had happened to the Africans who had been moved from the border with Mozambique to make the 'no-go' area. They had been moved into a protected village at the beginning of December. (Where they had been before this was not disclosed.) The village they were shown, near the Musengezi River, was fifty acres in area, surrounded by a high security fence. (Another is in the Dande area.) The houses were prefabricated steel carports on concrete slabs, with cement-washed hessian as walls. According to the reporter: 'The villages would be run on tribal lines, but those living in them would be checked in and out. If they

were found wandering in the no-go area without authority, they would run the risk of being taken for terrorists. Inside the villages, however, they would be protected from terrorists'. The journalists quoted the District Commissioner's final words: 'Until we can get the battle for the hearts and minds of these people into full gear, we are doing only a holding action. We must have a presence with these people and control to make our task easier'.⁶⁶ Since this village, and others in the same area, were set up, more have been built further to the south, in the Chiweshe and the Madziwa TTLs. In a debate in Parliament, one of the African MPs who had been made to live in a protected village, spoke of the resentment which was building up because of the lack of facilities, the lack of freedom, the loss of schools and clinics, the loss of their homes, the loss of their stocks, and so on.⁶⁷

At the beginning of 1974, on 7 February, the regime published further regulations extending the powers of the 'protecting authorities' in the north east. They would be able to order residents to build and maintain roads, fences, bridges, and dams, (but they would have to pay them). They would be able to control food, and they could also control the movement of stocks. This last was because cattle had been used to destroy guerrilla tracks. The police would now be able to detain people for sixty days, instead of thirty as previously, pending enquiries. District Commissioners would also have powers to deal with persons who behave in a contemptuous manner towards District Commissioners. Finally, magistrates courts could be set up as and when necessary without the necessity of notification in the Government Gazette. According to Salisbury Radio, the regulations 'are particularly useful in the protection and administration of protected villages'.⁶⁸

Also related to the setting up of protected villages was the arming of District Assistants. The first group of thirty-seven finished their training in February 1974 at the Tomlinson

Depot, where they had been trained by the BSA Police. Their particular function, according to the 'Minister of Internal Affairs' was to 'assist the African civilian population in the defence of their villages and kraals against terrorism'.⁶⁹ In line with this, the 'Minister' announced a week later that a local African militia would be set up. It would be hand picked, organized and disciplined under the control of the District Administration. The District Assistants would act 'like military NCOs'. He said that a vast communications network would be set up, connecting African villages with the security forces and main centres.⁷⁰ Although by October 1974 there was evidence that the District Assistants had been involved in some incidents, there have been no reported incidents involving the African militia, or even evidence of its existence.

On 5 April, the regime announced that a whole village, Musiwa Kraal from the Madziwa TTL, was being moved to an area in Beitbridge (a distance of 470 miles) 'as a punishment for assisting terrorists and for rehabilitation'.⁷¹ As far as is known, they are still there.

On 16 April, the regime announced that they would offer cash rewards for information leading to the death or capture of guerrillas, or the discovery of weapons and explosives. The rewards were large, and were 'not less than', rather than the previous 'up to'. The largest sum was \$5,000 for information leading to the death or capture of a 'senior terrorist leader', down to \$300 for a box of ammunition, a gun, or a mine. The money would be given in such a way that its source remained confidential. Obviously the regime hoped that cupidity would overcome fear. Whether this has been successful is very difficult to say because so many of the trials are heard entirely or partly in secret. The regime claims it has, and the nationalists claim it has not been successful.⁷²

On 25 June 1974, a new regulation was published in

which it was stated that in specific areas all Africans over twelve years of age would need a 'registration book' or Situpa. The previous age limit was sixteen years.⁷³

This catalogue, which is necessarily brief, is up to date to the middle of October 1974. It is based upon an edifice of security legislation which has been called by one eminent legal writer 'draconian'.⁷⁴ Whether it will do its job of preventing an uprising, without the carrot of some real political reform is doubtful. The only sop the regime is offering to African nationalism is the promise of two African Parliaments, and this is not acceptable. It has no way of getting mass African support, and so it must keep the Africans down by giving dictatorial powers to the members of its administration in the African areas of the country. It hopes that if it cannot get the willing co-operation of the African population, it will get their co-operation under threat. No other reasonable interpretation of its policy is possible.

The Use of Terror

At the beginning of February 1973, in a review of operations up to that date, the regime announced that information from villagers had resulted in thirty-one arrests, including guerrillas and people assisting guerrillas. At the same time, they also said that two Africans had been rescued after being severely beaten by the guerrillas for refusing to join them.⁷⁵ The next day, they said that guerrillas had assaulted an African store keeper.⁷⁶ A whole series of reports alleging the use of violence to terrorize the African population into support of the guerrillas, was issued. The most complete statement by the regime about the use of terror is given in a booklet issued in May 1974 and called 'Anatomy of Terror'. It gives in horrific detail a chronological account of the alleged use of violence against Africans. It describes eighty-nine separate incidents

involving Africans and guerrillas, which allegedly took place between 22 December 1972 and 10 May 1974. The regime maintains that these atrocities are continuing.

A number of those who were killed were, according to the booklet, supporters of the regime, or thought to be so by the guerrillas. For example, on 17 April 1974 a 'headman of his village, Mr Chivarenge was approached by a gang of ten terrorists who accused him of being a "sell-out" and tied his hands behind his back and shot him . . . Mr Chivarenge had led a blameless life and no motive is apparent'. Again on 8 October 1973, in the Mt Darwin district 'African constables Mizha and Makaya were found bayoneted to death'. On 25 January 1974, in the Madziwa area 'three District Assistants (were) seized by the terrorists, beaten up, ridiculed and bound by side of road. Terrorists opened fire killing Regis. Others feigned death'. This was shortly after the regime had started to train District Assistants in the use of arms as part of the armed wing of the 'Ministry of Internal Affairs'.

The first question that must be asked is: Is there any independent evidence of guerrillas killing civilians? The answer to this question must be: Yes. One particular example has come to my notice—the information came from an African sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and so cannot be discounted as further 'propaganda'. The case concerned an African minister in the north east area, who was quite a-political—he did not support the regime, the ANC or the nationalists. He devoted himself to his farming, and his job as a parson. However, he aroused some jealousy because of his efficient farming. As a result a number of African neighbours denounced him to the regime, who collected him for interrogation. After some time, the authorities were convinced of his innocence, and they released him. The Africans then denounced him to the guerrillas as an informer. They said that the new motor bike he had been able to buy because of farming activities

had been given to him by the regime so that he could easily report his findings to the security forces. The guerrillas took him away and despite his pleas of innocence, they shot him. Other Africans from his area were very upset when they discovered this, and told the guerrillas so. Apparently the guerrillas did, publicly, accept that they had made a mistake.

The problem for an insurgent force as in Rhodesia, is one of security, and also of authority. There will rarely be an occasion where all the people in a place are on the side of the insurgent. In occupied Europe during the last world war, there were people informing to the Germans. In Rhodesia, where the Europeans have ruled the country for eighty years, it is likely that some Africans will still look to the Europeans. These people are the potential traitors to the African cause. The guerrillas do not have the highly developed judicial system that the Europeans have, for charging and trying people, although there have been fairly well substantiated reports that they have had a rudimentary system operating in some areas in the north east.⁷⁷ They have no option but to make decisions in the field. What makes it more difficult is the fact that their most dangerous enemies are those who are not clearly identified. For example, five Africans were sent to gaol for twenty-five years in August 1974 for recruiting others to do guerrilla training. They were found out when an African undercover policeman infiltrated their group.⁷⁸ The rewards given by the regime for Africans who pass on information must make the guerrillas even more nervous. They want to show their supporters that they are the 'real law' in the area, and they want to frighten potential traitors into not betraying them. Inevitably, they make more mistakes than the regime's judicial system does — when that judicial system is used.

It is also inevitable that the guerrilla leaders will not have the control of the men in the field that a standing army

normally has. The guerrilla fighters will be on their own to a much greater extent. In general they are very much more highly motivated than soldiers in an army. They have to be, to be able to operate in the comparative isolation that they are in. The guerrillas in the Portuguese territories appear to have exercised strict discipline over their cadres. There is evidence that ZANU have held their own courts to deal with those members who have sexually assaulted women in the rural areas.⁷⁹

On the other hand, if a guerrilla does turn to banditry, then it is more difficult to bring him under control rapidly. What is more, someone can attach himself to a genuine band from very mixed motives. The nationalists will have their share of sadists. Two such were Kid Morongorongo and Solomon Ngoni, who seem to have operated by themselves. (They may not even have been members of ZANLA at all.) The regime announced that they had been killed at the beginning of September 1974. They were responsible for a number of very nasty acts of brutality, including pulling the upper lip of an African woman off with pliers and a rusty bayonet. Several of their crimes were reported in the regime's booklet 'Anatomy of Terror'. The regime used their death to show the African population to whom to look for protection against unprovoked and brutal attacks such as these.⁸⁰

Finally, it is inevitable that criminals will take the opportunity afforded by the general confusion to undertake a wide range of criminal activities. There has been a spate of cases in the courts, in which Africans have been charged with pretending to be guerrillas. In March 1974, the prosecutor in the trial of an African charged with robbery in the Sipolilo area, said that offences by Africans masquerading as 'terrorists' and obtaining money and food in 'bush areas' were becoming prevalent.⁸¹ In another case, an African was found guilty of two charges of robbery, one of housebreaking and one of assault on an African woman.

The man had said that there were sixteen guerrillas in the bush outside the hut where he made the assault. He had made rifles of wood and metal piping.⁸²

Thus it can be concluded that the guerrillas bear some, but only some, responsibility for unprovoked attacks on civilian Africans. The execution of people who are in fact working for the regime, i.e. for the enemy, can be justified by the exigencies of war. But it is counter-productive to their cause if they allow criminals such as Morongorongo and Ngoni to operate for as long as they did.

There is a lot of evidence to show that members of the security forces have used terror. The first public expression of this came in a speech by the Rev. Fred Rea, a European—and conservative—Methodist minister. In an address to the Rotary Club in Salisbury in March 1973, he asked the regime for an assurance that they were not instituting a deliberate campaign of counter-terrorism. He went on: 'Of what value is it for the security forces to drive out the terrorists if in doing so they leave behind a heritage of hate and fear and a deep sense of injustice in the hearts of the whole African population?'⁸³ Mr Rea's very mild and careful allegations were hotly denied by the regime. Nearly six months later, the Zambia Daily Mail published a detailed account of an alleged attack by the Rhodesian security forces on a number of villages in the northern Mt Darwin area in January 1973. Apparently the villages were surrounded and hundreds of bullets pumped into them. Furthermore, most of the men were taken away to the military camps, and were badly beaten up. Many of the women decided to escape from the area, and made their way to Zambia.⁸⁴ Although the regime again denied the report, it ties in well with the Rev. Fred Rea's account.

There is also evidence that Rhodesian troops operating in Mozambique were using terror tactics against the African population there. They hoped to break the hold of Frelimo. The Observer journalist, David Martin, in an unheralded

visit to a refugee camp run by Frelimo, met some of them in August 1973. According to one African, Rhodesian troops clashed with Frelimo guerrillas in July 1973 near to some villages in the Zambezi valley. These villages were then subjected to a violent attack by bombers, jet fighters, helicopters, gunships and troops. Many African civilians were killed. They were definite that the troops were Rhodesian, because of the direction they came from, the different colour of Portuguese and Rhodesian aircraft, the different uniforms, different hats, and the fact that the troops were asking after ZANU and not Frelimo.⁸⁵ These reports were confirmed in a detailed report made by a number of Portuguese officers just before the coup in April 1974, and printed in the Guardian. They alleged that 'Rhodesian paratroops on anti-guerrilla actions have struck at selected targets deep inside Mozambique, with orders to take neither military nor civilian prisoners, but to kill everyone they find'.⁸⁶ There was reason for the Rhodesian security forces to especially avoid taking prisoners in Mozambique. It would have caused embarrassment both to themselves and to Portugal. At the same time, it indicates the way in which they are prepared to act if necessary.

In dealing with individual Africans, both guerrilla sympathizers and the guerrillas themselves, there is evidence of brutality by the security forces. A European farmer's wife told Max Hastings of the Evening Standard in August 1973, that a guerrilla was captured locally. They thought they would get information out of him. 'But while they were jumping up and down on him to get him to talk, somebody jumped too hard. He died. So they never did find out anything from him.'⁸⁷ Shortly after this, a trial judge condemned, from a legal point of view, 'the employment of what counsel has called "methods of strenuous investigation"', for getting information to track down guerrillas. The case involved a sixteen year old youth who alleged that he had been beaten by African policemen and

'suspended while wearing leg irons'.⁸⁸ Other cases have been cited. The most important series was issued with the 'Appeal to Conscience by Christian Leaders' on 15 August 1974. It was accompanied by a 'Draft statement' from victims allegedly assaulted by the Rhodesian security forces. The ten cases are only a small part of a much larger number. The signatories include the Rev. Paul Burrough, an Anglican Bishop who has stood out against the World Council of Churches support of the nationalists, the other two Anglican Bishops, the Rev Fred Rea and his Methodist colleague and the Roman Catholic Bishops. The leaders point out that they only took the step of publicizing the atrocities because their attempts to talk to the regime behind closed doors had completely failed. The regime has responded by refusing to conduct any sort of independent enquiry—presumably because they know that the allegations are justified.

A report of a slightly different form of 'terror' was given by Salisbury Radio at the end of November 1974. 'An awe-inspiring display of fire-power by air and ground units of the security forces in Rhodesia was witnessed this week by nearly 1,000 tribesmen and their wives from many kraals in the operational area. The demonstration was one of several which have been mounted in recent weeks to demonstrate the effectiveness and armed superiority of the security forces over the terrorists. The demonstration commenced with a talk by a warrant officer from the Rhodesian African Rifles on the various weapons used by the terrorists, including automatic rifles, landmines and stick grenades. He urged the crowd, in the interest of the peace of their district, to report the presence of strangers to the local authorities or police and hand over any terrorist weapons and ammunition that they should find.'⁸⁹

An important question which must be asked is whether the 'counter-terrorism' being used by the security forces is justified. Some of it will probably be caused by soldiers and

over-worked police reacting to the opportunity of getting at someone who has physically threatened them, their families and their properties. This can never help the regime's cause. It also shows a lack of discipline in the service in question. Some of it will be from a determination to get important information from a man who will go to prison or be executed. It may produce the information. If the person is then not allowed contact with other Africans, the hatred it causes may not be spread. Finally, one of the uses of terror is to show 'who is boss'. In the short term, it may well work. The complete destruction of a village will mean that that village can not support guerrillas. Fear of brutal punishment may well frighten a person into not doing anything likely to bring that punishment down. But this will really only be effective if the punishment is reasonably sure—i.e. if the means of detection and apprehension are effective. And also, the punishment must not be arbitrary. Even then, it will probably engender a hatred and bitterness which will result in bitter fruits in the future. The situation in Rhodesia is such that the African population will not be cowed, and so the use of terror only heightens the hatred.

The Conflict Continues

Both the security forces and ZANU have issued regular communiques since December 1972, with more occasional ones from ZAPU. The figures from these are tabulated overleaf, and the discrepancies between them are very striking.

All military communiques are meant to mislead the reader into believing that the army or body which issues them has either won a major battle, or only suffered a minor setback. They are usually a very distorted version of the truth. The communiques issued by both the regime and by ZANU are typical of this. (ZAPU have issued very few.) The ZANU communiques do not mention any ZANLA

casualties at all. They only mention casualties claimed to have been inflicted on the Rhodesian security forces. The number they claim to have killed seems higher than is possible. The European community is close-knit, and it is unlikely that it could bear the large numbers of casualties suggested by the ZANU figures. If it did, it would become public knowledge and a subject for discussion. Even if censorship stopped publication within Rhodesia, the information would leak out of it. It is easy to assume that every enemy soldier who falls to the ground is dead. It is also very unlikely that, in the many clashes and fights the guerrillas have had with the regime, they have had no-one killed. However, the ZANU communiques do probably reflect the number and location of actual incidents. The geographical area they cover is relatively circumscribed, comprising mainly the Sipolilo, Darwin, Shamva, Bindura and Mazoe districts. They usually report the location in detail, but the results of the clash more vaguely. This reflects the fact they they operate a classic guerrilla 'hit and run' method. They would know the location, but they would not wait to see the results.

The regime's communiques are no more reliable than ZANU's. They do state some of their own casualties. This gives their communiques a respectability which is not fully justified. A number of 'accidents' have been reported from the operational or north-east area of the country. For example, there have been a number of 'crashes' by aircraft, and of 'accidental shootings', which have been categorized as accidents. It seems likely that a number of these should be added in to the European casualty figures. There have also been reports from European members of the Territorial Forces that the numbers of army casualties are higher than is generally supposed.

The number of African guerrillas reported killed by the regime is very much higher than their own reported casualties. The Africans in Rhodesia claim that the figure

Casualties since December 1972

Period	Guerrillas killed	Members of Rhodesian and SA security forces killed in action	killed in an accident in the operational areas	killed in action	killed in action
	(regime's figures)	(regime's figures)	(regime's figures)	(ZANU's figures)	(ZAPU's figures)
Dec 1972	54	15	7	345	(15)
June 1973					1
July-Dec. 1973	141	9	5	249	36
Jan-June 1974	189	15	10	236	24
July-Oct 1974	103	10	2		

* August-November 1972.

ZANU and ZAPU report only those whom their own guerillas claim to have killed.

of guerrillas killed are inflated by African civilians killed by the security forces. Some of the evidence that a number of civilians have been killed by the security forces has been given in the section on the Use of Terror. These people could well be reported as guerrilla casualties. This is particularly so if a captured guerrilla subsequently dies as a result of questioning. It is also quite possible that a number of Africans have been killed because they happen to cross the path of an army patrol, or because they are out after curfew. (The regime has reported when some Africans were accidentally killed— but there may have been other occasions.) The killings may not always be 'malicious', and a genuine mistake may have been made. In this way, the

regime can inflate the 'score' of guerrillas as it has killed.

The number of incidents reported by the regime in their communiques is deflated. For example, a Wild Life Department truck was mined in the Marangora-Mana Pools area, and two of the four members of the Department and their South African escort in the truck were seriously injured (one requiring a leg amputation). When asked why this incident was never reported, the 'Ministry of Information' said: 'For security reasons it is not Government policy to give details of every single incident that occurs in the operational area'.⁹⁰

The whereabouts of the incidents are described misleadingly. For example, at the end of April 1974, a Government animal health inspector was killed, according to the regime's communique 'in the north-east border area'. However, a letter from his sister-in-law made it clear that this 'border area' was only half an hour's drive from the town of Bindura, which is one hour from the centre of Salisbury.⁹¹

Finally, the communiques often minimize the results of an engagement. For example, a communique describing the results of an engagement with ZANLA stated that 'two others (members of the security forces) have been wounded, neither seriously'. A few days later, in a short report about one of the wounded men, it was stated that he had had the lower half of his jaw shot away in this fight. The newspaper rightly described him as 'seriously wounded'.⁹² Furthermore, there is fairly explicit censorship of the press. For example, after the right wing monthly newspaper 'Property and Finance', sent a reporter on a visit to the north-east area in May and June 1974, it printed a report which had not been submitted for vetting. As a result, it was not allowed to sell the copies in question. The report was connected with security, as the appeal against this banning was heard in camera.⁹³

Despite the difficulties in the interpretation of the

communiques, it is quite clear from both sides that the fight started in December 1972 has continued. In February 1973, the regime announced that it had lost one of its helicopters. It reported a series of engagements, and a series of vehicles mined by the guerrillas. At the end of the month, it launched a major air attack against a guerrilla hide-out in the Mavuradonha mountains. The results were spectacular but didn't cause a single casualty among the guerrillas. Six Vampires and Hunter planes swooped on a guerrilla hide-out, sending up plumes of smoke. Helicopters then landed army patrols which scoured out a network of caves—to find that the guerrillas had left some days before. Apparently it did act as a morale booster for the local farmers.⁹⁴

Guerilla Attacks on Property

Period	European farms	Farm stores	African stores
Dec. 1972- June 1973	8	9	5
July-Dec. 1973	4	3	?
Jan.-June 1974	11	6	9
July-Sept. 1974	1	2	

Source: *Rhodesian Herald* and *Salisbury Radio*.

The European farm stores are usually burnt down. The African stores are rarely burnt. Probably some of the thefts are by bandits pretending to be guerrillas.

This morale-booster was needed, for the guerrillas have attacked European farmsteads relentlessly. These attacks have always taken place at night. They are directed against both the European farm house itself and also the farm

buildings and equipment. The objective here is to try to drive the farmers away. Thus the huts of the African workers are often destroyed as well. Stores used by Africans whether or not they are owned by the European farmers, are also attacked. Many of the African farm workers are not Rhodesian, but are from Mozambique or Malawi. For example, one of the buildings destroyed at the Whistlefield farm in December 1972, was a mosque. It must have been used by Moslem African workers from the Mozambique coast.⁹⁵ The number of reported attacks on European farms, and on stores, (both European and African) are shown below. There must be many more which have not been reported.

It is exceptionally difficult to say how successful the guerrillas have been in frightening off the European farmers. They have had a dramatic effect on their way of life. Each farm has become, in essence, a minor fortress. There are almost no farms in the area which do not have a ten foot security fence built to deflect a rocket. Most are floodlit at night and have alsatians running around the garden. The official advice is not to trust the African staff and not to sleep in the bedroom. Most houses are sand-bagged, with steel shutters and wire mesh for the windows against rockets and gunfire. They have a small arsenal of arms, and a radio to contact the security forces. Some farmers have tried to control the African quarters as well. One set up an alarm system wired to the African compound. When Max Hastings spoke to the farmer's wife in August 1973, the alarm had been triggered on three occasions for no apparent reason. She commented: 'It's not good for a peaceful night's rest'.⁹⁶ This sort of protection has, of course, taken some time to build up. Initially the houses were simple targets for the guerrillas, but as the houses have become better protected, the guerrilla attacks on them have not been so successful in terms of deaths. However, they have destroyed a great deal of farm property.

The regime is quite clear about the importance of keeping the European farmers on their land. In an illuminating speech in September 1971, Desmond Lardner-Burke, the 'Minister of Law and Order', said that it was essential for Rhodesia to have as many people as possible on the land. 'It is only when you have vacant farms that you are liable to suffer from squatter problems. This could lead to infiltration of terrorists or their supporters and could undermine the security of the country.'⁹⁷ That this was causing great concern to the regime was shown by a speech given by the 'Minister of Lands and Natural Resources' in June 1974. He said that the regime was taking steps to ensure that there would be no unoccupied land in 'security-sensitive' areas. The regime intended taking powers to ensure that unoccupied European farming land was used. While it was not, the area would be 'policed'. A bill giving the regime the requisite powers was introduced in September 1974.⁹⁸ A number of the guerrilla attacks have been against farm houses which were unoccupied at the time of the attack. However this may well be because the owners were taking a 'normal' weekend off in a hotel in Salisbury or one of the other towns.

The guerrillas have also attacked the communications. They have used mines on many roads in the rural areas. The number of incidents relating to vehicles are tabulated overleaf.

These figures include many army trucks, and also vehicles owned by Europeans but driven by Africans. For example, in June 1974 two Africans were killed and four Africans seriously injured when a bus they were in hit a mine in the area north of Mt Darwin.⁹⁹ In Salisbury, the Africans call the buses 'mine sweepers'. In 1973, the guerrillas hijacked them, gave a political lecture, occasionally they removed someone they wanted to deal with further, and left with the ticket collector's takings. At the end of 1973, they began to let the passengers out and then destroy the bus, usually by

Attacks on vehicles by mines, etc.

Period	European owned vehicles mined	African owned vehicles mined	Buses mined	Buses burned or at- tempted burning	Buses held up
Dec. 1972- June 1973	8	0	0	0	0
July-Dec. 1973	7	2	0	1	7
Jan.-June 1974	6	5	3	5	1
July-Sept. 1974	6	2	1	0	0

Source: *Rhodesia Herald* and *Salisbury Radio*

burning. For example, a group of eight guerrillas hijacked a bus when it arrived at its destination in the Dande township right near the Mozambique border. The leader of the group told the driver that they had been given ample warning before that no buses should come into the area. The group split into two. One half remained with the passengers and conductors, so they could not call the army. The other half went with the driver and the bus which was driven into the bush and set on fire after being drenched with diesel fuel. They then sent the driver back to Dande saying to him: 'You should report everything that has happened; do not leave out anything'.¹⁰⁰ They have also tried to stop the building of the new tarred roads in the north east. For example, in May 1974, six African road workers were told to set their grader alight, and then two were shot dead and the other four injured.¹⁰¹

There has been a series of attacks on schools. These have taken two forms. In a number of cases the teachers have been killed. It is not completely clear why this is

so — whether it is an attack on the educational system, or on the individual concerned. There have also been a number of mass 'abductions'. The first, and the largest was that from the St Albert's mission, in the Mavuradonha Mountains, on the northern border of Centenary. According to the regime, this was an act of desperation by the nationalists, needing both new recruits, and women for their guerrillas to sleep with. Two hundred and seventy-three children and staff were taken by the seventeen man guerrilla band. The guerrillas were at the mission for three hours before they left. They had cut the telephone wires first so that the European mission staff were unable to ring for help to the troops four kilometers away.¹⁰² The view of Europeans was best exemplified by the Sunday Mail in an editorial aimed at its African readership (it was translated into Shona): 'The terrible events at St Albert's Mission last week have aroused great anger throughout Rhodesia, among Europeans and Africans alike . . . There are some among the African people who have given aid to the terrorists, either in fear or by persuasion. There are others who have half believed that the way of the terrorists might be the way to a better life. Now all know the truth. The way of the terrorists is to murder and rape, to abduct and destroy'.¹⁰³

The story was not as simple as this. The guerrillas included a number of former pupils among their number — they knew their way round the mission. Although the priests argued with them vigorously, the guerrillas tolerated them and hardly touched them at all. ZANU has women guerrillas among its ranks, so that it was quite reasonable for women to go with the guerrillas. According to the ZANU communique, a 'high powered team of high ranking commandos and political commissars' went to 'address a political meeting at St Albert's Mission at the invitation of students, staff, and local people. The high-powered ZANLA team freely addressed the meeting for two

hours . . . After the address . . . the people present unanimously reached an agreement that every able-bodied male and female present should go for military training. As the people marched, led by the ZANLA officers, some got tired and others sick, and therefore decided to go back to the Mission. On their way back they were rounded up by rebel terrorist forces and taken to interrogation centres before being allowed to go back to the Mission. Meanwhile the enemy forces who tried to pursue the ZANLA fighters and the people, were blown up by mines which had been laid by ZANLA before the two-hour address. Two enemy troops were killed and six wounded and their truck destroyed by the explosion. The ZANLA mission was very highly successful'.¹⁰⁴ According to the regime, one guerrilla was killed, but also an African girl who was caught in the cross-fire. At the end of July, only a boy, seven girls, and an African woman had not been accounted for.¹⁰⁵ In the middle of September 1973, another ninety-three school children were removed from their school by the guerrillas. Again most of the children returned to the school.¹⁰⁶ In March 1974, sixteen African children were removed from their home area by guerrillas. It is not clear whether they were taken from their school or not.¹⁰⁷ The ages of many of the guerrillas are very often below twenty, so that it is not surprising that they see the schools as a fertile recruiting ground. ZANU recruited many from Rhodesian schools in 1971 and 1972. The impetus to join the guerrillas must be even greater now, and reports from African schools up and down the country suggest that this is so.

However, it has not all been going the nationalists' way. There have been a number of engagements in which it is clear that the guerrillas have not come off best. In an engagement at the end of August 1974, the security forces claimed to have killed eight guerrillas. One of their soldiers was killed, and two others badly wounded. According to a report in the Rhodesia Herald, a group of guerrillas was

reported to the army, probably by one of the light spotter planes operated mainly by the police. Within twenty minutes, a number of helicopters carrying members of the RLI took off to the area where the guerrillas had been seen. By the time they had arrived, the guerrillas had hidden themselves, but the helicopters landed the troops, and the fight began. The helicopters then took off, and were able to spot the guerrillas and inform the troops on the ground. A soldier on the ground said that 'the action moved back and forward over an area of one kilometer'. At first the guerrillas engaged them in a stand-up fight, but then they tried to escape. Other aircraft then bombed and strafed them.¹⁰⁸

This engagement shows the basic military strategy of the Rhodesians. After locating a guerrilla group, they try to get to them as soon as possible. If the security forces get to the guerrillas before they can move on, then they will overwhelm the guerrillas by superior numbers of troops, with intelligence (via the helicopters) and with superior power (especially from the aircraft). It is no more 'fair play' than when the guerrillas ambush the security forces. It is a matter of trying to catch the enemy at a disadvantage. On the occasion mentioned above, an officer briefing the press said: 'They put up a good fight, but if we meet these chaps face to face as we did in this instance, we will beat them every time'. The reporter went on to say that the bodies of the guerrillas killed in this engagement were to be shown to the tribal leaders to demonstrate the regime's success.¹⁰⁹

The fortunes of the nationalists have fluctuated since the beginning of 1973. In February, the regime closed all the schools and commercial activity in Chiweshe, and then later in Chesa, and screened all the Africans with the object of rooting the guerrillas out. A number of African villages in the Chiweshe TTL paid collective fines for not reporting guerrillas.¹¹⁰ As a result of the screening, a large number of Africans were charged, including two of the Chiweshe

headmen. However, this had little real effect on the fighting. A Rhodesian soldier was killed and six injured when their vehicle hit a mine in the Centenary area in the middle of February. The loss of a helicopter at the end of February, in the Ruya game reserve, was ominous for the regime.¹¹¹ ZANU has claimed to have shot down several others.

In February, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe, (Frolizi), sent two groups of guerrillas into Rhodesia, crossing the Zambezi from Zambia downstream from the Kariba dam. One was involved in a fight with the security forces in Mukwichi TTL and a police reservist was killed. Some were arrested near to where the fight had taken place, but others were only arrested much further south in Gatooma. The other group attacked an empty farm house in Mangula, and then moved down towards Wedza. There were two coloureds in this group, and they went to Salisbury to try to recruit but were arrested before they had any success. The leader of the group tried to get recruits in Gwelo, apparently with some success. He was also responsible for the death of a European farmer in Wedza at the end of March, but was not caught until the middle of June 1973.¹¹² These are the only two Frolizi groups to have been reported in Rhodesia.

The Frolizi incursions provoked fears that a new front was opening down the middle of Rhodesia. However, these fears were not justified. The fight in the Centenary area continued with its previous intensity. Communiques from both sides confirm this. The death of a member of a 'police anti-terrorist unit' was reported at the beginning of April. Another member was seriously wounded. The police unit had been following a group which had burnt down an African store, and taken goods from a farm store. The guerrillas ambushed the police from behind some ant hills, and the unit had to get air support before it could escape.¹¹³

At the end of April, the security forces announced what

was a major defeat for them. In an ambush by ZANLA, they lost four soldiers and another five were seriously wounded. Three guerrillas were apparently killed in the incident, and some others were captured. The incident seems to have happened near to the border with Mozambique.¹¹⁴ At the same time, there were two attacks on European farms, one in the Sipolilo area, and the other in the Shamva area.

In May, the same pattern continued. A mine placed by ZAPU in the Mana Pools area blew up a land rover containing two men who were on a fishing trip in the area. One was killed.¹¹⁵ The most reported incident, though, was the death of two tourists in the Victoria Falls gorge. Two Canadian girls were killed by Zambian troops who, it is claimed, thought that the girls were going to attack a Zambian power station on the other bank. The death of the two girls provoked a major international storm.¹¹⁶ Rhodesian sources claim that the Zambian troops are very ill-disciplined. They have claimed other incidents where people have been shot up from the Zambian bank. (For example, a Rhodesian fisherman was killed in February 1973 on the Zambezi, allegedly by the Zambians. The Zambians have denied this.)¹¹⁷ If the regime believe this about the Zambian army, then they should keep tourists away from danger.

The battle between the guerrillas and the regime continued in this way for several months. In July, ZANU visited St Albert's Mission as has been described above. A number of fierce battles were fought between the guerrillas and the Rhodesians. The guerrillas did not always win — as for example in June 1973, when a guerrilla group of about twelve fought with a unit of the Rhodesian African Rifles in the Sipolilo district.¹¹⁸

In August, ZANU appointed a new Chief of Defence, and it was disclosed that it had a women's detachment which had been formed in the Centenary district.¹¹⁹ In October

the regime announced that they had killed thirteen guerrillas in one incident and lost one member of the security forces.¹²⁰ The number of army trucks hitting mines had been slowly reduced. There were still some. For example in November, an army truck hit a mine, and an African soldier was killed and a European soldier injured.¹²¹ In the same month, five African soldiers appealed against a twenty-five year gaol sentence for mutiny. As the case was in camera, the verdict was not disclosed.¹²² In December, the pace seemed to slacken. However, ZAPU claimed that nineteen South Africans were killed in a series of mines laid in the Makuti/Mana Pools area.¹²³ Lusaka Radio also reported that since the beginning of 1973, the South Africans had sent a further nine or ten companies into Rhodesia.¹²⁴

In January 1974, the numbers of incidents increased. Two farms were attacked. A private aircraft was damaged in one, and the son of a farmer wounded in the other.¹²⁵ A few days later, the regime announced that one of their police reserve aircraft had been 'slightly damaged' by guerrilla fire.¹²⁶ In February, the security forces' attention was forced back to the Centenary area when two European farmers (a Mr and Mrs Fletcher) were killed in an ambush, and another European, a police reservist, was killed in the follow-up operations.¹²⁷ It was very significant that four farm labourers on the Fletcher's farm were shortly afterwards found guilty of 'having assisted terrorists generally over a period of time in the area of Runyararo'.¹²⁸ This incident took place during a bye-election for the Rhodesian Parliament, and caused the Rhodesian Front some political embarrassment. These deaths were followed by a flurry of activity by the security forces. Within ten days they were able to announce that they had killed sixteen more guerrillas. The communiques did not make it clear whether they had been involved in the Fletcher killings.

The continuing chaos in the regime's administration was

recognized by the appointment of Mr Wickus de Kock as a 'Deputy Minister to the Department of the Prime Minister' with special responsibility for security. This new appointment was announced at the beginning of February. His job was to co-ordinate the regime's services as they affected security—or as he put it, to 'cut red tape', and 'knock heads together'. He commented that 'all over the world governments are slow in implementing decisions'. He intended to increase the speed of implementation.¹²⁹

At the beginning of March, ZAPU ambushed a South African patrol slightly upstream from the Victoria Falls, and killed all its members. According to the South Africans, four were killed and one was missing (he was never recovered). According to ZAPU, nine were killed. The regime claimed that the ZAPU group operated from Zambia.¹³⁰ However the regime was able to record a success against the ZANLA guerrillas in the Centenary area. Acting on a tip, the security forces ambushed a guerrilla group which was about to attack a farm, and succeeded in killing three guerrillas and wounding one.¹³¹

The continued attacks on farms in the Centenary area worried the European farming community. At the end of March, the security forces decided to again screen all the African labourers on the tobacco farms in the north-eastern border area. According to Christopher Munnion: 'Farming communities in the Centenary, Mt Darwin and Bindura areas fear that ZANU are enlisting African workers to assist them in Mau Mau style attacks on homesteads'.¹³²

In April, the regime lost one of their precious Canberras in a flying sortie in the north-east area. It was described as a 'flying accident', and the regime said that the results of an enquiry would remain confidential.¹³³ ZANU however claim that it was shot down by ZANLA ground fire in a battle in the Mudzengerere village, Centenary district.¹³⁴ Two light spotter aircraft were lost at the end of the same month. The second was lost searching for the first one. No

reason was given for the crashes, which were said to have happened 'in a remote border area'. The regime said that the first plane had been tampered with before they got to it. It seems most probable that the border area was so remote that it was in Mozambique, and the planes had been shot down by Frelimo. ZANU did not claim to have brought them down.¹³⁵

In May, the Zambians were again accused of shooting across the Zambezi. This time the alleged victim was an African policeman who was patrolling the Zambezi near to Chirundu.¹³⁶ In a trial report, further evidence of the presence of women in ZANLA guerrilla bands was given. A young guerrilla who had been recruited in Rhodesia, described how he and four girls were 'instructed to shoot if they saw a European'.¹³⁷ At the end of May, the regime claimed a major victory. They said that they had had a battle with two guerrilla groups which lasted the whole week end in the north-eastern area. As a result, two guerrilla bands had been virtually wiped out and sixteen guerrillas killed, including 'several senior ZANU gang leaders'.¹³⁸

In July, ZANU attacks on farms in the north-east area continued. They destroyed both equipment and some of the huts occupied by the African labourers.¹³⁹ A few days before the General Election for the Rhodesian Parliament, a hand-grenade was thrown into a night club in the middle of Salisbury. Six people were injured — and the grenade was identified as being of 'communist' origin.¹⁴⁰

In the middle of August, the regime announced that they had fought a very successful engagement, killing eight guerrillas and losing only one soldier. In his budget speech to the Rhodesian Parliament shortly after this incident, the 'Minister of Finance' showed what the fighting was costing in financial terms. He announced a retrospective surcharge of ten per cent on income tax paid for the previous year. A deficit of \$40 million, mainly caused by the security

situation, necessitated this. He also proposed substantial increases in expenditure in a number of crucial sectors such as the police, defence, internal affairs, and roads. All of these are connected with the security situation. To these figures ought to be added the cost of the South African forces used in Rhodesia, and their support groups in South Africa itself.

A day or two later, they had to announce the death of three soldiers as the result of a land mine explosion. A further eight were also injured.¹⁴¹ In September, the pattern was similar. Two Europeans, (one a soldier and one a District Officer in the 'Ministry of Internal Affairs') were killed, but the regime claimed to have killed thirty-one guerrillas. October began with the death of two soldiers in a land mine explosion 'in the operational area'. ZANU was presumably responsible for these attacks.¹⁴³ The same day it was announced that two members of the South African security forces had been killed in a clash with guerrillas.¹⁴⁴ Four days later, the regime announced that there had been altogether five clashes with guerrillas in the previous ten days. They claimed that the guerrillas were coming across the Zambezi at the north and north-western end of the country from Zambia. These can only have been ZAPU, who were probably trying to start another front in Rhodesia.¹⁴⁵ Only time will tell whether they will succeed as well as ZANU has.

Speaking in February 1973, the Publicity Secretary of the African National Council, Edson Sithole, put it very well. He said that the Rhodesian security forces could not bring peace to Rhodesia. The most urgent task was to reach a just political settlement acceptable to the African people. He said the freedom fighters could never be defeated because they did not rely on numbers or formal attacks. A guerrilla could choose his target and fight when he liked. He might not fight for a year, but in the meantime he kept the adversary's forces tied down in the bush waiting for an

The Response of Europeans and Africans

The morale of the European population has taken a series of severe knocks during the last three years. The first was the result of the Pearce Commission, in which the British Commissioners gave equal (or even greater) weight to the African opinion. Then came the opening of the guerrilla front in the north east of the country in December 1972, and the closing of the border with Zambia. This border remained closed even when Rhodesia opened her side. The collapse of Zambia, expected by many Rhodesian Europeans, did not come about. In May 1973, Smith had to admit that, although they had considered a pre-emptive strike against Zambia, they could not do so because they did not have sufficient friends internationally.¹⁴⁷

Gradually came the realization that Mozambique was not a country which could be depended upon. In April 1974, the fascist government in Portugal fell, and a junta with the avowed policy of getting out of Africa, came to power. Frelimo became a part of the Mozambique government, and a short lived right wing revolt in Laureço Marques was quelled in September 1974. The prospect of African Rule in Mozambique was brought home to Rhodesia. Nkomo safely incarcerated in the southern most tip of Rhodesia near to the Mozambique border had to be moved to Salisbury, and a new railway had to be built to South Africa on Rhodesian territory. At the end of August 1974, Rhodesia's 'Accredited Diplomatic Representative' to Pretoria said in Salisbury that South Africa would like to see 'internal accord, more than anything else'—and by this he meant racial accord. He ended by saying 'what we should certainly never do, of course, is take South African help for granted'.¹⁴⁸ The very next day, Mr A. Grobelaar, of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, said that Rhodesia's importance as a 'buffer zone' for South Africa was declining.¹⁴⁹

At the same time, the continual call-ups of members of the Territorial Force has worried the country's business men who have to bear the cost. Furthermore, many of those who are called up, are not at all enthusiastic. Max Hastings reported in August 1973 that: 'Out in "The Valley" I was told the nine battalions of young conscript territorials are neither very good soldiers nor very keen. They are valued for their numbers, but the territorial units are said to show a marked lack of enthusiasm for hurling themselves on the enemy bayonets'.¹⁵⁰ This was confirmed in the Rhodesia Herald in March when a reporter, following up a letter from a member of the Territorial Forces, interviewed a number of soldiers who had just come back from the north-east. 'Some were angry. Some were bitter. Some were worried. All were concerned about the situation in the north east and the conditions they had to face during their twenty-eight days on territorial duty.' One of the men he interviewed said: 'The real thing that worried me was that a lot of my chaps had not picked up a weapon for several years. One chap didn't even know how a machine gun worked. Yet we went in on the Sunday morning and that night were up there and fully operational . . . Some of the organization among the officers was terrible. There were about eighty chaps in our section and morale was taking a tumble simply because of the conditions. It was most distressing'.¹⁵¹ Others were finding that the guerrillas are not the simple 'communist thugs' that they are made out to be. One discovered bibles in guerrilla hides as well as Mao Tse Tung's 'Little Red Book'.

A basic indicator of confidence is whether Europeans are prepared to stay there. Mr M. Britten, the secretary of ACCOR (The Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia) spoke to the Rhodesia Herald in November 1973. He believed the main reasons for the acute shortage of (European) professional people in Rhodesia were that they had no faith in the future of the country, military call-up and the lack of opportunities in Rhodesia. 'The military

call-up is the over-riding factor causing people to leave.¹⁵²

The European migration figures confirm this view. Two tables, the first giving gross figures for migration to and from Rhodesia, and the second giving figures for the migration of professional people, are given below.

Total European Migration since 1969

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration
1969	10,929	5,890	+ 5,040
1970	12,227	5,890	+ 6,340
1971	14,743	5,340	+ 9,400
1972	13,966	5,150	+ 8,820
1973	9,433	7,750	+ 1,680
1974 (Jan.-Oct.)	8,054	7,260	+ 794


Source: *Monthly Digest of Statistics, Rhodesia.*

Migration of Economically Active European Professionals

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net migration
1971	1,227	560	+ 667
1972	1,290	585	+ 705
1973	834	850	- 16
1974 (Jan.-Aug.)	546	572	- 26

Source: *Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, Rhodesia.*

Furthermore, it is very likely that a lot of people who leave the country, do so without declaring themselves as emigrants at the border. One reason is that it is possible to take a little more money out when leaving temporarily (on holiday or a business trip). Probably one of the main



Infiltration of African nationalist guerrillas into Rhodesia, 1972 to 1974
(approximate date of entry with probable route)

reasons why those who are well-established in the country remain there, is that it is very difficult to get their money out of Rhodesia. The regime's exchange controls are very strict. In addition, Rhodesian currency is worthless outside the country. Thus, a lot of the emigrants will be recent immigrants, who have not got a great deal to leave behind.

The morale of the Africans is, on the other hand, very high. They feel that they are on the winning side. There is tremendous support for the guerrillas, and correspondingly less fear of the regime. A very small example of this was given to a correspondent of Anti-Apartheid News. The person concerned was standing waiting for a bus in the country with a group of about twenty other Africans. A convoy of about fifteen troop lorries passed. About ten minutes later, the convoy returned, and a soldier got down to ask them if they knew the road to a local village. Although all of the soldiers had guns, and they waited for an answer for a minute or so, they were met with absolute silence. The turn-off was only about a mile down the road, and a few years ago, the soldiers would have got an immediate reply.¹⁵³ Another example was given in a letter to the African newspaper 'Moto'. 'The films that the Government is showing in our areas are causing a lot of doubt and we think they should be well edited to be more real than they seem to be. One fails to believe that what they are showing people is what is really taking place on the north-eastern border of this country. The films show the success of our army and the support the Government is getting from people, especially chiefs.'¹⁵⁴ The number of strikes which there have been in the last two or three years is also indicative of the growing self-confidence of Africans.

Recent reports from Rhodesia indicate that the guerrilla struggle is spreading rapidly. Although they have not been reported in the press, the ZANU guerrillas are all over the Lomagundi district, as well as down the eastern border to Umtali. Guerrillas are beginning to operate in Bulawayo

and quantities of arms have been found in Salisbury. Just before the elections at the end of July 1974, a grenade was thrown into a European night club, injuring a number of people in it. It seems that the security forces have not been able to contain the fighting purely in the north east.

According to Herbert Chitepo, writing in November 1973, 'The strategical aim . . . is to attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over the entire country. The subsequent mobilization of a large number of civilians from industry, business and agriculture would cause serious economic problems. This would have a psychologically devastating effect on the morale of the whites, most of whom had come to Zimbabwe, lured by the prospect of the easy, privileged life promised by the regime.'¹⁵⁵ This aim appears to be on the way to fulfilment.

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7 The Future

At the beginning of December 1974, it was announced that the Rhodesian regime had allowed the detained leaders of ZAPU and ZANU, and the leaders of the African National Council to go to Zambia to have talks with the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana. These talks were the result of a whole series of moves which appear to have been planned by Mr Vorster of South Africa, and President Kaunda of Zambia, and the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU in Lusaka were not involved until after the first meeting.

In Kaunda's eyes, these meetings had two objects: Firstly to get the nationalists to talk to the Rhodesian regime; secondly to get them to present a united front.

In an attempt to achieve the first object, the nationalist leaders agreed to a constitutional conference with the Rhodesian regime. According to a communique signed by all four leaders, they agreed to a ceasefire which was to start after the date of the constitutional conference had been settled with the regime. Subsequently, the African National Council stated that an informal cease-fire had also been agreed for immediate implementation. On their side the regime promised to release all political leaders and their supporters. Again according to the African National Council, the regime also promised to release those imprisoned for political offences, to revoke the banning of ZAPU and ZANU, and to lift the state of emergency.¹

The regime did not immediately keep their side of the bargain, and by the second week in January, had released less than 100 out of nearly 400 detainees. No political prisoners had been freed, and neither the State of Emer-

gency nor the banning of the parties had been lifted. On the nationalist side, the cease-fire was patchy. Apparently Zanu sent runners to their fighters as well as broadcasting messages over the radio to tell them to stop fighting. However they were also told to keep their weapons, not to surrender, and not to move back to the border. Although there have been a number of clashes, and by mid January at least seven South African members of the security forces had been killed, according to both Rhodesian and South African sources, the general level of activity had greatly declined. The regime interpreted this informal cease-fire as virtually total surrender, and showered the area with leaflets calling on guerrillas to surrender their arms and themselves to the security forces, or go back to the border. Although it seems that these leaflets have been mostly ignored, one guerrilla who did voluntarily surrender was sentenced to five years imprisonment for an earlier attack he took part in in the north eastern area.²

The first step towards the second objective, the unity of the Zimbabwe nationalists, was the signing of the 'Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity'. This had the signatures of Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU), Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), Abel Muzorewa (ANC) and James Chikerema (Frolizi). In it, the four parties recognized the African National Council 'as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe'. The ANC executive was enlarged to include representatives of ZAPU, ZANU, and Frolizi. It had two major functions: to prepare for 'any Conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might be called', and to prepare a Congress at which the 'leadership of the united people of Zimbabwe shall be elected'. However it did not immediately dissolve the 'organs and structures' of ZAPU, ZANU and Frolizi, but called on them to merge into the ANC. It ended by recognizing 'the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe'.

Pressures from many sides have brought about these recent attempts to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia. The attitude of the leaders of those African states who took part in the Lusaka talks is expressed in the 1969 'Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa'. In this, they stated: 'If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors'. Thus the willingness to talk has long been present. It is now being reinforced by the present economic problems facing all developing countries. As a result of the border closure by the Rhodesians, Zambia's southern routes are cut off. While the changed situation in Mozambique and Angola has now made these routes to the coast safe, and the TanZam railway is built, the routes through Rhodesia, as well as a peaceful border, would help Zambia's economic problems greatly.

The reason why talks have not taken place before, and why armed struggle has been necessary, has been the intransigence of the Rhodesian regime. The real question, therefore, is what made the Rhodesian regime prepared to send its two biggest internal enemies to talk to its two biggest external enemies. The answer is given by the success of the guerrillas within Rhodesia. By undermining the position of the regime, the nationalists have made it heavily dependent on South Africa for military support. Mr Vorster expressed South Africa's concern about the success of the nationalist guerrillas very bluntly when commenting on the temporary breakdown in the Lusaka talks: 'The alternative is too ghastly to contemplate.'³

The alternative that Mr Vorster saw was a Rhodesia which had become an indefensible outpost instead of a buffer zone. In other words, the defensible frontline of white supremacy has now moved south from the Zambezi to the Limpopo. When Mozambique becomes independent in the middle of 1975, it will not look favourably on the Rhodesian regime. Frelimo has a military alliance with ZANU. Its people in the Tete Province have suffered grievously at the hands of the Rhodesian security forces. It seems clear that it will support economic sanctions as well as opening the rest of its borders to guerrilla infiltration. For Rhodesia to survive, it will require massive South African help to deal with the military problems of an expanding ZANU offensive, and the economic problems of the loss of its routes through Mozambique to Malawi, and to the ports of Beira and Laurencio Marques. Although South Africa already has congested ports, it would probably have continued to support Rhodesia economically if the security situation were under control. However it is not prepared to pour money and men into a Rhodesia which has manifestly lost the military, and as a consequence, the political initiative. The success of the guerrillas has attracted international, and particularly African, support. Any moves by South Africa to improve her international position would be seriously hindered by her support of an ailing white Rhodesia.

South Africa has therefore put pressure on the Rhodesian regime. In a number of statements, South African leaders have made it clear that Rhodesia is no longer of great strategic importance to her. For example, at the end of October the South African UN mission announced that 'the intention is to reduce the number of policemen serving on the borders in future'.⁴ Speaking at the beginning of November 1974, Mr Vorster stated that the South African police would remain in Rhodesia 'as long as there (was) a threat to the Republic'.⁵ In welcoming Smith's announce-

ment of the constitutional talks and a cease-fire, Mr Vorster said: 'As soon as it is confirmed and it is clear that terrorism has ended, South Africa will withdraw her police from Rhodesia because then the necessity for their presence will have fallen away.'⁶ When a fortnight later, the South Africans announced the loss of five police on Christmas Eve in an ambush in Rhodesia, a senior officer of the counter-insurgency division of the South African police tried to minimize the significance of the incident during the supposed ceasefire period. He said that it should not be regarded as 'a rejection of the ceasefire by all terrorist groups'.⁷ In January, the *Transvaaler*, the official paper of the Transvaal section of the ruling Nationalist Party, published the statement of an unnamed 'informed source' as saying 'Ian Smith must realize now . . . blacks are going to rule . . . or violence will break out'.⁸ This public pressure on Rhodesia must reflect even more intense pressure behind the scenes. Only the prospect of the loss of South African support has made the Rhodesian regime talk to the African nationalist leaders.

What is the future? By recognizing that the 'forgotten men', the detainees, are the legitimate leaders of the African people, the regime has taken another irreversible step towards its own political demise. The release of the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU has been a fundamental step, and completely undermines what the security forces have been fighting for. Although the regime says that it will only allow Africans into the government if they are prepared to play a 'responsible part',⁹ any real settlement must be on the basis of a very rapid move to majority rule. This prize is within the grasp of the Africans. The African supporters of the regime (including the RAR) will have little enthusiasm for fighting an obviously losing battle. The Europeans in the security forces, especially the national servicemen, and the members of the Territorial Force, will also have little incentive. White immigration will decline further, and

emigration increase. The longer the white leaders try to avoid real negotiations with the nationalists, the weaker their position will be.

On the other side, the morale of the Africans has been raised even further. They are determined to accept nothing less than majority rule in the very near future. African distrust of the regime is as deep, if not deeper, than it has ever been. The main hope the regime has is to divide the Africans. ZAPU and ZANU have kept their identity so far, and continue to broadcast separately from Zambia. ZANU, in particular, is very dubious about the value of sinking its structural organization, particularly its military wing, into an African National Council which it does not control or really trust. However the nationalist leaders in Rhodesia are unlikely to fall into the trap of 1963-64 again, when their followers were allowed to fight it out in the African townships. The regime has also tried to disrupt the ZANU offensive by the interpretation of the ceasefire described above. This has not succeeded, and the guerrillas are in a position to quickly escalate their activities if the present detente falls through.

A fundamental problem of the Rhodesian conflict has been the mechanism for the handover of power. It has been clear for many years that Rhodesia is an African country, and the dictatorship by the small minority of Europeans could not last for ever. In countries like Kenya, the British Government provided the means for handing over power from the Europeans to the Africans. In Rhodesia, Britain has refused to do this. South Africa, by sending its 'police' into Rhodesia, has taken Britain's place, and is the quasi-colonial power. It is now trying to get out of this role. If it does not succeed in doing so (and one way to success might be to engineer a change of white government in Rhodesia which would then negotiate) South Africa will have to decide what level of support it will continue to give Rhodesia. It does not want to be involved on the losing side

in the armed conflict in Rhodesia.

In commenting on the Lusaka talks, the *Zimbabwe Review* (the old ZAPU journal, but for this issue seeking to talk for the 'people of Zimbabwe') stated that 'the proposed Constitutional Conference is a talking point and not a power point. Zimbabweans must keep that in mind and be clear, therefore, that the liberation struggle is still on'.¹⁰ The editorial of the November issue of *Zimbabwe News* (written by ZANU just before the results of the talks were announced, but issued at the end of December) made ZANU's revolutionary position very clear: 'ZANU seeks the complete transformation (not merely reform) of the capitalist society through a violent revolution. It means all the state machinery and apparatus—army, police, courts and jails used by the settler minority racist regime to exploit and suppress Africans must be rooted out and completely destroyed and replaced by those which serve the interests and aspirations of the masses of the people. This is a difficult task to perform through peaceful means. In fact it is virtually impossible . . . It is only—and only—a violent revolution that will lead to the realization of this objective. This road of "direct confrontation" is the one ZANU has chosen. ZANU has resolutely translated this into concrete action right from the day it was formed. Right now ZANU is engaged in a fierce struggle against the settler minority racist regime in order to bring to the masses of Zimbabwe complete and total independence and freedom.'¹¹

It is this 'ghastly alternative' that Mr Vorster is worried about. Whether the Rhodesian regime will see that all it can try to do is to pick up the crumbs before it is too late, is doubtful. What is not in doubt is that the Fight for Zimbabwe is nearing its end. The white-ruled state of Rhodesia will shortly be the African country, the African-ruled state of Zimbabwe.

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APPENDIX 1

Words from the Dock

Reports of the trials of Zimbabwe freedom fighters have often tried to make either monsters or fools out of them. However, in some cases the actual statements of the men charged, in which they expressed why they were fighting have been reported. Below are given these statements with as much relevant detail as is necessary. The excerpts are sometimes very short and are reproduced exactly as they appeared in the press. The collection is small—but is all that is available.

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Bulawayo Chronicle* 10.6.66)

Mazwi Gumbo, ZAPU member, leader of a sabotage group at Wankie Colliery.

'Workers at the colliery were dissatisfied with the company because it turned a deaf ear to our grievances. When UDI was declared, we became even more angry. We realize that only one people can rule a country. It should be the Africans.'

High Court Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 22.6.66.)

Horace Nyasika, speaking on behalf of six other ZANU members.

He said that they should be treated as prisoners of war and not criminals, as they had 'declared war on the Smith regime'. Challenging the jurisdiction of the court, the men accused the courts of having 'become part and parcel of the illegal regime.'

'We are not prepared to plead or to be tried by this court . . . we consider ourselves not criminals, but

prisoners of war who should be either shot dead or captured and detained . . .

If anything, we are prisoners of war of the illegal regime, and not criminals against the public or the state. The Smith rebel regime, having grabbed independence, violated, abrogated and trampled on the 1961 Constitution on 11 November last year. It became the duty of every loyal citizen to fight and restore the constitution . . . An act of violence to the constitution and good government had been committed and there was no way, apart from the use of force, by which such a rebellion could be put down.'

He said that they underwent military training out of 'respect for constitutional government' and 'conscious of our duty as citizens, to protect the country and its constitution' from a regime that continued 'to suppress all constitutional resistance in the country. We returned to this country for one specific purpose—to fight the rebel regime and defeat it . . . We accordingly declared war against the Smith regime and the forces that support it to bring about good government and bring the constitution back into operation . . . Although both the British Government and the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, live under the fiction that the police force, the armed forces, the courts and the public service as a whole, function under the 1961 constitution, in reality, all these institutions have become part and parcel of the illegal regime'. About the judiciary, he said: 'Although it has not been, up to this day, made to categorically say where it stands, there is no doubt that it is practically operating within the framework of the illegal regime. It is more identifiable with the rebel regime than with the Governor or the British Government. The Attorney-General's office works under the directives of the rebel Minister of Justice, and Crown counsel has appeared on several occasions for the rebel Ministers. Practically the whole machinery of the state has fallen into the rebel regime's hands.'

Within this set-up the loyal citizen finds himself perplexed and unable to rely on any institution in the country to restore the constitution . . . It was for this reason that we brought arms into the country. Since we are now fully convinced that the institutions in this country—the police, the armed forces and the Public Services—are operating in some form or another in the furtherance of the illegal regime, we see no reason why we should be subjected to a trial for what we consider to be a legitimate cause’.

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6.7.67)

Leader of a guerrilla band, speaking on behalf of his comrades:

‘Our hearts were sore, and you know what causes African hearts to be sore. We want freedom and we are going to get freedom by fighting of this man who is refusing us freedom, fights us.’

Asked who the man was who refused freedom, he replied ‘The Government’.

‘This present Government takes part of its children and locks them behind a door while the others are feeding.’ He said his band intended only to fight ‘white men who are anti-African’, and intended to use their weapons only in self-defence.

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6.7.67)

One accused said they were not worthy to be called ‘freedom fighters’ . . . I was surprised to see that African villagers supported the present Government and its operations to exterminate guerrilla warfare. I am not going to regret anything because we are letting each other down and this will take us a long time to liberate this country’.

Another accused said: ‘I was carrying weapons to come and fight the whites, the war that was left by our forefathers’.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 6.3.68, 8.3.68)

A judge in the High Court was asked by a guerrilla on trial, from where the Court derived its power to try him and

whether he, as someone who belonged to Rhodesia and who had come here to ‘free it’, would be regarded by the Court as a ‘freedom fighter’ or merely as an offender. The judge told the man that he was being tried under the Act and, if found guilty, would be regarded as an offender. The judge added that the question on the Court’s authority to try the accused was irrelevant. ‘The Court is, in fact, trying him and has the power to try him’, he said. The judge was then asked by the man whether he was aware that Rhodesia was part of Africa and a country which ‘as a whole belongs to black people’. The judge replied that the question was irrelevant.

On the final day of the trial, seven of the accused, who had refused to be represented by counsel, made unsworn statements in which they admitted bringing arms into Rhodesia. They said they intended to use them.

One man told the judge that he did not think his case was a serious case. ‘This was not a unique happening in Rhodesia, it was not the first of its kind. Every country in the world knows full well that people in Rhodesia are fighting for their freedom.’ They had come here, not to destroy the country as such, but to fight for the freedom of a country which belonged to black people.

The juvenile accused, said he had not been forced to bring arms here. Had he not been arrested quickly, he would have destroyed many things to get ‘freedom quickly’.

Admitting he had brought arms with intent to kill, another man said there was nothing wrong about it ‘because, if a person wants his country, he should not fear to die for it’.

Another of the accused said that he wanted to kill ‘all white people’. He claimed that he could not sit with folded arms while ‘four million people were suffering. You snatched away our country unlawfully . . . We are going to fulfil the aims of the war we abandoned in 1897’.

Another said that the ‘fight’ had begun with words,

followed by stone-throwing, then guns, and before long, aeroplanes would be used.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 8.3.68)

Eight guerrillas.

One man said the intention was to kill all Europeans, not simply selected groups. Asked if this included women and children, he replied: 'A war is a war. You cannot select women and leave them out of it. Even if I were to see a child at a vantage point, I would kill it there'. European adults were once children. If he were released, he would continue with his avowed task. He knew when he came into the country, that if he encountered soldiers, they would kill him on the spot. 'A person dies once, I will die speaking the truth—that is, that this country belongs to black men and white men only came here afterwards.'

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 13.3.68, 14.3.68)

ZANU men.

One man told the judge that it would be a 'wise move to stop the legal proceedings at this stage' as he believed he had committed no offence by entering Rhodesia with arms. He did not want to be tried by a court under the control of the present government. 'I do not know how it becomes possible that if I fight with a man, that man conducts my trial.'

The first accused told the Court he had found oppression in Rhodesia. 'When we come to politics, if a black man tries to have a say in political matters, he finds himself in great trouble. We must fight to have a say in the Government; it is only a beginning; we will still fight.'

On the final day of the trial, before the death sentence was passed, one of the accused said he had come to fight Mr Smith and his laws. 'To hell with him', he said.

Another said that the 'bloodshed' would stop only when a black man sat on the throne of judgement in Rhodesia.

The fourth accused said he did not approve of the trial and wished to be tried in London.

Magistrate's Court, Bulawayo. (*Bulawayo Chronicle* 10.5.68, *Rhodesia Herald* 10.5.68)

Three ZANU members.

The youngest, (19) said they came to Rhodesia to fight. 'I was hurt in my feelings to see my relations being killed with firearms and some of them being arrested when they wanted their country. I say we will fight until we are all finished. Finishing Africans will not help anybody. Africa will remain in the hands of Africans. Zimbabwe belongs to Africans.' The man said he agreed with his leader, (Ndabaningi Sithole) that Africans should take up spears, axes and any weapons and destroy the enemy—white people. Replying to the senior public prosecutor, the man said he went to Zambia in 1961, aged twelve. He had not seen any of his relatives being killed with firearms or being arrested. He said he and the others crossed into Rhodesia as an armed band and were aware that they would perhaps be killed or arrested. He had come into Rhodesia to fight to free his father, brothers and other relatives. He said in reply to further questions: 'I was not taught political science but how to use a gun. I came back to make war, to kill white people in Zimbabwe. I would also kill those Africans who joined Europeans and come to us armed.'

Another man said in answer to a question: 'We entered Rhodesia from Zambia in an armed band of eleven to make war. We were not forced to enter the country. Our intention was to fight the minority Government in order to achieve majority rule based on one man one vote'.

Magistrate's Court, Bulawayo. (*Bulawayo Chronicle* 9.6.68)

A twenty-seven year old African. He told the magistrate he underwent military training outside Rhodesia in order to remove the Rhodesian regime, by force if there was to be a war. The man said he had welcomed the opportunity to

leave Rhodesia for military training because 'I was being troubled and tortured by the police'. Before leaving Rhodesia to undergo military training he was tortured by the police when a school building in his area was burned down. He was tortured again in Bulawayo when he was picked up at the Western Commonage Magistrate's Court where an African nationalist leader was standing on trial. He said, when the police took him to a house where he was living, they found old copies of a petition which had been sent to the Queen. He was taken to the Central police station and police then took him along the Khami Road and tortured him in the bush. Replying to the prosecutor, the man said he was trained in the use of firearms, explosives, radio communications and how to ambush the enemy. He had also been trained in how to follow a map when in the bush, and how to defend himself with his hands. While being trained, he used bazookas, grenades, automatic pistols and machine-guns. When he crossed into Rhodesia, he was with four others. They crossed in a canoe to Rhodesia three years ago and were not armed. Asked if it was his aim to overthrow the Government by sabotage, he said: 'In the army everyone is taught to obey his leader. If my leader gave me instructions, I was obliged to obey'. The man told the magistrate that he and his colleagues underwent military training to further the political objects of a banned African nationalist organization. 'What we were interested in was to get the country.' He still thought the Rhodesian Government was a bad one and should not remain in office. During the three years he had been back, he had not taken any steps to overthrow the Government. The reason was that he was without a leader and had received no more instructions since his leader disappeared.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Guardian* 10.8.68, *Rhodesia Herald* 10.8.68)

From the *Guardian*.

Thirty-two African guerrillas, 28, members of ZAPU and

4, members of South Africa's African National Congress, burst into song in the Salisbury High Court, after being sentenced to death for bringing 'weapons of war' into Rhodesia.

As soon as the judge had left the court, the men sang freedom songs and chanted nationalist slogans. They were still singing loudly as they shuffled, barefooted and handcuffed in pairs, down the steps to the cells.

Many of them addressed the court before sentences were passed. Some were defiant, some made political speeches, but all appeared to be unafraid. 'As we stand here, the people are fighting so that everyone can enjoy life in Rhodesia' one said. 'Harsh sentences and the hanging of our people will not cower us. It will only make us bitter. Whatever happens to me, we shall continue to fight.'

Another said with a smile: 'I welcome the death sentence, I am prepared to sacrifice my life for Zimbabwe . . . My spirit will continue to fight with the Zimbabwe people'.

One guerrilla told the judge bitterly: 'You don't want to listen to the African. You don't want to listen to the Privy Council. Who are you going to listen to . . . When you go to heaven, you will find us there and we will continue asking you these same questions'.

Another man told the judge that he would be committing murder if he sentenced them to death. 'The judge is going to stand trial in future for assisting the illegal regime in trying us' he said.

The accused sat in court with numbers round their necks. Number fifteen said simply that he was sorry that he had not accomplished what he had set out to do. Another said it was 'Smith and his terrorist government who should have been on trial'.

One accused the court of trying to exterminate the black man. 'It's exactly like your brother Hitler said, that the black man shall not be left in this world, except his statue.'

Number seventeen started his speech: 'I am so pleased

that on Friday 9 August 1968, I am going to be told by an illegal regime that I am going to be sentenced to death. I am not afraid of death. My name will be respected in History'. He asked for permission to call a press conference before he died.

From the Rhodesia Herald.

One said his intention, when he was captured, was to free some of the people of this country.

Some of the accused referred to a 'Fascist regime' in Rhodesia and pleaded for a 'government of the people, by the people'. Some said they were not racialists and welcomed white men into their future Government.

One said he could not be said to have entered his own country illegally; he was going to die in a just cause.

Another said that as a soldier he should be dealt with as a prisoner of war.

Several said the Government here was an illegal one and had no right to govern.

One said he was not a criminal but a freedom fighter.

One said the judge 'would like to agree with the Government so he can get food and remain in employment'.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 16.8.68)

Sly Masuka (ZAPU) told the court: 'I have nothing against a white man or the Security Forces of this country. The fight was simply directed against the law, the law which oppresses other people in this country, the law that is discriminatory'.

Salisbury Magistrate's Court. (*Rhodesia Herald* 21.8.68)

In a statement read in court, one of the men, who said he joined the 'arms struggle' in 1964, said he had not been forced by anybody to come to Rhodesia. He wanted to teach the African people about arms because 'speaking politically, we have failed . . . What should be clear is we do not just go killing people—we fight the man who fights us, not an unarmed man. We do not hurt Europeans here in Zimbabwe. They are our brothers and we want to sit side by

side with them. My coming here was not to terrorize anybody'.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 23.8.68)

The judge had earlier stopped one of the prisoners from making in court 'an extremely insulting political manifesto' which, he said, had nothing to do with a mitigation plea. Mr Justice Lewis said the attitude of the accused had made it necessary to say certain things 'which would not ordinarily be said'.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 7.11.68)

One accused said he disagreed with the law under which he was standing trial. He alleged there was one law for the Europeans and one for the Africans.

Another objected to the use of the word 'terrorist'.

Another added: 'If this form of oppression does not cease, terrorism will not cease'.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 9.11.68)

Six ZAPU men.

The fourth accused made a statement from the dock. In his speech, he referred to a previous trial of thirty-two Africans who had been charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and, as a result of that trial he claimed 'the Rhodesian judges had been forced to declare their position as regards the rebellion here . . . As loyal citizens of Her Majesty the Queen we cannot, and do refuse to be tried by officers of the illegal regime'. He stated that there was "no paragraph in law" which validates your claim to try us'. They would, however, 'remain prepared to state their case to lawful authority'. He went on: 'You were forewarned of the consequences of UDI'. Their great leader, Joshua Mngqabuko Nkomo, had said that UDI was 'suicide'. 'Britain warned you and so did the United Nations.' He said it was 'a very amusing thing' to suggest that they (the accused) were endangering law and order. He ended by raising his arm in salute.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 14.11.68)

One accused, from the dock, said they did not like the present Government in Rhodesia. That was the reason they entered Rhodesia carrying arms.

Another said: 'Your Government takes joy when a black man suffers'.

Other accused said they endorsed the remarks of their co-accused.

The sixth accused spoke for several minutes from a prepared statement. He asked a number of questions: 'Why did the Government not publish their names? Why was the place where they were arrested not published? Why did the Government restrict the people it suspected if it had majority support? He said that newspaper reporters were warned not to publish their names, party etc. 'Why does the Government do this?' They were British subjects, and as such, were loyal to the Queen and recognized the Governor as the legal representative of Britain in Rhodesia, which was a colony of Britain. 'The illegal Smith Government claims the support of the majority of the people of Rhodesia and claims that there is freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of movement.'

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Rhodesia Herald* 23.11.68)

One of the accused said that Africans were suppressed by white people and he could not keep as many cattle as he liked or plough as much land as he liked. He said he had a purpose to carry arms and would have 'fought my own father'.

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Times of Zambia* 28.11.68)

Eight ZANU members.

One said the black man had tried various peaceful ways of reaching an understanding with the whites in Rhodesia. He said he was surprised to face an arms charge because the Rhodesian regime should have been aware that armed struggle would have been the last resort to end white rule.

Another man said Africans had been frustrated by UDI

and a stand by Smith that he would not see majority rule in his lifetime. This had brought him to a position of no choice but to die for his fatherland. 'The African people of this country know that I am fighting for the truth, and the whites living outside Rhodesia know that I am fighting for my rights. Some whites in this country sympathize with me but they are afraid to go against their brothers. Because we are not accepted as sons of Zimbabwe, we are being insulted by being called terrorists. If this word means a wild person who kills other people, what is the white man to be called, since he came into this country armed and killing people, and he is still doing so? While I am fighting for the truth, the white man is fighting for the wealth of Zimbabwe. We did not ask God or Britain to have this country.'

Another man said peace might come to Rhodesia if the whites killed all the blacks or if they painted all the blacks white. Some whites claimed that Rhodesia was their land because they were born there, but that did not entitle them to suppress the black man. A child born in hospital could not be expected to claim ownership of that hospital.

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Times of Zambia* 30.11.68)

Five ZANU members.

A nineteen year old guerrilla said that if the Smith regime wanted an African burnt to death in return for majority rule, he would offer himself. He said he had come 'to fight the people who are suppressing us. The war will not end until the African is free'. White men did not seem to understand the meaning of revolution but black men knew it meant a war leading to freedom. He said that ZANU had been directed by its President, Rev Sithole, to take up spears, axes and arrows to fight the enemy. The men thanked the United States and all other countries in Europe, Asia and Africa who had championed the cause of majority rule in Rhodesia. He asked 'God to bless Rev Sithole, the restrictees, and those who died fighting in the Zambezi valley'.

Another man said ZANU had decided to wage a revolution because whites wanted to rule forever, on the excuse that black rule would cause another Congo or Nigeria and that Rhodesia would become a breeding ground for Communists. 'We don't care what Communists do in their own countries. We want the owners of the country to rule themselves.'

A third man said bloodshed would only end when restricted and detained men were released and a general election held on the basis of one man, one vote. 'To achieve national and economic independence, ZANU must use the barrel of a gun. We are not fighting for money like mercenaries and traitors, but for the liberation of our motherland. I came to fight to free four million Africans from exploitation of man by man.'

High Court, Bulawayo. (*Times of Zambia* 2.10.69)

ZAPU man convicted of sabotage.

He said that ZAPU wanted to sit down with the whites and solve Rhodesia's political crisis. 'If we fail to get our country peacefully, we will appeal to the world to stop business with Rhodesia, and our people to strike and paralyse industry. We are prepared to die for our country . . . I will continue to fight. I ask for no mercy. I would be happy to be sentenced to death.'

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 26.5.70)

Arguing that a confession had been got out of him by force, a ZAPU guerrilla said: 'What I know, my Lord, is that members of the police force are employees of the Government. What I have been doing is to fight against the Government. Therefore I was doing something the police force disliked. Hence their false stories in court. And I know that the court is an institution which belongs to the Government that I am fighting against, so it will not surprise me if the court disbelieves me as well'. (It did.)

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 4.4.70)

Group of nationalists.

One man said they had come to liberate their relatives. Another man said the law under which they were charged was a recent law.

Another man said: 'We have fought the battle in this country and we have not gone to Britain to fight them in the country where they came from. We Africans do not have the privilege to criticize the Government'.

Another said: 'We are called against our will by the name of terrorists. Our purpose was to recruit, not to terrorize anybody'.

Another said: 'We have long wished for majority rule. It has always been our intention that the government should be negotiated with.'

Another said: 'This is the last forum I have to air my views . . . The Rhodesian Government is just an agent of the British Government. I don't recognize the Government here'.

Another said: 'I don't understand why we have been arrested for bringing arms into the country. I have seen guns in this country from time immemorial'.

Another said: 'Even if they (the Europeans) employ these laws which are like Hitler's laws, I maintain they will never defeat us. The African of today is not like the African of yesterday but is a clever person'.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 26.5.70)

Group of nationalists.

One man said: 'I did enter this country with weapons with the intention of fighting the Government. The Government in this country has established laws which oppress the African'. Prosecution asked: 'May we take it you are proud to be what you call a freedom fighter, and you are not sorry for what you have done?' The man answered: 'I am sorry, however, because I was unable to accomplish my mission'.

Another said: 'I did these things because the African is

unable to move either forward or backward. He is more or less stationary'.

Another said: 'The Government has failed to satisfy the Africans . . . (and) the laws which have been enacted by this Government have so oppressed the African that he is unable to have any say in anything'. Had it been elected by all the people and which all the people liked, he would never have entered the country with arms.

High Court, Salisbury. (*Rhodesia Herald* 26.10.71)

Edison Machona Paradza, ZANU, of Gwelo.

After conviction for going to Zambia for guerrilla training he said: 'Although things look grim at the moment, we will not despair . . .'

APPENDIX 2

The Geographical and Demographical Background

Rhodesia is a landlocked country with a high plateau running through the middle, approximately from the south west to the north east. From the map, it can be seen that the vegetation is mainly tree or bush savanna (i.e. grassland with a fair number of trees or bushes), with a substantial amount of forest and woodland. In the north, there are a number of thickets along the Zambezi Escarpment, some of which stretches to the border. Although this vegetation will give cover to both security forces and the guerrillas, it is particularly helpful to the guerrillas. Their main form of attack is by ambush, and they also need to be able to move undetected by the regime's spotter planes.

Rhodesia's borders with the five neighbouring countries are described in the table overleaf.

These borders are particularly significant because of the land along their length. From the map, it can be seen that most of this land is either designated for use by Africans, or else set aside for wild life and game parks.

According to the 1969 census, the African Tribal Trust and Purchase lands have a population of over three million, of which only 2,200 are European. There are thus 1,450 Africans for every European. The wildlife, game and national parks have a far smaller population, with a density less than 1/20th of that of the African areas, and there are forty-five Africans for every European. An incursion from outside must therefore either pass through an African area, or an almost unoccupied area before it comes to the


<i>Border</i>	<i>Bordering country</i>	<i>Length (miles)</i>	<i>Special features</i>
northern	Zambia	445	runs along Zambezi for whole length
western	point contact with South West Africa (Caprivi Strip)	0	
western	Botswana	490	southern most part follows Shashe river
southern	South Africa	135	runs along Limpopo
eastern and part of northern	Mozambique	725	northern section is in Zambezi Valley, middle section (around Umtali) runs along top of mountain range

European areas in the centre of Rhodesia. This is greatly to the guerrillas' advantage. Even in the European rural areas, there are just over one million Africans—a ratio of twenty-four Africans for every European. Most Europeans live in the towns and cities. Even there they are outnumbered—in 1969 by 3.7 Africans for every European. The lines of communications, radiating principally from the two centres of Salisbury and Bulawayo, are an important factor in the economic and strategic domination of the country by whites. However the communications along the borders are very poor, and European control over this vital area has until recently been neglected. No statistics are available to indicate whether the number of Europeans in the African areas has significantly increased since 1969.

The Rhodesian climate will also have an effect on the guerrilla fight. The rainy season runs from about November until february, March, or April. As the rains can


be very heavy, this restricts all movement, but particularly of vehicles along unmade roads. This period would therefore be expected to favour guerrillas who do not depend on trucks for troop movements. They also do not have to worry about water. The cold season lasts from the end of the rainy season to about mid July. In June it can get sufficiently cold that frost occurs at night. From then till the beginning of the rains, it gets hotter and hotter. In practice, incursions have taken place at all times of the year, and not only during the rains.

Rhodesia is wide open to a guerrilla struggle of the type that has been successfully concluded in the neighbouring country of Mozambique. In particular it has large areas with little day to day European control, but with large African populations.



194

Land distribution and African population in Southern Rhodesia



195

Physical geography and vegetation of Southern Rhodesia

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Council (of Zimbabwe)
ANC	African National Congress (of South Africa).
BSA police	British South Africa police (Rhodesian police).
DC	District Commissioner.
DO	District Officer.
Frelimo	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
Frolizi	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.
OAU	Organization of African Unity.
PIDE	Portuguese secret police.
RAR	Rhodesian African Rifles.
RF	Rhodesia Front.
RLI	Rhodesian Light Infantry.
SAS	Special Air Squadron (paratroopers).
TTL	Tribal Trust Land.
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence (11 November 1965).
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union.
ZPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army.
\$	Rhodesian dollars (£1.00 = \$1.4)

THE FIGHT FOR ZIMBABWE

When Ian Smith announced that he had freed the leaders of the two outlawed Rhodesian Nationalist parties, and was prepared to negotiate with them, the reaction of most people was one of amazement. One of the factors which forced him to take this uncharacteristic action was the highly successful guerrilla war along the Rhodesian northern border.

This book traces the armed conflict from the first clashes in 1966. It describes the evolving strategies of the two outlawed parties, and the problems which faced them when their initial tactics failed, and deals also with the Rhodesian security forces and the military aid which has come from South Africa. It explains the background to the major battle which is being waged in the north of Rhodesia as the present time and shows that the earlier battles were not the totally un-coordinated mess which official Rhodesian propaganda suggests that they were, and it makes clear that the success in the present fighting is based on the lessons learnt from the earlier failure.

Much that has been written on this subject is based upon gossip, rumour and speculation. This book is based primarily upon Rhodesian sources, including the reports of the trials of captured guerrillas. Nationalist reports are also used to amplify this material. As a result, this book is probably the most detailed and well-documented description of the fighting which has so far appeared.

This is an expanded and updated version of the author's study published in cyclostyled form in 1973.

UK price 95p